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1 Introduction 
1.1 Object and Purpose 
The aim of this thesis is to address the extent and particulars of the regulation of procedural 
transparency
1
 in treaty-based investor-state dispute settlement. I will investigate the devel-
opment that has taken place in states’ approach to treaty design and in the relevant arbitral 
regimes with regard to the transparency of investor-state dispute settlement. To what extent 
are “transparency and accountability … beginning to outweigh privacy and confidentiality 
in importance” in investment arbitration?2 In order to answer this and related questions, it is 
essential to analyse decisions of arbitral tribunals pertaining to procedural transparency, as 
these provide interpretations of the procedural rules relevant to transparency, as well as 
illustrating the degree of interplay between treaties, applicable procedural rules and the 
powers of arbitral tribunals to determine issues of procedure, including issues pertaining to 
transparency and confidentiality. I will attempt to present a hopefully representative over-
view of the extent and characteristics of transparency regulation in investment treaties, the 
approach of arbitral tribunals when exercising procedural discretion on the most central 
issues, as well as point to possible future developments with regard to treaty design and 
tribunal attitudes to transparency in arbitration proceedings. 
 
Underlying the debate on transparency in investment arbitration is the question of whether 
investment disputes, as disputes between private investors and sovereign states, are deserv-
ing of more transparent proceedings than what has been the practice in traditionally private 
                                                 
 
1
 As opposed to regulatory transparency, which focuses on the transparency of national regulatory and ad-
ministrative systems. Regulatory transparency has also received considerable attention in investment law 
debate and practice, often in connection with the interpretation of treaty standards providing “fair and equita-
ble treatment”. See, e.g. Kotera (2008) pp. 617–636. Regulatory transparency is quite distinct from procedural 
transparency and considerations on the issue lay outside the scope of this thesis. When I refer to “transparen-
cy” in the following, this must be taken as a reference to procedural transparency. 
2
 McLachlan, Shore and Weiniger (2007) p. 57.  
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commercial arbitration, on which the investment arbitration system is modelled.
3
 Generally 
speaking, claims submitted to investment arbitration are based on an alleged breach of the 
rights vested in an investor by an investment treaty, while claims subject to conventional 
commercial arbitration, usually between private parties, are based on breach of contract.
4
 
The former category of disputes involves a tension between treaty standards of protection 
and the regulatory powers of sovereign states under municipal law.
5
 This tension is re-
solved by investment tribunals, by the “review of sovereign acts through the lens of inter-
national law, [which] often raises issues of public interest.”6 Furthermore, the subject mat-
ter of individual disputes commonly involves matters concerning public interests. In addi-
tion, should a state lose a dispute, it will potentially have to pay considerable damages to 
the aggrieved investor, which raises the issue of state finances and expenditures.
7
 These are 
all concerns which have been furthered in favour of increasing the transparency of invest-
ment arbitration.
8
 In the words of one scholar: “[A] system that curtails democratic princi-
ples – by, for example, removing issues that directly affect citizens to a system that is inac-
cessible and structurally isolated from public input – creates a democratic deficit.”9 In-
creased transparency has the potential to decrease this deficit. 
 
Before continuing, a few remarks should be made with regard to the placement of the issue 
of transparency in the greater context of the debate on the legitimacy of the investment ar-
bitration system as such. As arbitration under investment disputes became far more fre-
                                                 
 
3
 Mistelis (2005) pp. 205–206; Teitelbaum (2010) p. 54. 
4
 Sornarajah (2010) p. 307. For an extensive work on the settlement of contract based investor-state disputes 
through the parallel processes of treaty and commercial arbitration, see Alvik (2011). 
5
 Spears (2010) pp. 1037–1038. 
6
 Blackaby and Richard (2010) p. 254.  
7
 The largest reported award in the history of investment treaty arbitration was given in Occidental v 
Equador, in which the Claimant was awarded more than 1.7 billion USD. See Occidental v Republic of 
Equador, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/11, Award, 20 September 2012. 
8
 See e.g., Brown (2011) p. 13–14; Levine (2011) p. 205–206. 
9
 Choudhury (2008) p. 784. 
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quent in the 1990s,
10
 and the 2001 Argentinian economic crisis resulted in a number of 
highly contested investment treaty claims being brought against Argentina,
11
 the system 
came under increasing criticism. In what some have termed a backlash,
12
 the system has 
been criticized on a number of points. Some have argued that the investment arbitration 
system is biased in favour of investors and ill-suited in its current form to deal with what is 
in effect regulatory disputes involving matters of public law and interests.
13
 Others have 
pointed out the lack of consistency in decision-making, and its consequences for the pre-
dictability and legitimacy of the system.
14
 Yet others have emphasized the problem of 
“broad and open ended”15 investment treaty standards being interpreted to impose obliga-
tions and restrictions beyond the intention of treaty parties.
16
 
  
The debate concerning the place of transparency and inclusiveness in investment arbitration 
should be approached with this greater context of multifaceted legitimacy-based criticism 
in mind. Nevertheless, procedural transparency may be investigated independently. The 
issue of the legitimacy of investment law system is a much broader one, drawing on a 
plethora of topics, and increased transparency will hardly be sufficient to “save” a system 
otherwise perceived as illegitimate. Consequently, transparency is at best a necessary con-
dition for a legitimate system. But this does not hide the fact that transparency is also a 
                                                 
 
10
 Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) p. 11. 
11
 For a background on the crisis and its significance for investment law, see Brown (2011) p. 1–4, with ex-
tensive references to case law. 
12
 Waibel, et al. (2011) p. xxxvii. 
13
 See, e.g. Gus Van Harten’s concept of “the businessman’s court, cf. Van Harten (2007), pp. 152–184; 
Burke-White and von Staden (2010) pp. 689–720. Kulick (2012) views investment law as a system of global 
administrative law and argues for the greater role of public interest considerations in investment treaties and 
dispute settlement.  
14
 Franck (2005) pp. 1521–1626. 
15
 Montt (2009) p. 127. 
16
 Sornarajah (2011) p. 632. 
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thing unto itself, and may be examined as such. It has an “inherent value”17 worth address-
ing. 
 
1.2 The Concept of Transparency 
  
The concept of transparency is somewhat opaque and hard to pin down. It elicits notions of 
information flows, access and openness systems of decision-making and process, and as 
such may be aptly, though roughly, described as “the generation and dissemination of in-
formation”18 concerning a given regime. Adapting Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell’s defini-
tion of transparency in single-treaty systems
19
 to the investment arbitration context, Julie 
Maupin provides that: 
 
‘[T]ransparency means ‘the adequacy, accuracy, availability, and accessibility of 
knowledge and information about the policies and activities of [the international 
investment law regimes and its participants], and of the central organizations 
[functioning within] it on matters relevant to compliance and effectiveness, and 
about the operation of the norms rules, and procedures [underlying the regime].’20 
 
This conception of transparency provides a useful starting point, or framework, for address-
ing the practical questions and problems of procedural transparency in investment arbitra-
tion. As is often the case in international regimes, the practical impact of transparency in 
investment arbitration “remains elusive”.21 This elusiveness calls for an assessment of the 
                                                 
 
17
 Maupin (2013) p. 150. 
18
 Chayes and Chayes (1995) p. 22. 
19
 Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell (1998) p. 43. 
20
 Maupin 2013, p. 149. Maupin’s adaptations of Chayes, Chayes and Mitchell’s definition indicated in 
brackets. 
21
 Mitchell (1998) p. 111. 
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transparency of the system. The primary questions become whether and in what ways in-
vestor-state dispute settlement mechanisms provide for adequate, accurate, available and 
accessible knowledge and information about arbitral proceedings and the subject matter of 
investment disputes. In practice, these are usually framed as questions of “document trans-
parency”, i.e. questions pertaining to public availability of and access to different types of 
documents produced during proceedings, and the related question of the extent and form of 
access to information pertaining to ongoing disputes. One often sees a division into several 
categories of documents, the most central being documents containing information on the 
initiation of arbitral proceedings, pleadings and submissions of the parties, minutes and 
transcripts of hearings and the decisions, orders and awards of tribunals.
22
 
 
Furthermore, the application of the above definition may be supplemented with perspec-
tives on the related concepts of “openness”23 and “inclusiveness”.24 The former encom-
passes both issues of public access to information and issues of non-party participation,
25
 
while the latter typically refers to the status and interests of non-parties with regards to par-
taking in a dispute, by having the opportunity to attend hearings or in some way present 
their views.
26
 Some aspects of these concepts, such as physical access to arbitral hearings, 
seem to fall within the transparency definition adopted above (as access to proceedings 
would entail access to information). However, the notable and much discussed issue of 
amicus curiae participation in investment arbitration proceedings does not. Consequently, 
for the present purposes, and based on the way the discussion on procedural transparency in 
investment arbitration has been framed to include elements of third-party participation – as 
                                                 
 
22
 See, e.g., the division by the Tribunal in Abaclat and Others v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/07/5, Procedural Order No. 3, 27 January 2010 (hereinafter “Abaclat, Procedural Order 3”), paragraph 
153. 
23
 See e.g. Van Harten (2007) pp. 159–164; Rubins (2006) p. 3. 
24
 Asteriti and Tams (2010), p. 787. 
25
 Van Harten (2007), p. 159. 
26
 Asteriti and Tams (2010), 787. See also Rubins 2006, pp. 2–3. 
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demonstrated by how closely related the issues appear in much scholarly commentary
27
 and 
tribunal case law
28
 – the conception of transparency applied herein will include perspec-
tives on participation in investment arbitration, first and foremost questions pertaining to 
amicus curiae participation. 
 
However, it would go beyond the scope and size of this study to address the full range of 
issues raised in connection with amicus curiae participation, many of which have also been 
extensively discussed (sometimes even overshadowing more general transparency issues). 
Maupin makes the important observation that “the debate over the appropriate form and 
content of transparency norms within international investment law cannot be reduced to the 
parallel debate over amicus curiae participation in investor state arbitration proceedings”.29 
For the present purposes, amicus participation will be addressed primarily with regard to 
whether the issue is regulated in investment treaties, and with regard to questions pertain-
ing to the rights of amicus curiae to access procedural documents. 
 
A further delimitation should be accounted for. In the following, I will not address trans-
parency issues pertaining to non-disputing state parties, as a thorough analysis on this point 
would prove to extensive for the size and scope of this study A notable number of invest-
ment treaties contain provisions granting the non-disputing state party to the treaty access 
                                                 
 
27
See e.g. Magraw, Plagakis and Schifano (2008); Bernasconi-Osterwalder (2011); Atik (2004); VanDuzer 
(2007); Sureda (2012) p. 127. 
28
 See e.g. the seminal decision by the NAFTA Chapter 11 Tribunal in the Methanex case on its authority 
under UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules to allow for amicus curiae submissions from non-disputing parties. See 
Methanex Corporation v United States of America, Decision of the Tribunal on Petitions from Third Persons 
to Intervene as ‘Amici Curiae’, 15 January 2001 (hereinafter Methanex, Decision on Amici Curiae). See also 
the similar decision of the ICSID Tribunal in the Suez-Vivendi case. See Aguas Argentinas, S.A., Suez, So-
ciedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v The Argentine Republic, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/03/19, Order in Response to a Petition for Transparency and Participation as Amicus Curiae, 
19 May 2005 (hereinafter “Suez-Vivendi, Order on Amicus”). See section 3.5. 
29
 Maupin (2013) p. 149. 
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to information and to submit briefs on issues of interpretation of the treaty. However, issues 
pertaining to the transparency rights of non-disputing state parties are of a somewhat dif-
ferent character, and raises at least partially different questions than transparency with re-
gard to the public and non-state third parties.
30
 Provisions are aimed at the treaty states, not 
the general public, and primarily concern the relationship between the disputing parties, the 
non-disputing party and the tribunal, typically with regard to questions of interpretation 
related to material standards of protection.
31
 In this context, transparency in relation to the 
general public and other non-state stakeholders is rarely a notable concern. 
 
1.3 Actors and Interests 
The issue of transparency in investment arbitration should be approached with the interests 
of relevant actors and stakeholders in mind. The role of the public interest in investor-state 
disputes can be approached from several angles: There may be a “specific interest in the 
measure that is challenged in the case; general interest in the appropriate functioning of the 
investment protections; interest in the domestic law analogues of the treaty provision in-
voked; interest in the appropriate interaction between federal, state and local government 
authorities; and many others.”32 The specific interests can be addressed in relation to the 
potential actors and stakeholders in the system. Investment disputes raise issues of public 
interest and there is a danger of the legitimacy of investment arbitration being “put at risk if 
genuine stakeholders cannot participate in decisions affecting their rights and interests.”33 
At the very least, stakeholders may have legitimate claims with regard to transparency. 
                                                 
 
30
 See Kaufmann-Kohler (2013) pp. 307–326.  
31
 On the issue of non-disputing state party participation in the context of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (“NAFTA”) and the Central America–Dominican Republic–United States Free Trade Agreement 
(“CAFTA–DR”), see Cate (2011). 
32
 Legum (1998) p. 144. 
33
 Buckley and Blyschak (2007) p. 354. 
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There are several actors with a potential stake in investment disputes.
34
 The nature of these 
actors and their interests will be addressed in this section. 
 
The disputing parties have a clear interest in the level of transparency of the proceedings. 
Whether or not they would favour transparent proceedings or would prefer to keep all or 
parts of the proceedings confidential depends on the circumstances of the case in question, 
and is not necessarily determined by whether the party is an investor or a state. An investor 
will always have a strong and legitimate interest in protecting business-related and other 
sensitive information from being disclosed. In order to properly protect such informations, 
even fully transparent arbitral proceedings will provide mechanisms for the non-disclosure 
or redaction of confidential information, but the argument could be made that blanket con-
fidentiality upon the proceedings will ease the logistics of safeguarding this information. 
Moreover, an investor would be likely to insist on confidentiality when there is fear of 
damage to the public image of the investor or the investment. Both parties to a dispute 
would likely be interested in avoiding negative publicity in general, and if public light on 
the details of the case and the proceedings is expected to lead to critical attention, the par-
ties will probably choose to keep the details of the proceedings as confidential as possible. 
The parties may also fear that public discussion will lead to an escalation of the dispute, 
deteriorate the relationship between the parties or generally complicate the resolution of the 
case before the tribunal. Such fear is likely to lead to less transparent proceedings, at least 
to the extent that the parties share the anxiety.  
 
Expressing the guiding principle of party autonomy in arbitration,
35
 all the arbitration 
frameworks subject to this study provide the parties with the authority to determine issues 
                                                 
 
34
 On the investment law regime as on the one hand comprising a collection of political stakeholders and on 
the other constituting a “particularized epistemic community”, see Maupin 2013, p. 146. These two categories 
sometimes overlap. 
35
 Redfern and Hunter (2009) p. 365, para 6.08. 
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of procedure, including transparency issues, by agreement.
36
 Consequently, where the in-
terests of both parties are best served by confidentiality, this is likely to reduce the level of 
transparency to the minimum under the applicable regime, as the parties will agree on con-
fidentiality in accordance with their common interests. However, as we shall see, the par-
ties will not be able to derogate from mandatory transparency provisions in the treaty 
providing the basis for the arbitration. 
 
Where the parties’ interests with regard to transparency do not overlap, there will normally 
be no basis for an agreement on the issue, and the question will have to be decided by the 
tribunal on the basis of its powers to determine the procedure and conduct of the arbitra-
tion.
37
  
 
An array of possible interests may provide the basis for a party’s position in favour of 
transparency, and a comprehensive discussion at this point would go too far. For instance, 
investors may have a strong interest, as well as related statutory or contractual obligations, 
in providing shareholders with accurate information concerning its activities, including 
pending legal disputes. Furthermore, depending on the circumstances, it is not out of the 
question that claimants may wish to direct wider public attention, including that of the pub-
lic in the host state, to the proceedings. This is perhaps most likely in cases involving cor-
                                                 
 
36
 See e.g. ICSID Convention, Article 44 and Arbitration Rule 20 (2); ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration 
Rules, Articles 28 (2); UNICTRAL Arbitration Rules (both the 1976 and 2010 versions of the rules), Article 
1 (1); Rules of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC Arbitration Rules”), Articles 19 
and 22 (2); Rules of Arbitration of the London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA Arbitration Rules”), 
Article 14 (1); Rules of Arbitration of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC Arbitration Rules”), 
Article 19; Rules of Arbitration of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA Arbitration Rules”), Article 1 
(1). 
37
 The various arbitration regimes all provide for wide tribunal powers in this respect. See, e.g., ICSID Con-
vention, Article 44 and Arbitration Rule 19; ICSID Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, Articles 19 and 35; 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), Article 15 (1), UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Article 17 (1); 
ICC Rules, Articles 19 and 22;  SCC Rules, Article 19; LCIA Rules, Article 14; PCA Rules, Article 17 (1). 
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ruption of state officials, discriminatory treatment or similar instances of wrong-doing on 
the part of the host state.  
 
States have an interest in providing the public with information on state affairs. This inter-
est may be based on national statutory obligations for disclosure
38
, public pressure, national 
tradition or mere self-interest, in the latter case typically with regard to influencing public 
conception of the dispute and the foreign investor. Developed democracies may have a 
particularly strong interest in disclosing information pertaining to international legal dis-
putes to its population, as such disputes raise legitimacy and democracy issues deserving of 
public discussion. Failure to properly inform carries political risk and may lead to trust is-
sues between the state and the public at a later stage. On the other hand, it is not necessarily 
so that concerns related to public opinion will always be the determining element in a 
state’s position in a transparency issue. Sometimes a state would prefer to settle the dispute 
in silence. This is perhaps most likely when the dispute relates to state conduct which is 
suited to alarm other foreign investors or where the public reaction to disclosure is ex-
pected to be particularly negative. 
 
The individual investment tribunal is a significant actor by virtue of its stake in and respon-
sibility for the conduct of the arbitration. “An inherent characteristic of the arbitral process 
is the tribunal’s adjudicative role and responsibility for establishing and implementing the 
                                                 
 
38
 The potential obligations of both parties in this respect have been acknowledged by several tribunals, see, 
e.g., Metalclad Corporation v. The United Mexican States, Decision on a Request by the Respondent for an 
Order Prohibiting the Claimant From Revealing Information, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1 (hereinafter 
“Metalclad, Decision on a Request”), paragraphs 9, 10. See also Loewen Group Inc and Raymond L Loewen 
v. United States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/98/3, Decision on Hearing of Respondent’s Objection to Compe-
tence and Jurisdiction, 5 January 2001 (hereinafter “Loewen, Decision on Hearing”), which referenced the 
Metalclad Tribunal on this point, cf. paragraphs 26, 28. Some have argued that agreements on confidentiality 
and tribunal confidentiality orders may be overridden by such obligations; see Feliciano (2013), p. 20, with 
references. In several IIAs containing comprehensive transparency provisions the issue is resolved by ex-
pressly making procedural confidentiality subject to any national statutes demanding disclosure. 
11 
 
procedures necessary to resolve the parties’ dispute.”39 Its primary duty is to resolve the 
specific case before it, including issues of procedure, independent from other tribunals and 
its legitimacy restricted to the case in question.
40
 This duty extends to securing “the orderly 
unfolding of the individual case”,41 a matter which, as we shall see below in this thesis, 
have been central to the way tribunals have approached transparency issues in specific cas-
es. For now it suffices to say that the primary interest of the tribunal lies in protecting the 
arbitral process. While not necessarily colliding with increased transparency as such, this 
responsibility entails a certain amount of caution on part of the arbitrators. 
 
There is a wide array of non-party actors with a possible stake in investment disputes. Typ-
ical examples are NGOs, e.g. environmental organizations or organizations representing 
specific business interests, special interests groups such as indigenous peoples, trade unions 
and industry associations.
42
 It follows then, that such entities are likely to have a significant 
interest in proceedings being as transparent as possible, as this would entail access to the 
most information. Furthermore, they are likely to be interested participating in the proceed-
ings. Any third-party’s interest in a given dispute is likely to stem from a perception on the 
part of the third-party as “genuine stakeholder”,43 whose interests may be affected by the 
dispute. NGO and special interest group activity in relation to individual disputes can be 
addressed from such a perspective. 
 
A final issue pertaining to actors and interests in relation to procedural transparency war-
rants discussion. Critical commentators are often quick to point to public interest in the 
subject matter of investment disputes as creating a need for increased transparency in arbi-
                                                 
 
39
 Born (2009) p. 1759. 
40
 Kessedjian (2009) p. 44.  
41
 Kinnear and Diop (2006) p. 47, with references to relevant case law. 
42
 These are all actors who at different junctures have been granted access to submit amicus curiae briefs to 
investment tribunals. See Kasolowsky and Harvey (2009) p. 11; Kahn (2009) p. 117. 
43
 Buckley and Blyschak (2007) p. 354. 
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tration proceedings. While many investment disputes undoubtedly involve important issues 
deserving of public attention, the concept of “the public interest” remains rather vague. 
Who or what constitutes “the public”? What are “public interests”, and how best to safe-
guard these? Who should be entitled to represent it? Answers to such questions are not ob-
vious. 
 
The issue of the public interest with regard to transparency of arbitration may be ap-
proached as two distinct issues. One is the general interest of the public to be informed on 
matters of importance to them and their society. The review by investment tribunals of the 
sovereign actions of states should be considered such a matter of public interest.
44
 This 
interest may be attended to through the dissemination of information concerning disputes 
by the state. The consistent and comprehensive dissemination into the public domain of 
information concerning investment disputes would essentially constitute transparency in 
the most basic sense, in line with the definition adopted above. Another issue is the more 
complex question of the role of specific public interests in relation to specific proceedings, 
and whether anyone besides the disputing state may represent such interests in the arbitra-
tion. Scholarly discussion and case law on this issue have primarily focused on questions 
concerning the representation of public interests through amicus curiae submissions. 
 
Different public interest affected by a dispute need to be represented by a specific actor in 
order to potentially make an impact on the decision of the tribunal in question. Typically, 
and simplistically, there are two ways for this to happen. Firstly, the disputing state may 
present its opinion on the public interests impacted by the dispute in the proceedings.
45
 
Secondly, a third-party may attempt to gain recognition by the tribunal of the relevance of a 
particular public interest by way of submitting amicus curiae briefs. 
                                                 
 
44
 Magraw and Amerasinghe (2009) p. 339. 
45
 Kyla Tienhaara refers to the argument promoted by some that it is the disputing state which should repre-
sent public interests, and not third parties, though she does not herself support this view. See Tienhaara 
(2007) p. 239. 
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1.4 Perceived Advantages and Disadvantages of Transparency 
Increased transparency and inclusiveness of investment arbitration is associated with a 
number of perceived advantages and disadvantages.
46
 With regard to publication of deci-
sions and awards, the potential for transparency leading to an increase in the quality, con-
sistency and predictability of decisions has been pointed out.
47
 It is suggested that the 
availability of previous decisions provides a more substantial basis for decisions,
48
 and also 
that the certainty of decisions being subject public scrutiny will promote “accurate, thor-
ough and defensible decisions by arbitrators”.49 Furthermore, some have emphasized the 
possibility of a general increase in the transparency and public participation contributing to 
increased effectiveness in implementation and popular acceptance of the system, as its le-
gitimacy is likely to be strengthened by the availability of information and reduced secrecy 
surrounding proceedings.
50
 This process could be self-reinforcing, as increased transparen-
cy and third-party participation may result in a newfound public awareness and interest, 
leading to greater participation in investment disputes by local communities.
51
 However, 
one would assume that whether or not this is considered an advantage depends on one’s 
perspective. Moreover, it is not necessarily so that greater access to information will lead to 
increased legitimacy and public acceptance. On the contrary, if the public do not like what 
is revealed, the legitimacy of the system in the eyes of the general populace may in fact be 
weakened.    
                                                 
 
46
 Putting aside for the time being the notion of inherent value.  
47
 See Magraw and Amerasinghe (2009) p. 345; Delaney and Magraw (2008) p. 761–762; Knahr and Rei-
nisch (2007) p. 111. 
48
 Magraw and Amerasinghe (2009) p. 345. However, the strict focus of arbitrators on the case before them 
and the lack of any rule of stare decisis in investment arbitration are likely to weaken such an effect, see Ru-
bins (2006) p. 5–6. 
49
 Delaney and Magraw (2008) p. 761. 
50
 Ibid. p. 762; Yannaca-Small (2005) p. 11. 
51
 Buys (2003) p 134–135.  
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Another significant potential advantage of increased transparency and inclusiveness is the 
protection of a broader set of interests. The raised awareness and knowledge likely to result 
from an increase in transparency of documents and information could lead to more frequent 
public participation through amicus curiae submissions, securing the representation of in-
terests otherwise unlikely to be brought to the attention of tribunals.
52
 However, in the case 
of such briefs being filed, it is no guarantee that they will be taken into account by tribu-
nals. Often they are not even referenced in awards.
53
 Nevertheless, the ability of third-party 
submissions to contribute perspectives different than those promoted by the disputing par-
ties may potentially have an effect on the reasoning of tribunals.     
 
As announced, there are perceived disadvantages to increased openness as well. Increased 
costs and delay following the carrying out of transparency measures are highlighted as pos-
sible consequences of increased transparency obligations.
54
 Considering that arbitration 
traditionally has not allowed for much openness, the logistical arrangements necessary to 
provide for dissemination of documents and information and provide for third party partic-
ipation are rarely in place. To overcome these obstacles may generate costs and delay. 
More serious, perhaps, are the perceived threats against the privacy, confidentiality and 
lack of publicity that has traditionally characterized international arbitration,
55
 as well as 
the related danger of re-politicization of investment disputes.
56
 For those who cherish these 
particular values of traditional arbitration, increased openness represents a real threat to the 
system. 
                                                 
 
52
 Magraw and Amerasinghe (2009) p. 349–350. 
53
 De Brabandere (2011) p. 111. 
54
 Delaney and Magraw (2008) p. 762. 
55
 Ibid.; Sabater (2010) p. 50–52; Levine (2011) p. 220–221. 
56
 Rubins (2006) p. 6–8.  
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1.5 Method and Structure 
At this point, certain methodological issues must be addressed. Investment treaties, being 
interstate agreements, are instruments of public international law.
57
 The applicable law in 
treaty-based investment arbitration is the investment treaty, and in turn, the applicable law 
for the interpretation of treaties is international law, as expressed in the Vienna Convention 
on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”), Articles 31 and 32.58 In principle, this also applies to the 
interpretation of investment treaty provisions on procedure, including provisions on proce-
dural transparency. However, the extent to which investment treaties regulate such issues 
varies. Furthermore, investment tribunals are operating according to procedural rules main-
ly developed in private commercial arbitration.
59
 In the absence of express rules in the pri-
mary source, the applicable arbitration rules provide the basis for the procedure. This im-
plicitly follows from treaty provisions on investor-state dispute settlement making different 
arbitration regimes available to investor claimants.
60
 This creates a two-level dynamic vital 
for the present study. This is because the level of detail in an investment treaty’s provisions 
on arbitral procedure determines the scope of application of the arbitration rules applicable 
under the treaty, including rules on the exercise of tribunal procedural discretion and the 
access of the disputing parties to agree on differing arrangements. 
 
The method I have chosen consists of addressing procedural transparency on these two 
levels. I will address the prevalence and characteristics of transparency regulation in inves-
tor-state dispute settlement provisions in international investment treaties. Considering the 
amount of investment treaties currently in force worldwide, it has been necessary to con-
                                                 
 
57
 Roberts (2013) p. 50.  
58
 MchLachlan, Shore and Weiniger (2007) p. 66; Weeramanrty (2012) p. 13–14. The principle is expressed 
in the ICSID Convention, Article 42 (1); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature 
May 23, 1969, 1155UNTS 331.  
59
 See, e.g., Brown (2010) p. 659. 
60
 Occasionally, it is stated outright, see e.g., U.S.–Uruguay BIT (2005), Article 24 (5): “The arbitration rules 
applicable …shall govern the arbitration except to the extent modified by this treaty”. 
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fine the analysis to a limited selection of treaties. The particulars of this selection will be 
accounted for in the introduction to chapter 2.  
 
To the extent that dispute settlement provisions supplements or deviates from the applica-
ble arbitration rules under the treaty, such modifications are binding on the arbitral tribunal 
and the parties. This follows from an interpretation of the treaty as the legal basis for the 
dispute. If the treaty provides procedural arrangements different from those of the applica-
ble rules, these differences must be interpreted as an expression of the will of the parties. 
The treaty is the instrument of consent, stating the conditions on which the treaty parties 
give their consent to arbitration.
61
 The investor, in submitting his/her claim to arbitration 
under the provisions of the treaty, accepts these conditions, including any modifications of 
the applicable rules. With regard to the applicable rules, the modifications must thus be 
respected as an agreement between the disputing parties.
62
 Any procedural modifications, 
then, constitute lex specialis regulations of the arbitral procedure, applying specifically to 
the treaty regime in question; as opposed to the lex generalis rules of the different interna-
tional arbitration rules.
63
 Against this background, I will investigate the extent to which the 
treaties selected for review create mandatory solutions with regard to transparency of arbi-
tral proceedings. 
 
The second part of this study, chapter 3, consists of a presentation and analysis of key 
transparency issues with a view to how these are regulated in the arbitration rules most 
commonly provided as alternatives for dispute settlement in investment treaties. I will ad-
dress relevant case law on these issues. Underlying this approach is a wish to illustrate how 
the lex generalis regime of international arbitration regulates transparency of proceedings 
in the absence of express rules in the primary source, i.e. the treaty. Reviewing case law is 
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 Onwuamaegbu (2009) p. 72. 
62
 See, e.g. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 1 (1).  
63
 Note that ICSID, in contrast to other international arbitral frameworks, in itself constitutes such a lex spe-
cialis regime, as it is designed exclusively for investment arbitration. 
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essential to this purpose as the rules themselves do not always provide clear solutions to the 
issues at hand, which instead become subject to procedural discretion.  
 
There is no formal binding rule of precedent in investment arbitration.
64
 The traditional 
position is that “each tribunal is sovereign, and may retain . . . a different solution for re-
solving the same problem”.65 However, tribunals do tend to build on earlier practice, to the 
degree that some have pointed to a development towards a de facto system of precedent in 
treaty arbitration.
66
 In the present context, one can clearly see similar reasoning on trans-
parency issues in a number of cases, and references to previous tribunals are prevalent, 
which support the notion of a de facto practice. It must nevertheless be kept in mind that 
the degree to which tribunals build on earlier case law is not the result of a precedent rule 
as such. 
 
Another point worth noting concerning the review of case law in this study is the general 
lack of transparency characterizing the system. Awards and decisions under other institu-
tional regimes than ICSID and transparent treaty regimes are rarely and inconsistently 
available to the public.
67
 Consequently, the assortment of decisions available for this study 
does not necessarily reflect the full range of tribunal approaches on the issues. In itself, this 
simple observation may illustrate some of the challenges with regard to the transparency of 
the system. All the decisions subject to analysis in this study have been rendered under 
UNCITRAL, the ICSID Convention
68
 or ICSID Additional Facility rules. 
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 Schill (2009) p. 288–292; Similarly Alvik (2011) p. 6–7. 
65
 AES Corporation v. The Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No ARB/02/17, Decision on Jurisdiction, 26 
April 2005, paragraph 30.  
66
 Schill (2009) p. 321; Schreuer and Weiniger (2008) p. 1196. 
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 Dugan et al. (2008) p. 77. 
68
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, 575 
U.N.T.S. (1966) 159 [hereinafter “ICSID Convention”]. 
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The chosen approach hopefully entails an emphasis on the interplay between investment 
treaties, arbitration rules and tribunal procedural powers which provides the basis for re-
solving transparency issues in arbitral proceedings. 
19 
 
2 Transparency provisions in IIAs – different approaches and 
recent developments 
2.1 Introduction 
As the power of tribunals to determine issues of procedure is limited to issues not deter-
mined by the treaty providing the basis for the dispute (or by agreement between the par-
ties), treaties providing mandatory transparency provisions curtail the discretionary power 
of the arbitrators to give orders to the contrary. It follows that the extent of transparency 
regulation the body of treaties in force will have significant effects on the level of transpar-
ency in investment arbitration proceedings as a whole. Against this background, an exami-
nation of the prevalence of express provisions on procedural transparency issues in the in-
ternational body of BITs and other types of international investment agreements (“IIAs”) 
would contribute to shed light on the conditions for increased transparency of investment 
arbitration. 
 
At the time of writing, the number of concluded IIAs worldwide exceeds 3000.
69
 The num-
ber of IIAs currently in force complicates any comprehensive analysis of the full interna-
tional investment treaty landscape. As a consequence, I have limited my examination to 
registered BITs signed between 2010 and 2013 for which text were available through the 
databases of UNCTAD
70
 at the time of consulting the database, as well as all the bilateral 
and regional RTAs that have been made publicly available through the website of the 
WTO
71
. The most recent versions of the model investment treaties of a number of notable 
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 Out of a total of 3196 agreements, 2857 are BITs, and 339 so-called “other IIAs”, a category encompass-
ing, among other types of agreements, regional trade agreements (“RTA”) containing some sort of investment 
regulation, though not necessarily investor-state dispute settlement. See UNCTAD (2013) p. 101. 
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Accessible here: 
http://unctad.org/en/pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20(IIA)/IIA-Tools.aspx 
(Treaties retrieved May - June 2013).  
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 Accessible here: http://rtais.wto.org/UI/PublicAllRTAList.aspx (Treaties retrieved June-July 2013) 
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states, including Canada, the United States, China and the United Kingdom, have also been 
examined. Model agreements provide useful illustrations of states’ attitudes and default 
policy positions on certain issues, including procedural transparency.
72
 Furthermore, model 
treaties, when compared to concluded treaties, serve to highlight differences and may illu-
minate the power relationships, the bargaining power and the priorities of negotiating par-
ties. And, depending on the circumstances, deviations from a model treaty in concluded 
treaties may constitute a significant factor in the interpretation of the latter.
73
 
 
The rationale behind this particular delineation with regard to document selection, besides 
time and space constraints, is that it enables a relatively comprehensive and thorough anal-
ysis of recent trends in state practice concerning investment treaty design, and simultane-
ously makes possible the identification of interesting differences and nuances between 
states, while at the same time providing, at least to a degree, a representative impression of 
the status quo. One could well argue that limiting the selection of BITs to the last three-
year period creates a danger of painting a skewed and simplistic image, possibly missing 
interesting nuances and approaches in relation to treaty design, especially because a num-
ber of states did not enter into BITs in this period. However, including in the examination 
all WTO-registered RTAs in force, as well as selected model investment treaties, should at 
least to a degree compensate for eventual imbalances created by the somewhat limited se-
lection of BITs.  
 
To further compensate for potential imbalances created by the differences in levels of trea-
ty-making activity between different states in the period 2010-2013, and because only 41 
out of the 113
74
 BITs concluded in the designated time period were actually available for 
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 On model treaties, see Brown (2013); Newcombe (2013), pp. 21–22. 
73
 Brown (2013) p. 11; Schill (2009) pp. 312–214. Others are somewhat more reserved, see Dolzer and 
Schreuer (2012) p. 14, in footnote 50.  
74
 This number is based on the country-specific lists of signed BITs available through the database of 
UNCTAD, see 
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examination through the database of UNCTAD or through the websites of the respective 
governments at the time of conducting the survey, I have selected an additional 30 BITs 
from between 2004 and 2010. The selection includes treaties involving states from all con-
tinents, both developing and developed ones. I have made efforts to include treaties con-
cluded by countries which were not represented among the treaties from between 2010 and 
2013 for which text were available, including treaties involving states which are among 
those party to the highest number of BITs, such as Germany, France, Switzerland and the 
Netherlands.
75
  
 
The decision to limit the supplemental selection to treaties concluded between 2004 and 
2010 is based on 2004 being the year significant revisions with regard to transparency were 
introduced in the model investment treaties of the United States and Canada. These revi-
sions are widely considered to be the first examples of comprehensive treaty regulation of 
procedural transparency.
76
 As will be accounted for in the following section, the accelerat-
ed development with regards to transparency in investment arbitration originated within the 
context of the NAFTA,
77
 and the US and Canadian model treaty revisions of 2004 are 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/International%20Investment%20Agreements%20%28IIA%29/Country-
specific-Lists-of-BITs.aspx?Do=1,50.  
75
 Non-conclusive numbers are provided by ICSID, see 
<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewBilat
eral&reqFrom=Main> (last accessed 29 December 2013). 
76
 See, e.g., Born and Shenkman (2009) p. 32–33; Ortino (2013) pp. 125–126. The conclusion of the United 
States-Chile FTA (signed 2003), the United States-Singapore FTA (signed 2003) and the Dominican Repub-
lic-Central American/United States FTA (“CAFTA-DR”, signed 2004) coincides in time with the US model 
revision of 2004, and reflect its content with regard to transparency of arbitral proceedings. 
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 North American Free Trade Agreement, done at Washington on December 8 and 17, 1992, at Ottawa on 
December 11 and 17, 1992, and at Mexico City on December 14 and 17, 1992, Can.-Mex.-U.S., reprinted in 
32 I.L.M. 289 (1993). 
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closely related to these early developments.
78
 Against this background, BITs concluded in 
the years prior to 2004 is not likely to contain provisions of interest for this thesis. 
 
In the following, I will discuss procedural transparency in the context of the examined trea-
ty materials. The primary questions are whether and how states choose to, or not to, pro-
mote transparency in their IIAs. Against the background of these questions, I will present 
my findings with regard to express treaty regulation of transparency, and then discuss these 
findings, with a view to possible explanations for the existence, or lack thereof, of specific 
transparency regulation in investment agreements. 
 
I will structure the discussion according to a division between BITs and other IIAs, the 
latter group consisting primarily of primarily free trade agreements (“RTAs”/”FTAs”). 
Such a division makes it easier to detect differences between the two treaty types. Further-
more, there seems to be an ongoing shift from traditional BITs, with an exclusive focus on 
investments, to broader, more comprehensive trade agreements, both bi- and multilateral. 
Thus, separating the two categories entails an investigation of whether the different nature 
and contexts of the treaty types influence the design and content of concluded agreements. 
The question becomes whether treaty type is significant with regard to the extent and de-
tails of transparency regulation in individual agreements. 
 
Before presenting the findings of the conducted examination, however, I will introduce the 
specific treaty regime of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). State and 
Tribunal practice under NAFTA have played a central role in the evolution towards more 
transparent investment arbitration. This evolution is essential for a proper perspective on 
later developments in the investment treaty design of Canada and the United States, and for 
a precise analysis of the extent to which the developments within NAFTA have influenced 
other states’ subsequent treaties with regard to the regulation of transparency in arbitration. 
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 See Lévesque and Newcombe (2013) pp. 32–33. 
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2.2 The Role and Significance of the NAFTA 
The North American Free Trade Agreement, consisting of Mexico, Canada and the United 
States, entered into force January 1, 1994.
79
 The agreement established what today consti-
tutes the largest free trade area in the world, covering a population of close to 450 million 
people and a combined annual gross domestic product of approximately $ 19.5 trillion
80
. 
As well as regulating trade in goods and services and providing rules on intellectual proper-
ty and technical barriers to trade, the agreement provides investment protection and mecha-
nisms for investor-state dispute settlement. 
 
Investments are covered by NAFTA Chapter 11. The purposes of Chapter 11 are similar to 
those of any investment treaty, i.e. promoting investment, protecting investments and 
providing mechanisms for dispute settlement.
81
 Investor-state arbitration is provided in 
section B of the chapter, which outlines the arbitral process in detail. The international dis-
pute settlement mechanisms available to investors are arbitration under the ICSID conven-
tion, under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, or under the UNCITRAL Arbitration 
Rules.
82
 According to Article 1120 (2), the applicable rules govern the proceedings except 
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 Office of the United States Trade Representative: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-
agreements/north-american-free-trade-agreement-nafta (last accessed 10 September, 2013).  
80
 Estimated numbers for 2012, cf. the CIA World Factbook, available at 
<https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html> (last accessed 29 
December 2013).  
81
 Gantz (2003) p. 683.  
82
 NAFTA Article 1120 (1). To date, all NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations have been submitted under the Addi-
tional Facility Rules or UNCITRAL, as a consequence of Mexico not being party to the ICSID Convention, 
and Canada not having ratified it, despite having signed the convention in 2006. In November 2013, however, 
Canada ratified the Convention. Consequently, claims against Canada and the United States, by investors 
from these two states may now be submitted to arbitration under the ICSID Convention. See ICSID Press 
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<https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=OpenPage&PageType=
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to the extent modified by the provisions of the NAFTA. Furthermore, according to Article 
1131 (2) interpretations by the Free Trade Commission of the provisions of the agreement 
are binding on tribunals. As such, the NAFTA agreement, constituting the instrument on 
which the treaty parties base their consent to dispute settlement, contains mechanisms es-
tablishing certain mandatory procedural arrangements for arbitration under the regime. 
 
In the context of the present study, there are two instances of express regulation of the 
transparency of arbitral proceedings in the original text of the NAFTA. To the extent that 
the provisions in question differ from the applicable arbitral rules, they constitute “modifi-
cations” in the sense of Article 1120 (2). The two provisions, taken together, provide trans-
parency of information on the early stages and conclusion of investment disputes, but do 
not concern the procedural stages in-between. 
 
The first of the two, Article 1126 (13), provides that, inter alia, notices of arbitration must 
be sent to the NAFTA Secretariat and put in a public register.
83
 Consequently, anyone may 
access the registry in order to attain information on ongoing disputes. To interested third 
parties, NGOs and the like, public registries constitute an important precondition for public 
discussion, lobbying activities and other operations, as these provide a permanent frame-
work for the dissemination of information concerning the existence of pending investment 
disputes. Without a publicly accessible medium for this information, knowledge of pro-
ceedings initiated under Chapter 11 would have been far less likely to reach the general 
public. 
 
The other express provision on procedural transparency is article 1137, paragraph 4 cf. an-
nex 1137.4. The provision sets down conditions for the publication of final arbitral awards. 
Interestingly, the conditions for a disputing party’s access to make an award public in arbi-
                                                                                                                                                    
 
AnnouncementsFrame&FromPage=Announcements&pageName=Announcement138> (accessed 30 Decem-
ber 2013). 
83
Bjorklund (2013) p. 506. 
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trations involving Mexico are different from those involving Canada and the United States. 
In disputes to which Mexico is a party, Annex 1137.4 provides that the applicable arbitra-
tion rules govern the issue of the publication of awards. In disputes involving the two other 
NAFTA states, either the disputing state or the disputing investor may publish the award 
without regard to whether or not the other disputing party consents. The reference to the 
applicable rules with regard to Mexico either completely rules out unilateral publication of 
awards, by demanding the consent of both parties, or leaves the decision to each disputing 
party.
84
 Consequently, the Mexican position, depending on the rules applied to a given dis-
pute, may make it more difficult for a disputing party to make an award public. Conse-
quently, disputes to which Mexico is party are potentially less transparent than disputes 
involving the United States and Canada. 
 
The transparency of Chapter 11 arbitral proceedings is no longer governed exclusively by 
the provisions of the NAFTA text. Somewhere between the late 1990s and the early years 
of the new millennium, a shift seems to have occurred with respect to how the NAFTA 
parties and Chapter 11 tribunals related to procedural transparency. It is difficult to point to 
a specific time when such a shift occurred, but it seems safe to say that by 2001 procedural 
transparency as a significant concern had made a breakthrough in the NAFTA.
85
 The de-
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 The ICSID and ICSID Additional Facility rules are different from the UNCITRAL Rules on the topic of 
publication of final awards, see section 3.6. 
85
 From early on, the United States argued for the primacy of its Freedom of Information Act over arbitration 
rules and decisions with regard to access to procedural documents. See Delaney and Magraw (2008) p. 744. 
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velopment should be viewed against a background of increasing public interest in invest-
ment arbitration and critical attention from civil society groups, academics and media.
86
 
Among the NAFTA parties, the United States and Canada have expressed particular inter-
est in heightening the level of transparency in Chapter 11 arbitrations. Mexico, on the other 
hand, has not been as vocal in this regard.
87
  
 
The US Trade Act of 2002 expressed this and other concerns in the form of trade negotia-
tion objectives.
88
 With regard to investment arbitration, the objectives were to ensure “the 
fullest measure of transparency in the dispute settlement mechanism”89, by providing for 
the public availability of all documents and decisions, ensuring public hearings and estab-
lishing mechanisms for the acceptance of amicus curiae submissions from representatives 
of civil society and business.
90
 These objectives were reflected in the 2004 revision of the 
US Model BIT as well as in later FTAs and BITs of the United States.
91
 In the context of 
Chapter 11 arbitration, individual arbitral tribunals have responded to these trends and con-
cerns, and, through interaction with the NAFTA states and disputing parties, played key 
roles in increasing the transparency of the regime. 
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
v Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Procedural Order No. 5 (hereinafter “Pope & Talbot, Procedural Order 
5”), 17 December 1999; S.D. Myers v Canada, NAFTA (UNCITRAL), Procedural Order No. 16 (hereinafter 
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 See Bjorklund (2013) pp. 506–507; Gantz (2003) p. 748; Hafner-Burton (2013) p. 15. 
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 Gantz (2003), p. 747. See Coe (2006) pp. 1377–1378, on the reluctance of Mexico with regard to expand-
ing the transparency of the regime. 
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 See Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–210, 116 Stat. 933, sec. 2102. 
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 Ibid., sec. 2102(b)(3)(H). 
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 Ibid., sec. 2102(b)(3)(H)(i)–(iii). See Parra (2012) p. 240. 
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The NAFTA parties’ primary instrument with regard to directly influencing the interpreta-
tion of the provisions of chapter 11 by arbitral tribunals is the Free Trade Commission 
(“FTC”). According to NAFTA article 1131 (2), an arbitral tribunal is bound by an inter-
pretation by the FTC of the provisions of the NAFTA. Consequently, through the issuing of 
general statements concerning the interpretation of the agreement, the parties may, to an 
extent, steer the interpretation of the agreement in their desired direction.
92
 To date, three 
interpretative statements regarding the procedure of Chapter 11 arbitrations have been is-
sued by the FTC, one in 2001 and two in 2003.
93
 All three may be viewed in connection 
with heightened critical interest as well as with a handful of tribunal decisions from the 
years 2000 and 2001, some quite restrictive, some of which broke new ground on transpar-
ency issues such as access to documents and third-party participation.
94
 
 
The first FTC statement on transparency was the Notes of Interpretation of Certain Chapter 
11 Provisions, from July 2001.
95
 According to the statement, “[n]othing in the NAFTA 
imposes a general duty of confidentiality on the disputing parties to a Chapter Eleven arbi-
tration”.96 It goes on, stating that “subject to the application of Article 1137 (4), nothing in 
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 The provision has been called a “safety valve”. See Alvarez and Park (2003) p. 397. 
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the NAFTA precludes the Parties from providing public access to documents submitted to, 
or issued by, a Chapter Eleven Tribunal.”97 With regard to the applicable rules, the FTC, 
“in accordance with NAFTA Article 1120 (2)”, states that “nothing in the relevant arbitral 
rules imposes a general duty of confidentiality or precludes the Parties from providing pub-
lic access to documents submitted to, or issued by, Chapter Eleven Tribunals, apart from 
the limited specific exceptions set forth expressly in those rules.”98 The reference to “lim-
ited specific exceptions” points to those applicable rules expressly regulating confidentiali-
ty and privacy issues,
99
 but as we recall, these only apply to the extent that they are not 
modified by the NAFTA, cf. Article 1120 (2). Having noted the absence of any principle or 
duty of confidentiality in the NAFTA and the applicable rules, and noted the corresponding 
absence in the NAFTA and the rules of any restrictions on the publication of procedural 
documents, the statement declares the agreement among the NAFTA parties to make public 
“in a timely manner all documents submitted to, or issued by, a Chapter Eleven Tribunal, 
subject to the redaction of” confidential information and information protected by law or by 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
exists in an arbitration such as that currently before this tribunal”, see S.D. Myers Inc v Canada, Procedural 
Order No. 16 (hereinafter “S.D. Myers”), 13 May 2000, paragraph 8, and below section 3.3.  
97
 The reference to Article 1137 (4) makes clear that the different conditions applying to Mexico on the one 
hand and Canada and the United States on the other with regard to the publication of final awards, are not 
affected by the statement. Consequently, and despite the heightened transparency practices stemming from 
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the applicable arbitral rules.
100
 This, at least in principle, establishes full document trans-
parency as the general rule in NAFTA Chapter 11 arbitrations.
101
 
 
The 2001-statement was issued in the form of a binding interpretation of the NAFTA under 
article 1131 (2), and as such should establish document transparency as the default rule in 
NAFTA arbitrations. One may raise the question of whether such a wide statement, not 
only on what is and what is not provided by the NAFTA but on the provisions of the appli-
cable arbitration rules as well, is in accordance with the powers of the FTC under article 
1131 (2).
102
 Essentially, the statement notes the absence of general restrictions upon publi-
cation of documents under NAFTA and the applicable rules, and then turns this assertion 
on its head, providing a general discretion upon the disputing NAFTA party to make such 
documents public in the form of a procedural modification under Article 1120 (2).
103
 It is 
not given that such a manoeuvre truly constitutes an “interpretation … of a provision” un-
der Article 1131 (2). Whatever the case may be, the objectives of the statement have been 
largely respected by Chapter 11 tribunals and the NAFTA parties have since consistently 
published documents on their websites.
104
 The FTC statement represents an important and 
significant shift in how states approach procedural transparency in investor-state disputes, 
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controversias/inversionista-estado> (both NAFTA and non-NAFTA cases listed); Canada, see < 
http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-
diff/gov.aspx?lang=eng>; the United States, see < http://www.state.gov/s/l/c3741.htm>. 
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and it has been influential on the development with regard to transparency within other 
important arbitration regimes, primarily ICSID and the UNCITRAL rules.
105
 This raises the 
issue of whether there has been an influence also on the contents of IIAs of other states. 
The relationship between increased document transparency in the NAFTA and transparen-
cy regulation in later IIAs will be explored in subsequent sections of chapter 2.  
 
The next important FTC statement with regard to procedural transparency came about in 
response to several tribunal decisions on the topic of non-disputing parties in investment 
arbitration, especially with the right of third parties to submit written submissions, so-
called amicus curiae briefs, to arbitral tribunals. On January 15, 2001, the tribunal in the 
Methanex case, operating under UNCITRAL rules, decided that it had the authority to al-
low for the submission of such briefs.
106
 On 17 October the same year, the tribunal in the 
UPS case, also conducted according to UNCITRAL rules, reached the same conclusion.
107
 
Reflecting these decisions, the FTC in October 2003 issued its Statement on Non-Disputing 
Party Participation.
108
 The statement reaffirmed the reasoning of the Methanex and UPS 
tribunals by stating that no provision of the NAFTA “limits a Tribunal’s discretion to ac-
cept written submissions from a person or entity that is not a disputing party.”109 Note that 
the statement does not require Tribunals to accept amicus briefs, but rather subscribes to 
the interpretations of the UPS and Methanex Tribunals on the matter. In section B of the 
statement, the FTC recommends certain formal and material requirements for applications 
to submit and the submissions themselves, as well as specific guidelines to the reasoning of 
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 Bjorklund (2013), p. 508; Parra (2012) p. 249–250. 
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 Methanex, Decision on Amici.  
107
 United Parcel Services of America v Canada (UNCITRAL), Decision re Amicus Intervention, 17 October 
2001 (hereinafter “UPS, Decision re Amicus”). 
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 Bjorklund (2013) p. 508; NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participa-
tion (7 October 2003), accessible at <http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/38791.pdf> (last accessed 
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 Ibid, Section A, paragraph 1. 
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tribunals when deciding on whether or not to accept a submission. According to the state-
ment, a tribunal should consider “the extent to which: 
 
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the determination of a  
factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by bringing a perspective, particular  
knowledge or insight that is different from that of the disputing parties; 
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address matters within the scope of the  
dispute; 
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and 
(d) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration.”110  
 
Furthermore, the FTC recommended that tribunals ensure that any third party submissions 
do not disrupt the proceedings and that no disputing party is unduly burdened or unfairly 
prejudiced by such submissions.
111
 The statement also makes clear that tribunals are under 
no obligation to address submitted briefs in their awards.
112
 
 
In Methanex, the tribunal, despite having asserted its authority to accept submissions from 
non-disputing parties, did not decide whether to actually accept the submissions being peti-
tioned for, instead being “at present minded to receive such submissions subject to proce-
dural limitations still to be determined by the Tribunal.”113 Following the statement of the 
FTC, the Tribunal declared that it adopted the procedure recommended in the statement, 
section B.
114
 This procedure has generally been adopted by later NAFTA tribunals.
115
 Cer-
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 Methanex, Decision on Amici Curiae, paragraph 53. 
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 ICSID News Release, 30 January 2004. Accessible at: 
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nnouncementsFrame&FromPage=NewsReleases&pageName=Archive_%20Announcement9 (last accessed 
12 September 2013). 
115
 Kinnear (2005) p. 6. 
32 
 
tain perspectives on how Chapter 11 case law on amicus participation relates to tribunal 
practice under other regimes will be addressed in section 3.5. 
 
The last of the fundamental procedural transparency issues that has been specifically dealt 
with in the context of the NAFTA and the FTC is the question of public and third-party 
access to arbitral hearings. The NAFTA contains no express provisions concerning public 
access to hearings, and the FTC has not been willing to direct the course of tribunals and 
disputing parties on this point, thus, no statements concerning public access to Chapter 11 
hearings have been issued.
116
 The issue has come up in several arbitrations under Chapter 
11, with tribunals generally having been unwilling to open up proceedings without the con-
sent of the parties.
117
 As a response, Canada and the United States in October 2003 both 
issued unilateral statements, declaring their willingness to open up arbitral hearings in all 
cases against them, conditional upon the consent of disputing investors and subject to the 
protection of confidential information.
118
 In 2004, Mexico, after having received criticism 
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 Since the NAFTA is quiet on the issue, and all the applicable arbitral rules under the treaty either demand 
explicit party consent (the recent UNCITRAL transparency rules notwithstanding) or an absence of objection 
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for failing to issue a similar statement
119
, followed suit.
120
 The clear position expressed 
through these statements signified a strong orientation towards the opening up of invest-
ment arbitration forums, and have likely increased pressure upon disputing investors to 
give their consent to open hearings.
121
 However, an examination of the procedural docu-
ments published by the NAFTA parties on their respective webpages does not necessarily 
support the claim that “virtually all Chapter 11 hearings are now open to the public”.122 
Although the majority of Chapter 11 arbitrations in the years following the statements have 
featured hearings open to the public, proceedings have been closed to the public in three 
cases against Canada, and possibly also in cases against Mexico.
123
  
 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
For the identical Canadian statement, see <http://www.international.gc.ca/trade-agreements-accords-
commerciaux/topics-domaines/disp-diff/nafta-transparency-alena-transparence.aspx?lang=eng > (both last 
accessed 18 September 2013).  
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cases brought against Mexico, the picture is somewhat less than transparent. This is because of a peculiar 
tendency of procedural orders missing from the list of published case documents on the webpages of the 
Mexican government. Consequently, I have not been able to determine which, if any, Chapter 11 cases 
against Mexico initiated after the Mexican commitment to open hearings in 2004 have featured hearings ac-
cessible by the public. As far as the United States are concerned, in addition to the Methanex case, all Chapter 
11 cases initiated after the 2003 statement have featured open hearings, with the possible exception for the 
Softwood Lumber v United States consolidation proceedings, for which I have not been able to locate any 
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The developments accounted for in this section together constitute a broad and comprehen-
sive approach to procedural transparency in the context of the NAFTA. Given the limita-
tions of the text of the original treaty with regards to final awards and public hearings, it is 
unlikely that the NAFTA parties could have established a more transparent procedure. In 
2004, Canada and the United States both incorporated comprehensive transparency provi-
sions in their model investment treaties.
124
 The model revisions mirrored the content of the 
FTC statements as well as the unilateral statements on public hearings.
125
 Through the in-
corporation of extensive transparency provisions in these model agreements, which provide 
the basis for US and Canadian IIAs, the increased transparency of NAFTA arbitration was 
extended beyond this specific regime. It is easy to interpret the model revisions as direct 
responses to developments specific to the NAFTA. However, it is perhaps a more enlight-
ening approach to view the FTC initiatives and the later US and Canadian model revisions 
as specific expressions of US and Canadian objectives with regard to increase transparency 
in investment arbitration in general. The United States Trade Act of 2002 highlighted the 
aim of increasing the transparency of investment arbitration, without any explicit reference 
to NAFTA. And as we recall, both the United States and Canada had argued for increased 
transparency in Chapter 11 arbitration prior to the FTC statements. Against this back-
ground, it is not unlikely that the states would have included express transparency regula-
tion in their models regardless of any particular development in NAFTA arbitration. The 
FTC statements are nevertheless very significant, first and foremost for establishing 
NAFTA as the, at the time, most transparent investment arbitration regime, and for provid-
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 The revisions were carried over into the new 2012 US Model.  See 2012 United States Model BIT, Arti-
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ing examples of clearly formulated transparency standards. Furthermore, coming in the 
aftermath of specific decisions on transparency issues, they highlight the interplay between 
the exercise of tribunal procedural discretion and regulation of procedural regulation at the 
treaty level. The 2001 Notes of Interpretation may be viewed as a response to the re-
strictions on transparency put down by the Tribunals in, inter alia, the Loewen, Pope & 
Talbot, and S.D. Myers cases. In all these cases, Canada and the United States, respectively, 
had argued in favour of transparency without fully convincing the different tribunals.
126
 
Coming in the aftermath of these decisions, the statement establishes a new transparency 
regime in Chapter 11 proceedings, and at least attempts to exclude document transparency 
as an issue subject to the discretion of tribunals as part of their procedural powers under the 
applicable rules. As such, it can be seen as an example of intended ex post lex specialis 
regulation of the treaty regime. A similar perspective may be applied to the Statement on 
Non-Disputing Party Participation. This statement was an affirmation of the conclusions of 
the Methanex and UPS Tribunals on the authority of tribunals to accept amicus briefs under 
the UNCITRAL rules.
127
 However, rather than retroactively censoring the decisions, as in 
the case of the 2001 statement, the NAFTA parties instead supported the Tribunals’ inter-
pretations of the rules.  
 
The advance of procedural transparency in the NAFTA and the subsequent revisions of the 
Canadian and US model investment agreements raise the question of whether a similar de-
velopment can be observed in later treaties involving other states. If such developments 
may be observed, how prevalent are they? Which actors have driven the developments? 
Are there regional or other significant differences at work? What is the level of transparen-
cy established under the different treaty regimes? These questions all relate to the bigger 
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question of the extent and particulars of express transparency regulation in recent IIAs? 
These issues will be addressed in the following sections. 
 
2.3 Transparency Provisions in BITs 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As indicated, under this section, I will attempt to provide a general overview of the most 
common approaches to BIT design with regard to the regulation of transparency in dispute 
settlement proceedings. Initially, however, it may be useful to go into some detail on a few 
common characteristics of the BITs under review.  
 
The clear majority of the BITS examined for this study feature transparency provisions in 
line with traditional investment treaty design, providing a list of definitions of the relevant 
terms and concepts, a relatively slim “catalog” of standards of protection (typically includ-
ing protection from and compensation for expropriation, fair and equal treatment, national 
treatment, most-favored nation treatment and some others), as well as a separate part on 
dispute settlement, usually containing both investor-state and state-state dispute settlement 
mechanisms.
128
 Provisions on investor-state dispute settlement commonly exhibit a modest 
level of detail, providing the investor with the choice between various international arbitral 
regimes. To varying degrees, the treaties expressly states conditions, restrictions and re-
quirements for the submission of disputes to arbitration. Among the most common condi-
tions are designated time periods from the time a dispute arises to when an investor may 
submit a dispute to arbitration and provisions establishing that the choice of dispute settle-
ment mechanism shall be final, but other types of regulations feature as well.
129
 Detailed 
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regulation of procedural issues, concerning the actual conduct of the arbitration, however, 
is less common, but does feature in some bilateral investment treaties.
130
  
 
The dispute settlement mechanisms that appear most frequently are arbitration under the 
ICSID convention and arbitration rules, arbitration under ICSID Additional Facility and 
arbitration established under UNCITRAL Arbitration rules. Among those of the examined 
BITs that provide for international investor-state arbitration,
131
 all but one
132
 grants access 
to arbitration under either ICSID or UNCITRAL rules. The large majority provide access 
to arbitration under both regimes. The choice of arbitration under other the rules of other 
regimes such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the Permanent Court of Arbitra-
tion, the London Court of International Arbitration and the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce are occasionally available, but explicit references to these institutions are relatively 
rare.
133
 However, several treaties provide the disputing parties with the option of submit-
ting the dispute to any arbitration institution agreed upon, or to ad-hoc tribunals established 
under any given arbitration rules of their choosing, or both. Indeed, as many as 36 of the 
examined BITs contain such options.
134
 In addition, 9 treaties expressly provide national 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
to international arbitration, cf. paragraph 4 b). The Turkey–Kuwait BIT (2010) contains an identical provision 
in article 8, paragraph 4 b).  
130
 See e.g. Colombia–Japan BIT article 26–41, which exhibits a high level of detail in its regulation of the 
arbitral process, but besides providing some transparency in relation to the non-disputing party, cf. article 32, 
does not touch upon transparency issues. 
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 Of the total 71 bilateral investment treaties examined, only one does not provide for any sort of interna-
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Closer Economic Relations Trade Agreement (2011).  
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See also Douglas (2009) pp. 5–6, with extensive references to dispute settlement alternatives in BITs.  
134
 E.g. Estonia–Azerbaijan BIT (2010) article 10, paragraph 2, Egypt–Switzerland BIT (2010) article 12, 
paragraph 4 and Papua New Guinea–Japan article 16, paragraph 4 d). A somewhat distinct solution can be 
found in Colombia–UK BIT (2010), which in article IX, paragraph 4 makes the choice of arbitral regime 
38 
 
arbitration institutions as avenues for dispute settlement. It seems, then, that even though 
most investment arbitration proceedings take place under ICSID or UNCITRAL rules, the 
existing body of treaty materials is not characterized by lack of access to alternative arbitra-
tion systems. 
 
When reviewing the selected treaty materials in order to assess the prevalence and contents 
of provisions on procedural transparency, it becomes apparent that the treaties can be 
roughly divided into two groups: One group consisting of treaties that feature such provi-
sions and another which does not. In general, and for the time being ignoring the occasional 
treaty breaking the pattern, the lack of any middle ground is readily apparent: Transparency 
is either regulated in relatively high detail or not at all. What are possible explanations for 
these tendencies? In the following section, I will address the group of treaties lacking ex-
press regulation. 
 
2.3.2 Group 1: No Express Regulation 
This group encompasses the overwhelming majority of the BITs I have reviewed for this 
section. Out of the 41 BITs signed between 2010 and 2013 for which text were available,
135
 
as many as 36 contain no express regulation of transparency issues at all.
136
 When examin-
ing the 30 treaties from the period between 2004 and 2010 which were included to supple-
ment those from 2010 and onwards, a similar pattern emerges. 14 of the older treaties pro-
vide no regulation of procedural transparency and of the 12 that do, 9 confine themselves to 
expressly state that the parties together decide whether or not final awards shall be pub-
                                                                                                                                                    
 
subject to party consensus, but in the case that no agreement is reached the dispute is to be submitted to arbi-
tration under the ICSID Convention or ICSID Additional Facility Rules.  
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 Out of a total of 113 signed BITs in the designated period. 
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 The 5 treaties that do feature provisions on procedural transparency are all treaties to which Canada is 
party. These will be addressed in the next section. 
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lished. Thus, they do not increase the transparency of the proceedings at all.
137
 One of the 
30 treaties makes publication of final awards mandatory.
138
 Merely two treaties
139
 provide 
for more extensive transparency regulations, including open hearings and mandatory publi-
cation of procedural documents and tribunal decisions. 
 
The impression that there is a general absence of transparency regulation in the majority of 
recent BITs is reinforced by the review of a number of model investment treaties which 
presumably provides the starting point for present investment treaty negotiations of the 
proprietary states. Neither the Austrian, British, Korean, Chinese, Colombian, Dutch, 
French, German, Italian, Korean nor Russian model treaty provide any regulation of proce-
dural transparency issues.
140
 Thus, all these model agreements effectively refer such issues 
to the disputing parties or the individual tribunal. 
 
In addition to possibly contributing to a prolonged and increasingly contested and costly 
process,
141
 lack of express regulation may very well lead to different and, from the vantage 
point of the state party, less ideal results than if the treaty parties had been willing or able to 
conclude on clear and express solutions to transparency issues during the negotiating of a 
particular investment treaty. As respondents to potential investor claims subject to interna-
tional arbitration, state parties are likely to have a common interest in specific solutions, 
and one would think that treaty negotiations would provide a more convenient, not to say 
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predictable, avenue toward such desired solutions than an arbitral procedure in which the 
state’s interest are pitted against those of an aggrieved investor. It follows, then, that to the 
extent that the treaty parties would find themselves in agreement on transparency issues, 
this should lead to these issues being regulated in the treaty. However, as we have seen, on 
a general level, this is hardly the case. The absence of transparency provisions in conven-
tional BITs reveals an apparent lack of awareness of, or willingness to address, transparen-
cy issues on the part of the states entering into these agreements, that, in light of the criti-
cism that has been leveled against investment treaty arbitration in recent years, is quite 
striking. By failing to address transparency in treaties, states miss the legitimacy gains po-
tentially following increased public access to investment arbitration. 
 
There are several possible explanations for the glaring absence of transparency regulation 
in most BITs. However, in order to prepare the ground for a discussion on this point, it is 
useful to first address those of the examined BITs that do in fact feature express provisions 
on the transparency of proceedings. Even though the criticism highlighting the lack of 
transparency in investment arbitration has not been able to impact the practices of most 
states, this does not mean there has been no impact at all. The NAFTA parties have been at 
the vanguard with regard to these issues also in the bilateral context. In recent years signifi-
cant developments in the treaty design of certain states have taken place. These develop-
ments are the subject of the following sections. 
 
2.3.3 Group 2: BITs Providing Procedural Transparency 
Turning the attention to the other group of bilateral treaties, a radically different pattern 
emerges. The, admittedly few, states which have, consistently or on occasion only, opted to 
include provisions on procedural transparency in their BITs have, with some notable excep-
tions, done so in a thorough and comprehensive way. These treaties reflect a range of the 
41 
 
issues that have featured in investment law debate on this topic.
142
 Regulation commonly 
includes provisions on the public registration of the initiation of arbitral proceedings and 
detailed rules concerning document transparency, amicus curiae submissions, public hear-
ings and the public availability of the final award. 
 
The primary actors have been the member states of the NAFTA, primarily Canada and the 
United States. As discussed above under 2.2, the development began within that regime, 
and thus originates not in the context of the isolated investment treaty, but rather in the 
wider context of the free trade agreement.
143
 However, as noted, the transparency rules 
developed within the context of the NAFTA have been carried over into the BIT-landscape 
by way of the model and specific bilateral treaties of the NAFTA-parties, mainly those of 
the United States and Canada. For the last 10 to 15 years, both these states have consistent-
ly included extensive provisions on procedural transparency in their bilateral treaties. In 
some respects, namely in the provisioning of mandatory open hearings and “prompt” publi-
cation of procedural documents, the countries have gone further than Chapter 11 tribunals 
and the NAFTA Free Trade Commission respectively. 
 
In recent years, there have been signs indicating that at least some of the treaty partners of 
the United States and Canada have adopted their attitude on transparency in ISDS. Among 
the BITs concluded in between 2010 and 2013 however, there are hardly any signs of this 
tendency. As mentioned at the outset of section 2.3.2 above, out of the 41 of the 113 BITs 
signed in the period 2010–2013 which were available for review under this section, only 5 
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contain express provisions on transparency. All 5 have Canada as one of the parties. And 
among the 30 supplementary reviewed BITs, only those to which the United States is party 
– the BITs with Uruguay and Rwanda respectively,144 – contain comprehensive transparen-
cy provisions akin to those in the Canadian treaties. These two are the only U.S. BITs con-
cluded between 2004 and 2014, as the United States seems instead to focus on negotiating 
FTAs.
145
  
 
The comprehensive approach to transparency is exemplified by articles 38 and 39 of the 
Canadian model agreement.
146
 According to the Canadian Government, the provisions in 
question are intended to “maximize openness and transparency in the dispute settlement 
process”147, and the two articles does indeed provide for a very high degree of transparency 
in investor-state dispute settlement. By default, the treaty guarantees the public full insight 
into all documents pertaining to an ongoing dispute, allows for public attendance at hear-
ings, and provides tribunals with the discretionary authority to accept amicus curiae sub-
missions. 
  
Under article 38 (1) of the model, arbitral hearings shall be open to the public. The provi-
sion is compulsory, i.e. the parties do not have the opportunity to agree on keeping the pro-
ceedings closed. However the tribunal may decide to keep “portions”, i.e. not the hearings 
in their entirety, closed, if the tribunal considers this to be necessary for the protection of 
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confidential information. Furthermore, the “Tribunal shall establish procedures for the pro-
tection of confidential information and appropriate logistical arrangements for open hear-
ings, in consultation with the disputing parties.”148 Thus far, the most common logistical 
arrangements of open hearings in investment arbitration have been closed-circuit televised 
broadcasting. Recently, however, there have also been examples of live streaming of pro-
ceedings over the internet, so-called webcasting.
149
 
 
Article 38 (3) and (4) concerns document transparency. Article 38 (3) provides for the pub-
lication of tribunal awards, and the public availability of “all other documents submitted to, 
or issued by the Tribunal”, as long as the disputing parties does not agree otherwise, and 
subject to the necessary protection (through redaction) of confidential information. The 
provision encompasses all documents submitted in the proceedings, typically from the no-
tice of arbitration onwards. The wording excludes the written arguments of the parties, to 
the extent that these are not handed over to the tribunal in writing. However, transcripts of 
hearings, which will include the written arguments of the parties to the extent that these are 
presented orally during hearings, shall be issued by the tribunal.
150
 This brings all written 
and oral submissions under the provision, as long as these are reproduced in some form of 
document. Although this is not stated outright, publication shall be prompt.
151
 
 
The effect of article 38 (3) is to establish document transparency as the starting position 
with regard to in investor-state dispute settlement. While most arbitral regimes and IIAs are 
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quiet on the issue of document transparency, and consequently leave the issue to the discre-
tion of the tribunal or the parties themselves
152
, the model instead expressly establishes a 
concrete default position, by requiring the agreement of the parties in order for the proce-
dural documents to remain confidential. Thus, as long as only one disputing party is in fa-
vor of keeping the procedural documents out of from the public eye, these will be made 
publicly available. Access to agreeing on document confidentiality is limited by article 38 
(4), according to which “any Tribunal Award … shall be publicly available, subject to the 
deletion of confidential information.” Thus, under the model, tribunal awards, including 
both awards on jurisdiction and on merits, will always be made public. On the other hand, 
decisions and orders of the tribunal do not constitute awards and are consequently regulated 
by article 38 (3). 
 
Mandatory open hearings compensate, at least to a degree, for the eventuality that the dis-
puting parties should agree on keeping the documents of the dispute confidential. Open 
hearings are no fully adequate replacement however, as attendance demands that one is 
present at the place of arbitration, or alternatively, that the hearings are broadcasted. Given 
Canada’s demonstrated commitment to transparency it is not very likely that it will consent 
to confidentiality in many cases. However, some of Canada’s treaty partners may not share 
this commitment. A mandatory provision on the transparency of documents would have 
provided for guaranteed publication in all arbitrations under treaties to which Canada is 
party, regardless of whether Canada is a disputing party in the case. Nevertheless, even in 
the case of the parties agreeing on confidentiality, the combination of mandatory publica-
tion of awards and open hearings ensure a process with a considerably higher degree of 
transparency than treaties which refer all such issues to the applicable rules. 
 
                                                 
 
152
 Cf. the notion of “no general duty of confidentiality” in investment arbitration as expressed by tribunals 
under ICSID, Additional Facility and UNCITRAL rules, as well as by the FTC in its Notes of Interpretation 
of Certain Chapter 11 Provisions. For references and discussion with regard to tribunal assessments of confi-
dentiality in ISDS, see chapter 3.3.  
45 
 
Article 38 (5) and (6) concern the extent to which the disputing parties may share confiden-
tial information provided to them with their legal counsel and other persons connected to 
the arbitration, and, with regard to a disputing state party, officials of their respective na-
tional and sub-national governments.
153
 
 
Article 38 (7) sets out general exceptions from the duty to disclose information to the other 
party or to the tribunal during proceedings. Information protected from disclosure under the 
provision will not be disclosed at all, and there is consequently not an issue of it entering 
the public domain under Article 38 (3). A converse variant of this provision, Article 38 (8) 
regulates the relationship between the arbitral procedure and national laws on access to 
information with respect to document confidentiality. It provides that in the event of con-
flict between a Tribunal’s order on confidentiality and national statutes on access to infor-
mation, typically “Freedom of Information” acts, the national law shall prevail.154  
 
Article 39 and the accompanying Annex C.39 provide tribunals with the authority to accept 
amicus curiae submissions. Disregarding a few minor differences in language, the provi-
sions are identical to the 2003 FTC Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation, 
providing tribunals with the exact same guidelines and safeguarding duties with regard to 
the decision on whether to accept an application to submit.
155
 Likewise, a tribunal is under 
no obligation to address a brief in the award or otherwise during the proceedings.
156
 Formal 
and substantial requirements for the application to file submissions and the submissions 
themselves are set out in Annex C.39.  
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 Paragraph 6 may be viewed against the background of the decisions of the S.D. Myers and Pope & Talbot 
Tribunals, which restricted Canada’s access to share such information with provincial and local governments. 
See Pope & Talbot, Procedural Order 5; S.D. Myers, Procedural Order 16. 
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156
 Ibid. Article 39 (7). 
46 
 
 
The United States Model BIT is akin to the Canadian model in most respects concerning 
procedural transparency. There are, however, a few significant differences. The most im-
portant difference is that the U.S. Model does not provide the parties with the opportunity 
to agree to keep procedural documents confidential, instead demanding that the disputing 
state “promptly transmit them to the non-disputing Party and make them available to the 
public”, subject to the protection of confidential information.157 Hence, where the Canadian 
model establishes a default position of document transparency, the U.S. model provides for 
a mandatory arrangement. Moreover, rather than requiring the publication of “all docu-
ments submitted to, or issued by, a Tribunal”,158 the U.S. model explicitly states the differ-
ent categories of documents to be published.
159
 The list comprises all the significant cate-
gories of documents, from the notice of intent to the final award. This approach arguably 
adds more clarity than the Canadian model, as there is no room for doubt as to which doc-
uments shall be made publicly available. 
 
Another difference is that while the Canadian model does not provide rules on the designa-
tion of confidential information, the U.S. model contains an elaborate procedure on this 
point.
160
 Finally, Article 38 (5) and (6) of the Canadian model have no equivalents in the 
U.S. one. With regard to amicus curiae submissions, the U.S. model grants tribunals a 
blanket authority to accept these, cf. Article 28 (3). The provision contains no guidelines or 
recommendations, nor does it contain formal and material requirements for applications or 
submission.  
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The five BITs entered into by Canada in the period 2010–2013 contain identical or very 
similar transparency provisions to those of the model agreement.
161
 Notwithstanding the 
differences that have already been noted, so does the U.S. Model BIT and the U.S. BITs 
with Uruguay and Rwanda. An exception should be made with regard to the treaty with 
China, which features a modification that shifts the balance of power sharply in favor of the 
state disputing party. This modification warrants some discussion. 
 
The Canada–China FIPA, signed 2012, in article 28, paragraphs 1 and 2, leaves the issues 
of document transparency (excluding the question regarding the publication of final 
awards, which are always published under the treaty) and open hearings to be decided by 
the state party to the dispute alone. If said party “determines that it is in the public interest 
to do so and notifies the Tribunal of that determination”162, it may decide that hearings 
shall be open and that documents submitted to, or issued by, the tribunal shall be made 
publicly available. With regard to the issue of public hearings, the disputing investor must 
also be consulted.
163
 The decision, however, is the state party’s alone. What this provision 
does, essentially, is it leaves the central transparency issues solely in the hands of the state 
party to the dispute. As such, is departs significantly from article 38 of the Canadian model. 
Leaving the issue of document transparency up to the state disputing party alone may po-
tentially create an imbalance in the arbitration. A tribunal will have no way of reviewing 
the “determination” of the disputing state with regard to public interest in the dispute. A 
consequence might be that investors during the proceedings will have to conform to the 
fact that documents may be published at any given time, if the disputing party so sees fit. 
As such, the provision potentially constitutes a weapon for the state party. While not neces-
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 The treaties exhibit differences in the level of detail, mainly on the procedure and formal and qualitative 
requirements for amicus curiae submissions. See Canada–China BIT (2012) Articles 28 and 29, and Annex 
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sarily constituting a threat to the proceedings – as in a mandatory regime parties would 
have had to relate to transparency as a matter of course – the provision nevertheless creates 
an element of unpredictability which would not have been present with a mandatory provi-
sion.  
 
It is probably safe to assume that the relative power of China, as well as the prestige and 
importance associated with the conclusion of the treaty, are central factors in explaining 
why Canada was willing to break a pattern it has consistently applied in its recent agree-
ments.
164
 Indeed, China’s default position seems to be to have no regulation of transparen-
cy issues at all in its investment agreements. As already noted, the China Model BIT from 
2003 contains no provision on such issues
165
, and the only mentioning of any transparency-
related issue in the three other Chinese BITs examined for this chapter, the China–
Colombia BIT, the China-Russia BIT and the China–Mexico BIT, can be found in Article 
20 (4) in the agreement with Mexico, which provides that final awards shall be made pub-
lic, unless the parties otherwise agree.
166
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 Similarly, Saulino (2012) p. 13. 
165
 On the Chinese Model BIT, see Shan and Gallagher (2013). The commentary does not touch upon issues 
pertaining to procedural transparency.   
166
 The dispute settlement mechanism of this treaty is considered to be based more on NAFTA Chapter 11 
than the Chinese model, see Shan and Gallagher (2013) p. 174. Regrettably, none of the four other BITs en-
tered into by China in the designated time period were available. Based on the modest transparency regulation 
in Article 20 (4) of the treaty with Mexico, which is in line with Mexico’s obligations under NAFTA Article 
1137, and the lack of any express regulation in the Colombia–China BIT and the China– Russia BIT, it would 
be surprising if China’s unpublished treaties (with the Democratic Republic of Congo, Chad, Libya and Uz-
bekistan) from the period 2010–2013 contain extensive provisions on transparency. 
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Kuwait, Slovakia, Benin and Tanzania, i.e. the other states with which Canada concluded 
BITs in the designated time period, all concluded BITs with other states during this time.
167
 
However, out of those treaties for which text is available, none contains express provisions 
on procedural transparency. Rather, these treaties place themselves firmly in the “conven-
tional” camp. This finding further strengthens the image of the development in treaty de-
sign with regard to procedural transparency as being a phenomenon primarily encouraged 
and put on the agenda by the United States and Canada.  
 
Mexico, itself party to the highly transparent NAFTA-regime, has largely failed to provide 
extensive transparency in its BITs. In addition to the abovementioned treaty with China, 
Mexico entered into ten BITs between 2005 and 2009 (but none after), out of which text is 
available for nine
168
. None of the available treaties contains any express regulation of pro-
cedural transparency beyond simple provisions concerning the conditions for publication of 
final awards. Publication is usually subject to the agreement between the disputing parties, 
though whether the treaties establish publication or confidentiality as default position var-
ies
169
. The only treaty providing for the mandatory publication of final awards is the Mexi-
co–Spain BIT (2006), cf. article 16, paragraph 4. Compared to the broad and nuanced regu-
lation that characterizes the treaties of the United States and Canada, the Mexican approach 
as expressed in its BITs is not very convincing, and does not indicate that transparency is 
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 The treaties for which text is available are Kuwait–Turkey BIT (2010), Kuwait–Pakistan BIT (2011), 
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considered an important policy issue. Through the (potential) publication only of final 
awards, transparency is granted only after the conclusion of proceedings, which reduces the 
chances of public and third-party interest or participation. Although not totally dismissive 
of procedural transparency, Mexico’s BITs signal not much more than a weak middle posi-
tion. 
2.3.4 BITs and Pieces: Discussion. 
 
The differences between treaties providing for transparent dispute settlement and treaties 
which are silent on these issues are quite striking. What are possible explanations for the 
widespread lack of express transparency regulation in recent BITs? What are the driving 
forces behind the approach of those states which do favor transparency of proceedings? If 
such driving forces can be identified, why do these not influence the approach of other 
states?  
 
Absence of provisions on procedural transparency is in line with the traditional BIT-design 
outlined above.
170
 Conversely, treaties which do provide express regulation of procedural 
transparency issues usually also exhibit a more detailed dispute settlement process in gen-
eral.
171
 As such, these treaties can perhaps be seen as expressions of a desire and ability on 
the part of the negotiating parties, or at least the dominant party, to reflect upon and regu-
late the different phases and aspects of the dispute settlement process in more depth. Com-
pared to these more comprehensive treaties, the traditional BIT appears quite modest, to put 
it mildly. 
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 UNCTAD (2012), p. 36. 
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 Compare, e.g., the U.S.–Uruguay BIT (2008) and the Switzerland–Trinidad and Tobago BIT (2010). The 
former treaty comprises 37 articles, 8 annexes and a protocol. 14 articles concern investor-state dispute set-
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The silence of most recent BITs might be at least partly explained by adapting a historical 
perspective. Historically, as is well known, BITs were negotiated primarily between capital 
exporting and capital importing states,
172
 and often concluded in haste and on the basis of 
“boiler-plate” texts, prepared in advance by the capital exporting party.173 Transparency of 
proceedings was not an issue in these treaties. This raises the question of whether the con-
tinuing failure of the large majority of states to regulate the transparency of arbitral pro-
ceedings is a remnant of the historical system, i.e. an effect of states being somewhat fas-
tened in the traditional form of the BIT. 
  
The short and concise form of the traditionally designed BIT does not provide an ideal 
structure for detailed regulation of the finer points of the arbitration procedure, such as 
transparency issues. As noted, there is usually not much regulation of procedural issues at 
all. Thus, going into treaty-negotiations, a certain initiative or determination is perhaps re-
quired in order to break the mould. However, any initiative would presuppose an awareness 
or interest with regard to transparency issues among negotiators. In the absence of such 
factors, the traditional treaty form in itself will likely work against the expansion of proce-
dural regulation. It seems then, that as long as negotiating parties are not willing or able to 
reflect on and confront the form of treaties and the connection between the treaties and the 
arbitral procedure with regard to the possibilities of fine-tuning procedural issues, one will 
probably continue to see the same slim treaty documents that we have seen dominating the 
majority of the body of recent BITs. 
 
Some signs indicate that the traditional pattern with regard to BIT design might be break-
ing. Increasingly, early BITs are renegotiated, and many of these renegotiated treaties come 
equipped with more elaborate investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, as well as oth-
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er alterations.
174
 There are several reasons for this development. Some states seek to 
strengthen investment protection standards; others seek a balancing of the states’ interests 
as prospective respondent and the interest in establishing a functioning investment protec-
tion regime.
175
 With regard to such a shift towards “balance” as an aim, several states have 
reviewed their investment treaty programs and models with a view to improve their treaties 
in this respect.
176
 The aim has been “to ensure consistency with the public interest, adjust 
the old model to new developments, and seek a ‘balance between protecting investor and 
host country’.”177 Increased transparency of proceedings would seem to fall well in line 
with these aims. However, against the background of the BITs reviewed for this study, any 
such changes in policy aims do not seem to have had much of an effect with respect to the 
regulation of the transparency of investor-state dispute settlement. Even those of the exam-
ined treaties which contain more elaborate dispute settlement provisions or are less tradi-
tional by design do not touch upon procedural transparency at all.
178
 If anything, this indi-
cates that for most states, procedural transparency is neither considered a pressing issue in 
negotiations nor something that needs to be addressed as part of a balanced approach to 
BITs. It seems then, that while states to different degrees are conscious of the need to mod-
ernize their treaties, there seems to be little support for concluding that transparency in dis-
pute settlement is a notable concern. 
 
It is conceivable that the majority of states are of the opinion that procedural transparency 
issues best belong under the different applicable rules, or that procedural transparency is 
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considered an unimportant issue per se. This is clearly not an opinion shared by all invest-
ment-treaty concluding states, as evidenced by the U.S. and Canadian treaties already dis-
cussed, and the way transparency has been a point of contestation in many arbitral proceed-
ings.
179
 However, despite the widespread criticism, it is a possibility that states themselves 
do not really consider increasing the transparency of investment arbitration an important 
aim. Indeed, one may argue that because a lack of publicly available information pertaining 
to investment disputes is likely to constitute an effective barrier to public discussion and 
pressure from civil society, it is not out of the question that a state may consider lack of 
transparency an advantage. This may especially be a concern in cases where negotiated 
settlement is a possible outcome. The political costs of lost cases and expensive settlements 
will likely be less damaging if a dispute is not well known in the public sphere. However, 
states actively avoiding the inclusion of transparency provisions in their BITs are not likely 
to admit that this is the case. On the other hand, lack of public discussion not only relieves 
the state from public pressure, but the investor as well. And a foreign investor will often 
have a considerably more vulnerable public image than the host state, a fact the state may 
wish to take advantage of. In that respect, express provisions increasing the transparency of 
arbitration proceedings could potentially constitute a tool for the disputing state against the 
investor, as public documents and information may be utilized in public discussion, typical-
ly through the media.
180
 From the perspective of states as both negotiating and disputing 
parties, this argument constitutes another point in favor of express transparency provisions 
in BITs. 
                                                 
 
179
 See the relevant case law discussed in section 3.3. 
180
 Such media tactics was subject to tribunal scrutiny in the well-known Biwater Gauff-case. During the 
proceedings the tribunal, operating under ICSID rules, issued a procedural order restricting the access of the 
parties to publicly disclose information pertaining to the dispute. Tanzania had previously published the 
Minutes of the First Session of the Arbitral Tribunal online. Had the treaty providing the basis for the dispute 
contained an express right to make procedural documents public, and as such modified the applicable rules, 
the tribunal could not have issued such an order. See Biwater Gauff, Procedural Order 3, and below chapter 
3.4. 
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Turning to the few BITs which contain express and comprehensive provisions on proce-
dural transparency, namely the seven recent U.S. and Canadian BITs, it is necessary to ad-
dress the “driving forces” behind these states’ adherence to transparent proceedings. As 
was discussed at length in section 2.2 above, the developments within the NAFTA, togeth-
er with clear unilateral policy in favour of increased transparency, led to the adoption of 
revised model treaties in 2004. Perhaps the clearest example of a general commitment to-
wards transparency as a policy issue is the United States Trade Act of 2002, which, as we 
recall, referred explicitly to transparency in investor-state dispute settlement.
181
 A wish to 
adhere to national access to information laws has been another significant factor.
182
 These 
developments constitute the primary explanations for the current design of U.S. and Cana-
dian BITs. Combined, the elements create an impression of a significant commitment to 
procedural transparency in Canada and the U.S.   
 
It is possible to place the U.S. and Canadian positions on transparency in the context of a 
supposed reorientation of investment treaties in the direction of a more balanced approach 
with regard to state and investor interests.
183
 While it is not necessarily correct to consider 
procedural transparency an issue concerning the relationship between investor and state per 
se, increased regulation of the arbitral procedure may be considered an obstacle by inves-
tors.
184
 To the extent that a state is interested in weakening incentives to arbitration, in-
creased mandatory transparency may constitute one of a number of instruments for this 
purpose. 
 
Comparing the “silent” BITs with the seven U.S. and Canadian agreements which do pro-
vide comprehensive transparency provisions highlight the “pro-active” nature of the latter 
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with regard to the procedural issues that potentially surface over the course of a given arbi-
tration: As states during treaty negotiations might take on and arrive at mandatory solutions 
to fundamental transparency issues before the conclusion of the treaty, they avoid having to 
subject themselves to the discretionary judgment of an arbitral tribunal in the case such 
issues should arise during proceedings. The treaty will provide the answer.
185
 In the midst 
of a dispute, things are rarely so simple. Considering that a tribunal in its administration of 
the arbitral proceedings has an obligation to respect and balance the interests of both parties 
to the dispute
186
, a state party might find it difficult to push through its desired solution to 
the issue at hand. During the negotiation of a bilateral treaty, on the other hand, there is no 
present and concrete investor interest that demands to be taken into account. Obviously, a 
state instead faces other constraints, primarily the negotiating power and leverage of the 
other party. Nevertheless, it does seem fairly obvious that states find themselves signifi-
cantly less constrained by external forces with regard to working out preferred solutions to 
a given issue than when they face similar issues in the midst of arbitral proceedings. Fur-
thermore, the express regulation of procedural transparency issues in treaty texts would 
contribute to both increased predictability and possibly lower financial and temporal costs 
in connection with dispute settlement, as less time will have to be spent on procedural ar-
rangements pertaining to transparency. These improvements, together with the potentially 
heightened legitimacy of a more transparent system, seem to be the primary gains of in-
cluding in treaties comprehensive solutions to procedural transparency issues. Potentially, 
the nature of these gains is simultaneously legal-technical (less extensive, complex and 
resource-intensive dispute settlement) and normative (increased legitimacy following 
greater transparency). 
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Based on the selection of BITs examined for this chapter, there is not much pointing in the 
direction of a radical shift in state practice with regard to the inclusion of transparency pro-
visions in investment treaties. Rather, the picture painted by the body of recently concluded 
BITs rather seems to point in the other direction, with only Canada and the United States 
consistently including detailed regulation of the transparency of arbitral proceedings, Mex-
ico taking a weak middle position, and the large majority of states steering clear of any 
transparency regulation at all. However, to conclude on the basis of BITs only would ig-
nore the increasing tendency to include investment chapters in FTAs. Surveying the in-
vestment chapters of the many FTAs concluded over the last 10 to 15 years provide im-
portant nuances and significant supplements to the findings discussed in this section. In-
deed, the agreements reveal what may constitute certain regional developments with regard 
to procedural transparency in investment arbitration. The following section will examine 
these materials. 
 
2.4 Investment chapters in “other IIAs”  
2.4.1 Introduction 
Economic globalization is fueled by the liberalization and coordination of international 
trade and increasing levels of foreign direct investment.
187
 Constituting the tools of the 
trade, international trade agreements are an essential component of the global economy. 
Since the 1990s, the global body of RTAs has been growing steadily.
188
 An increasing 
number of such treaties contain specific chapters on investment promotion and protection, 
many including mechanisms for ISDS. By design, these investment chapters commonly 
appear quite like BITs, including the same type of standards of protection and the same 
mechanisms for international arbitration. For this section I have examined all the agree-
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ments listed as in force in the “Regional Trade Agreements”-database of the WTO.189 In 
addition to conventional bilateral and regional free trade agreements, the database encom-
passes other treaty types, such as partial scope agreements, framework agreements and 
basic customs unions. Comprehensive investment chapters rarely feature in non-BIT IIAs 
other than FTAs/RFTAs.
190
 Some treaties provide limited investment protection such as 
provisions on pre-establishment and capital movements;
191
 others make investment protec-
tion and promotion an issue of future cooperation and negotiation
192
. The treaties subject to 
discussion in the present section is what is usually referred to as trade and investment 
agreements (“TIAs”). These are treaties “that include investment chapters or provisions but 
do not include agreements that refer solely to future negotiations or cooperation as to in-
vestment.”193 However, TIAs that do not feature mechanisms for investor-state dispute set-
tlement generally fall outside the scope of the issues at hand. It is the dispute settlement 
mechanism that is under scrutiny. 
 
The object of the present and following sections is to assess whether an examination of the 
body of relevant TIAs alters the impression created by the examination of BITs in the pre-
ceding section with regard to the prevalence and design of express provisions on procedural 
transparency in investment agreements. This is primarily an empirical question, concerning 
the prevalence and characteristics of provisions on procedural transparency in these trea-
ties. However, there is also a broader issue of the nature and context of TIAs as opposed to 
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BITs. To the extent that the two treaty types differ on the regulation of transparency in in-
vestment disputes, are there significant differences between them which contribute to ex-
plain any such differences? Both issues will be addressed in the following; the former will 
dominate the two following sections, while the latter will resurface in section 2.4.4.   
 
Out of the total 230 TIAs examined for this section, 78 contain comprehensive investment 
protection chapters, including mechanisms for ISDS, or a catalog of investment protection 
provisions equivalent to those found in regular BITs.
194
 The dispute settlement mechanisms 
available to investors by and large follow the pattern of BITs, i.e. ICSID, ICSID Additional 
Facility and UNCITRAL, with some treaties opening for other regimes if agreed upon. Ex-
press recourse to other arbitral regimes is rare. 
 
At the outset of this section, an interesting observation is the evening out of the balance 
between the number of agreements containing express provisions and the ones which do 
not. Out of the 78 relevant agreements, as many as 39 contain express provisions on the 
transparency of arbitral proceedings. This number is significantly higher than the number 
of BITs featuring similar provisions. The corresponding numbers of BITs were 7 out of 71. 
On closer inspection, the details of the agreements reviewed disclose that the United States 
and Canada exhibit the same great enthusiasm for a high degree of transparency in inves-
tor-state arbitration in their FTAs as they do in their BITs. In reality, of course, the isolated 
issue of investment protection is exactly the same in both contexts, and policy positions are 
likely to be similar. Therefore, there is no surprise to discover that transparency provisions 
in the FTAs of the two countries are identical or highly similar to those in their models 
agreements and BITs. However, Canada and the United States are merely party to 21 of the 
FTAs under review, and only 14 of these contain express provisions on transparency.
195
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When looking at the total of the available FTAs, a more widespread tendency of regulating 
procedural transparency than that indicated by the examination of BITs can be observed. 
Simply put, the FTAs show that more countries than the NAFTA parties regulate the trans-
parency of investment arbitration. In light of these findings, Canada and the United States 
might be seen as instigators rather than isolated advocates of the transparency evolution. 
The extent of their influence will be assessed in the following section. 
 
In contrast to the preceding section, I have chosen to start this section with treaties featur-
ing express transparency provisions. The reason is a wish to attempt to trace the influence 
of the Unites States and Canada. How far does it reach? Where does it stop? This entails a 
stronger regional perspective than in the section on BITs. To best express the regional ten-
dency, I will start where it has been most pronounced.  
 
2.4.2 “The New World” – Procedural Transparency in the TIAs of the Americas 
The earliest example of comprehensive provisions on procedural transparency in invest-
ment agreements, both BITs and TIAs, known to this writer is the Unites States-Chile FTA, 
signed in June 2003 and in force January 2004.
196
 Tellingly, this treaty was signed the same 
year as the United States revised its Model Treaty to reflect the transparency development 
that had at the time recently taken place within the NAFTA.  
   
                                                                                                                                                    
 
or investment dispute settlement provisions, e.g. United States-Israel FTA (in force 1985), or they provide 
investment protection through reference to older BITs still in force which do not contain provisions on trans-
parency, e.g. United States-Bahrain FTA (in force 2009, makes reference to BIT from 1999).   
196
 See Gantz (2003) for an overview of the evolution of United States FTAs as expressed in this and the 
United States-Singapore FTA (in force 2004). The United States-Chile FTA predates the United States BIT 
with Uruguay from 2005, as well as all of Canada’s treaties containing similar transparency provisions. How-
ever, the United States-Singapore FTA was signed the same year as the treaty with Chile and contains similar 
transparency provisions. This treaty will be discussed in connection with the noticeable absence of similar 
provisions in Singapore’s other FTAs, see below. 
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The treaty offers investment protection in chapter 10, section B of which provides mecha-
nisms for investor-state dispute settlement. The treaty covers the same basic transparency 
issues as the US (and Canadian
197
) models and BITs, i.e. providing for mandatory docu-
ment transparency and open hearings, both subject to the protection of confidential infor-
mation, as well as vesting in tribunals the authority to allow for amicus curiae submis-
sions.
198
 There is nothing in the section on investor-state dispute settlement that reflects its 
placement in a comprehensive free trade agreement as compared to a basic investment trea-
ty. The agreement is fully in line with the 2004 and 2012 American model agreements on 
this point. 
 
The United States-Chile FTA is only the first in a relatively long line of TIAs concluded 
between 2004 and 2013 that contains investment chapters with comprehensive procedural 
transparency provisions. Reviewing these treaties reveal transparency in ISDS to be a pri-
marily American phenomenon, with express regulation increasingly common in many trea-
ties involving Central and South American states. Certain states have played important 
roles in this development, with the United States, and to a lesser extent Canada, responsible 
for dispersing transparency regulation southwards through their treaties. In addition to 
Chile, both Colombia and Peru have relatively consistently included transparency regula-
tion of the NAFTA variety in their treaties concluded over the course of the last ten years, 
at least when restricting ones’ perspective to those of their treaties concluded with other 
American states.
199
 That all three of these states have done so after first having concluded 
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 Notwithstanding the option to agree on document confidentiality, as provided by the Canadian treaties.  
198
 Cf. Articles 10.19 paragraph 3 (on amicus) and 10.20. 
199
 As of 2013, Peru has concluded 11 FTAs, and 5 of these, all with parties from the Americas, contain 
transparency provisions similar or identical to article 10.19 and 10.20 of the United States–Chile FTA, see 
Peru–United States FTA (2009) articles 10.20 (3) and 10.21, Peru–Panama FTA (2012) articles 12.21, para-
graph 2 and 12.22, Peru–Chile FTA (2009) articles 11.20, paragraph 3 and 11.21, Peru–Canada FTA (2009) 
articles 830 and 831, Peru–Costa Rica FTA (2013) articles 12.21 paragraph 2 and 12.24. In addition, the 
Peru–Mexico FTA (2012) provides somewhat weaker transparency regulation, providing both parties with a 
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FTAs with the United States, is neither a coincidence nor a surprise, given the U.S. position 
on procedural transparency. 
 
Colombia has recently been highlighted as one of the modifying forces of the investment 
arbitration system
200
 and an examination of the country’s recent investment agreements 
with other Latin-American states support such a claim. Of the five
201
 relevant Colombian 
FTAs reviewed for this section, all but one contains the same broad range of transparency 
provisions as we have seen in US and Canadian treaties.
202
 For instance, Colombia’s FTA 
with Chile is testament to both states’ commitment to raising the transparency standards of 
investor-state dispute settlement also in the absence of direct U.S. influence and pressure. 
The same can be said with regard to the Colombia–Northern Triangle FTA.203 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
right to make documents public. See articles 11.31, paragraph and 11.34. On Peru’s other FTAs se below 
under 2.4.2. 
200
 UNCTAD (2013), p. 113, footnote 82. 
201
 I consider the Colombia–Northern Triangle FTA (in force 2009) to be a single agreement, between Co-
lombia on the one hand, and El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras on the other. 
202
 The five treaties are: Colombia–Mexico FTA (1995), Colombia–United States FTA (signed 2006, in force 
2012), Colombia–Canada FTA (2011), Colombia–Chile FTA (2009) and Colombia–Northern Triangle FTA 
(2009). The 1995-treaty with Mexico, unsurprisingly, is silent on transparency issues. As we recall, as early 
as 1995 procedural transparency had not yet become a contested issue among the investment law community. 
The Colombia-EFTA FTA (2011) does not contain investment protection or dispute settlement relevant for 
this paper. It is worth noting that when it comes to document transparency, Colombia generally opts for the 
mandatory publication clause identical to the one featured in the treaties of the United States, see Colombia-
United States FTA, Article 10.21 (1), Colombia-Chile FTA, Article 9.21 (1), Colombia-Northern Triangle 
FTA, Article 12.24, (1), cf. U.S. Model BIT, Article 29 (1). The only exception is the Colombia-Canada FTA, 
which gives the parties the opportunity of agreeing to keep procedural documents (excluding final awards) 
confidential. As we recall, this is in line with Canadian policy. See Colombia–Canada FTA, Article 830 (1). 
203
 Colombia–Northern Triangle FTA, Articles 12.23 (3), 12.24. The countries constituting the Northern Tri-
angle were at this point already party to the Central America–Dominican Republic–United States FTA (in 
force 2006), which provides for extensive transparency in line with the U.S. model, see the following para-
graph. 
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The consistent approach of Colombia with regard to regulating the transparency of ISDS in 
its FTAs is only one of a growing number of examples of the increasing adherence and 
loyalty to transparency standards with regard to ISDS in treaties involving Latin-American 
countries. In addition to the countries already mentioned, the Central American states of 
Costa Rica and Nicaragua have both entered into treaties containing similar transparency 
provisions as the other states in the region.
204
 A key document in this regard is the Central 
America-Dominican Republic-United States FTA (“CAFTA-DR”), signed 2004 and in 
force 2006. CAFTA-DR is the first treaty involving Central American parties that features 
the type of transparency provisions known from the NAFTA regime. This treaty, the Co-
lombia–United States FTA and the Chile–United States FTA are the first treaties involving 
Latin American countries expressing a desire to open up the arbitral process, and should be 
considered the foundational documents with regard to extending “NAFTA-transparency” to 
Latin America. 
 
The enthusiastic approach of American countries to transparency in ISDS in the years fol-
lowing the United States-Chile FTA has been consistent, with two exceptions. As we recall 
from the preceding section, the BITs of Mexico do not provide for the same level of trans-
parency in arbitration as the two other North American states, and the same skepticism or 
restraint can be observed in Mexican TIAs. The practice of avoiding extensive and manda-
tory provisions on transparency issues is sustained throughout Mexican treaties both with 
countries from the Americas and with countries from other regions.
205
 However, when at-
                                                 
 
204
 In addition to the CAFTA–DR FTA, see the Costa Rica–Peru FTA (in force 2013), Article, and the Nica-
ragua–Taiwan FTA (in force 2008), Articles 10.20 (2) and 10.21. Interestingly, the Panama–Central America 
FTA (in force 2008) does not feature these broad transparency provisions. See more on this treaty below. 
205
 Mexico is party to 9 TIAs (excluding FTAs with Israel and EFTA because of lack of relevant investment 
regulation and dispute settlement), and none of these feature the broad provisions known from the treaties of 
the United States, Canada and most Central and South American countries. At best, Mexican treaties provide 
the disputing party with the authority to make procedural documents public, see discussion in next paragraph 
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tempting to make viable assumptions regarding Mexican policy in relation to procedural 
transparency, it is important to keep in mind the time most of these agreements were con-
cluded. Mexico has been concluding FTAs since around the time NAFTA went into force, 
and all but two of its 9 TIAs went into force prior to 2004. As we recall, one did not ob-
serve express treaty regulation of the full range of procedural transparency issues until 
around 2004. Against this background, the generally consistent tendency of Mexican trea-
ties to limit transparency regulation to the issue of publication of awards is unsurprising, as 
it reflects the common approach to the issues at that juncture in time. 
 
There have been some signs of a development in Mexican TIAs in the years after 2004, but 
no apparent dedication to openness and transparency in general. The two most recent of 
Mexico’s TIAs, the FTAs with Japan and Peru, both expressly provide either disputing 
party with the authority to publish procedural documents. However, this is a purely discre-
tionary power;
206
 the treaty establishes no default position of transparency. As such, it is 
fundamentally different from the mandatory publication clauses known from other Ameri-
can treaties. Nevertheless, although modest, the provisions signify a possible shift towards 
increased transparency. However, the assumption of such a shift seems difficult to recon-
cile with transparency regulation in Mexico’s recent BITs. As we recall, these treaties con-
sistently concern themselves only with the publication of final awards. With regard to the 
treaty with Peru, in light of Peru’s general positive attitude to transparency in ISDS, one 
might speculate that its relative openness with regard to document transparency may have 
come as a result of Peruvian pressure. But the similar provision in the earlier treaty with 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
on Mexico’s FTAs with Peru and Japan. 7 treaties either makes publication of final awards conditional upon 
party agreement, or refer the issue to be resolved by the applicable arbitration rules.  
206
 See Mexico–Japan FTA (in force 2005), Article 94 (4): “Either disputing party may make available to the 
public in a timely manner all documents, including an award, submitted to, or issued by, a Tribunal estab-
lished under this Section”. The Mexico–Peru FTA (in force 2012), Article 11.34 (1) contains the same provi-
sion. In addition, article 11.31 provides that final awards shall be made public unless the parties otherwise 
agree. 
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Japan can probably not be explained based on such a rationale. Japan does not regulate 
procedural transparency in any of its other IIAs. Against this background, the two treaties 
constitute interesting outliers among Mexican TIAs. 
 
The other exception, less explicit perhaps, to the emerging American “continental consen-
sus” on procedural transparency is the treaties of Panama. Panama initially seemed reluc-
tant to include the same broad provisions as those featured in treaties of Colombia, Peru 
and the Central American states, as evidenced by its FTA with Chile, which does not touch 
upon transparency issues.
207
 The treaty was concluded two years after the Chile-United 
States FTA and around the same time as the conclusion of the Australia–Chile FTA, both 
of which feature very broad transparency provisions.
208
 The Panama–Central America 
FTA, in force 2008, is similarly limited with regard to transparency, the only provision on 
the subject making the publication of final awards conditional upon agreement between the 
disputing parties.
209
 
 
Panama’s recent treaties with countries hailing from its home region indicate a change in 
attitude. The Panama-Peru FTA (in force 2012), the Panama–United States FTA (in force 
2012) and the Panama–Canada FTA (in force 2013) all provide the level of transparency 
common in post-2004 treaties from the region. Whether the provisions of these three 
agreements are testament to a profound shift in favor of increased transparency on the part 
of Panamanian negotiators and policy makers, or just a result of the imbalances in bargain-
ing power in the context of the specific negotiations, is of course not entirely clear. It is 
very unlikely that Panama would resist U.S. and Canadian priorities on this point. On the 
other hand, the differences in bargaining power between Chile and Peru are probably not 
too significant, and if Panama was able to keep transparency regulation out of its treaty 
                                                 
 
207
 Panama–Chile FTA (signed 2006, in force 2008) provides investment protection by reference to the Pan-
ama–Chile BIT from 1996. This latter treaty is silent with regard to procedural transparency issues. 
208
 Australia–Chile FTA (in force 2009), Articles 10.20 (2) and 10.22. 
209
 Article 10.38 (4). 
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with Chile, why should it not be able to achieve this in its negotiations with Peru? A possi-
ble explanation could be that the emerging regional consensus has strengthened in the years 
between the conclusion of the treaty with Chile and the treaty with Peru, to the extent that 
this development has now been accepted by Panama. Another possible explanation is that 
the apparent change in attitude on transparency reflects a more profound policy shift among 
Panamanian treaty-makers, similar to that which took place in Canada and the United 
States 10 years ago. A third explanation may be that transparency, for whatever reason, was 
not an issue during the negotiation of the two earlier FTAs. If neither negotiating party 
considers procedural transparency an important issue, it is more likely to be left out of the 
treaty, especially if such issues are not regulated in models
210
 or other frameworks provid-
ing the basis for negotiations. Despite the strong transparency provisions in several of the 
other TIAs of Chile and the Central American states, it is possible that the issue was not on 
the table during negotiations with Panama. 
 
To sum up, there is a distinct and consistent tendency among Latin-American states to 
adopt the same kind of transparency provisions that have been a fixture of Canadian and 
U.S. investment treaties since the model agreement revisions of 2004 in TIAs with other 
Latin-American states. With the exception of Mexico, which still seems not to have a con-
sistent policy in this regard – most often limiting regulation of transparency to provisions 
concerning the publication of final awards,
211
 the conditions for differ somewhat across its 
treaties – it seems safe to conclude that a consensus supporting procedural transparency in 
investment arbitration has been established among Latin-American states. 
2.4.3 ”The Real World” – No global development? 
When reviewing the body of TIAs subject to this study and the extent to which these fea-
ture provisions on procedural transparency of the arbitral procedure, one is struck by a sur-
prisingly distinct geographical pattern. The consistent support for transparency described in 
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 I am not aware of any Panamanian, Peruvian or Chilean model BITs. 
211
 With the exception of the already discussed FTA with Peru. 
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the preceding section, when taking a global view, appears to be restricted primarily to the 
Americas. Of the 39 TIAs reviewed containing express provisions on transparency in 
ISDS, 21 have both parties belonging to either North or South America, while 12 treaties 
have one of the parties hailing from the region. Finally, a modest 6 have both parties be-
longing to other parts of the world.  In the following, I will take a closer look at the particu-
lars of this apparent pattern, in order to try to substantiate upon what I view as distinct re-
gional tendencies with regard to attitude and approach to procedural transparency in in-
vestment arbitration. As the treaties to which both parties hail from the Americas have al-
ready been discussed in the preceding section, the focus in the present section will be on 
the other two constellations. 
 
The established impression of the success of the United States and Canada with regard to 
the inclusion of comprehensive transparency provisions in their investment treaties is fur-
ther strengthened when examining the two state’s agreements with states outside the Amer-
icas. Of the 12 agreements containing express transparency provisions concluded by one 
country from the American continents and one from another region, 5 have the United 
States or Canada as one of the parties.
212
 That the United States and Canada have sufficient 
bargaining power to push through their desired regulations in negotiations is no surprise.
213
 
In addition, the abovementioned Mexico–Japan FTA provide for the possibility of making 
all documents public. 
 
When looking at the way procedural transparency is regulated in Latin-American countries’ 
TIAs with non-American parties, the absence of comprehensive provisions on procedural 
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 See U.S.–Republic of Korea FTA (in force 2012), U.S.–Oman FTA (in force 2009), U.S.–Morocco FTA 
(in force 2006) and U.S.–Singapore FTA (in force 2004). The Canada–Jordan FTA (in force 2012) does not 
contain a separate investment chapter, but references the 2009-BIT between the two states, which provide 
procedural transparency in line with the Canadian Model FIPA.  
213
 Although there is at least one treaty partially breaking the North-American success pattern in this respect, 
see the Canada–China BIT, discussed above. 
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transparency is obvious. At the time of writing, Latin-American states (Mexico notwith-
standing) have concluded 14 TIAs containing mechanisms for ISDS with non-American 
parties, all but one
214
 of them concluded after 2004.
215
 Six treaties contain express provi-
sions on procedural transparency. However, in four of these (three of which involve Cen-
tral-American states and Taiwan) the conditions for the publication of final awards are the 
only transparency issue regulated.
216
 The fourth, the Republic of Korea–Chile FTA (in 
force 2004) does, somewhat surprisingly, allow for unilateral publication of final awards.
217
 
A mere 2 treaties feature the same type of comprehensive regulation that have seemingly 
become the standard in continental American investment agreements.
218
 These numbers 
stand in sharp contrast to the recent inter-American IIAs discussed above, and strongly 
indicate that the transparency-oriented Latin Americans have met considerable resistance 
on this point when negotiating outside their region. An alternative explanation may be that 
there are circumstances surrounding some of these treaties or the investment opportunities 
that lie beneath them that alter the aims of the negotiating parties with regard to treaty de-
sign. If so, there must be present specific conditions relevant to the distinct investment re-
gime that will be established under the treaty, conditions which call for a different approach 
to transparency than the one generally expressed through inter-American treaties. In the 
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 The Republic of Korea–Chile FTA was signed 2003, around the time of the Chile–U.S. FTA, and went 
into force in 2004. 
215
 According to the WTO list of RTAs in force. 
216
 See the El Salvador and Honduras–Taiwan FTA (in force 2008), Guatemala–Taiwan FTA (2006), Pana-
ma–Taiwan (in force 2004), all three of which makes publication of final awards conditional upon party con-
sent, cf. Articles 10.39 (4), 10.38 (4) and 10.38 (4), respectively. 
217
 None of Korea’s other TIA examined herein contain similar provisions, with the exception of its FTA with 
the U.S. Interestingly, the treaty with Chile is the earliest of Korea’s FTA, and it’s relative openness may be 
an expression of a policy that was later changed.  
218
 Australia–Chile FTA (in force 2009), Articles 10.20 (2) (with regard to amicus submissions) and 10.22, 
Nicaragua–Taiwan (in force 2008) Articles 10.20 (2) (with regard to amicus submissions) and 10.21. That the 
latter treaty provides extensive transparency is somewhat surprising in light of the other Taiwanese treaties 
with Central-American countries, which only set down conditions for publication of final awards. 
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present context, in order to constitute relevant arguments against transparent dispute set-
tlement, the conditions and considerations in question must benefit from lack of transpar-
ency. It would, however, go beyond the scope of the present study to pursue these ques-
tions in detail. Whatever the underlying reasons may be, what is clear is the consistent ab-
sence of extensive transparency regulation in most treaties between Latin-American states 
and states from other regions. And there is no other reasonable explanation why these 
countries would diverge from what has been a fairly consistent treaty practice than the spe-
cific context and circumstances of these diverging treaties. 
 
To illustrate the pattern outlined in the preceding paragraph, one may consider for instance 
the treaties of Peru. Peru has per date concluded 11 FTAs, five of which are with countries 
from outside the Americas.
219
 None of these 5 treaties contain any express regulation of 
transparency in investment disputes, and as such exhibit a significantly different approach 
compared to the six Peruvian treaties with American counterparts, treaties which were con-
cluded in the same period of time. Peru’s 4 BITs from the years after 2004 conforms to this 
pattern.
220
 Colombia, on the other hand, has only concluded one FTA with non-American 
states, and this treaty, with EFTA (in force 2011), does not provide investor-state dispute 
settlement. As such, it does not shine light on the present issues. However, when reviewing 
the 7 Colombian BITs from after 2004, the pattern characterizing Peru’s agreements is re-
affirmed. Colombia’s BIT with Peru is the only one that contains extensive provisions on 
procedural transparency.
221
 The others, all with parties from regions other than the Ameri-
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 These five are: Peru–Japan FTA (2012) Peru–EFTA FTA (in force 2011), Peru–China FTA (in force 
2010), Peru–Republic of Korea FTA (in force 2011), Peru–Singapore FTA (in force 2009). The treaty with 
EFTA does not offer mechanisms for ISDS. 
220
 See Peru–Belgium BIT (2005) and Peru–Japan BIT (2008), none of which feature express provisions on 
transparency in investment disputes. The Peru–Colombia BIT (2007) and the Peru–Canada BIT (2006), on 
the other hand, provides procedural transparency of the NAFTA variety. 
221
 See Articles 25 (2) and 26. 
69 
 
cas, are completely silent on the issue.
222
 Chile’s TIAs also largely conform to this pattern, 
exceptions being its treaties with Australia and the Republic of Korea. 
 
The two treaties between Latin-American states and states hailing from other regions that 
do feature comprehensive provisions on the transparency of arbitral proceedings similar to 
those usually found in recent BITs and TIAs between exclusively American parties are the 
Australia–Chile FTA (in force 2009) and the Nicaragua–Taiwan FTA (in force 2008).223 In 
light of the fact that Taiwan’s other treaties with the Central-American states demand 
agreement between the parties for final awards to be published, and are otherwise silent on 
transparency, it is somewhat surprising that its treaty with Nicaragua establishes full docu-
ment transparency, especially considering that three of these four treaties were negotiated 
around the same time. As we recall, by 2008 the Central-American states were already par-
ty to the CAFTA-DR, which provides extensive transparency. However, several of the oth-
er treaties that were to solidify the regional adherence to transparency in arbitration were 
yet to be concluded.
224
 Against this background, it is likely that procedural transparency 
was not a high-profile issue in the negotiations of the treaties which ended up without sig-
nificant provisions on this point. The fact that the Nicaragua–Taiwan FTA provides the 
same transparency as the CAFTA-DR may indicate that the latter treaty had some influence 
on the negotiations, or at least that transparency was considered an issue of some signifi-
cance.      
 
As mentioned at the outset of this section, 6 TIAs between non-American parties contain 
express transparency regulation. These are the China–New Zealand FTA (in force 2008), 
the ASEAN–Australia-New Zealand FTA (in force 2010), the Malaysia–New Zealand FTA 
                                                 
 
222
 See Colombia’s BITs with the UK (signed 2010), Japan (signed 2011), India (signed 2009), Switzerland 
(signed 2006), China (signed 2008), and Spain (signed 2005). 
223
 The relevant provisions are referenced above, supra note 240. 
224
 E.g., the Colombia–Northern Triangle FTA was concluded in 2007 and went into force in 2009. The Cen-
tral-American treaties with Taiwan were concluded between 2005 and 2007. 
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(in force 2010), the India–Malaysia FTA (in force 2011), the Association of Southeastern 
Nations (“ASEAN”) Comprehensive Investment Agreement (“ACIA”, in force 2012) and 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (“COMESA”) Investment Agreement (in 
force 2007). Notwithstanding the COMESA Investment Agreement, which will be com-
mented on below, these treaties all give the disputing state the authority to make publicly 
available tribunal decisions and awards, subject to the protection of confidential infor-
mation.
225
 With regard to the FTA between Malaysia and New Zealand the authority to 
make materials public also encompasses the state party’s own written submissions.226 With 
regard to the China–New Zealand FTA, the discretion extends to all procedural docu-
ments.
227
 The issues of amicus curiae submissions and public access to hearings are not 
regulated in any of the 5 treaties.
228
 
 
With regard to procedural transparency, these 5 treaties exhibit a state-centered approach, 
which is interesting. Rather than establishing document transparency as default, they in-
stead vest the authority to disclose in the disputing states.
229
 On the one hand, these treaties, 
by providing for a choice rather than a duty to disclose, establish a markedly weaker stand-
ard of transparency than comparable American treaties.
230
 On the other, in vesting discre-
tionary procedural authority solely in the state party, the treaties influence the balance of 
power between the disputing parties and between the parties and the tribunal. This may be 
seen as a departure from the traditional structure of arbitration, which is characterized by an 
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 See ASEAN–Australia-New Zealand FTA Article 26, ACIA Article 39 (1), India–Malaysia FTA Article 
10.19 (14), China–New Zealand FTA Article 157, Malaysia–New Zealand Article 10.28. 
226
 Cf. Article 10.28 (1). 
227
 Cf. Article 157 (1). According to Alvarez, the agreement is “clearly” inspired by the 2004 U.S. Model 
BIT. See Alvarez (2010) p. 11. 
228
 Leng Lim (2013) pp. 55, 62, refers to Asian states opposing amicus submissions in the context of the 
WTO. A similar opposition may account for the general absence of provisions on amicus participation in 
Asian treaties. 
229
 The Canada–China BIT also fits into this category. 
230
 Similarly, Liu (2013) p. 72, on the China–New Zealand FTA. 
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emphasis on agreement on procedural rules and the power of tribunals to direct the proce-
dure in the absence of agreement. Furthermore, it creates a different situation than when 
treaties provide for mandatory publication, where the duty follows directly from the prima-
ry rule itself, i.e. the treaty, with no discretion left to either party. 
 
It is possible to view this state-oriented approach to transparency in arbitration in connec-
tion with the “balanced-approach” to investment treaty-making discussed above.231 The 
provisions indicate a willingness to increase transparency of proceedings, while allowing 
the state to “keep the hands on the wheel” by having the last word on whether and the ex-
tent to which documents shall be available. While the China–New Zealand FTA is the only 
one among the five treaties which confer on the state a right to publish to all documents, 
not just decisions and awards, the treaties are nevertheless interesting, especially with re-
gard to India, Malaysia and China, which have generally tended to not including transpar-
ency provisions in their TIAs.
232
 In light of these treaties, all of them relatively recent, one 
might expect further developments with regard to transparency of investment disputes in 
future treaties involving Asian states. 
 
However, apart from the few treaties just accounted for, the non-American TIAs subject to 
the present study show an almost unilateral lack of regulation increasing the procedural 
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 Section 2.3.4. See also, e.g., Alvarez (2010). 
232
 Australian openness towards transparency in arbitration is indicated by its FTA with Chile. The Australia–
U.S. FTA (2012) does not feature investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms, see Article 11.16. This is in 
line with Australian policy at the time of conclusion. See Peterson (2011), available at 
<http://www.iareporter.com/articles/20110414> (last accessed 10 January 2014). The Australian position has 
now been reversed, and according to reports, the recently concluded, but not yet released Australia–Republic 
of Korea FTA contains mechanisms for investment arbitration. See McDonald and Simmons (2013), availa-
ble at <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=84e9ed1f-9d40-4da7-9fa4-f07ff3e9e0b2> (last ac-
cessed 10 January 2014).. New Zealand’s openness towards transparency is indicated by it being party to 
three of the six non-American TIAs featuring transparency provisions. I am unaware of any TIAs between 
New Zealand and Latin-American states, which rules out a test against the American regional tendency. 
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transparency of investment arbitration. Significant state actors with a high number of con-
cluded TIAs, such as Singapore, Republic of Korea, India, China, Japan and Malaysia, to a 
great extent avoid express transparency regulation in all or the majority of their investment 
treaties.
233
 The approach of these states, while confirming the general impression created 
by the majority of recent BITs, stands in strong contrast to the noted tendency of American 
states to include comprehensive transparency provisions in their TIAs.
234
 
 
The 2007 COMESA Investment Agreement constitutes an interesting outlier among the 
non-American treaties. The agreement provides for the same comprehensive procedural 
transparency that we have observed in intra-American states as well as the treaties of the 
U.Ss and Canada in general.
235
 Full document transparency and public hearings, both sub-
ject to the protection of confidential information, are granted under the agreement, as is the 
tribunal’s authority to accept amicus curiae submissions. This is the only inter-African in-
vestment treaty known to this writer that contains comprehensive provisions on the trans-
parency of dispute settlement proceedings. It will be interesting to observe the development 
of dispute settlement provisions in inter-African investment agreements as such agreements 
become more widespread.
236
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 For example, and indicating a persisting conservatism, the China–Japan–Korea Trilateral Investment 
Agreement (signed 2012) does not contain any provisions on procedural transparency. 
234
 On East Asian RTAs and transparency in trade dispute settlement, see Leng Lim (2013). He points to a 
traditional position in favour of closed proceedings which serves to shed light on East Asian attitudes towards 
transparency in investment disputes as well.  
235
 Article 28 (4) to (8). 
236
 See also the 2012 Southern African Development Community Model BIT, developed in cooperation with 
the International Institute for Sustainable Development. The model contains provisions establishing the same 
level of transparency as in the U.S. Model BIT, see Articles 29.15 and 29.17. Available at:< 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/SADC-Model-BIT-Template-Final.pdf> (last accessed 9 
January 2014). 
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2.4.4 The Bigger Picture 
How does the examined TIAs relate to the examined BITs on the issues at hand? In broad 
terms, the TIAs subject to examination in the preceding sections confirm the “either-or”-
pattern highlighted in presentation of BITs. States tend either to regulate procedural trans-
parency quite extensively, or not at all. Furthermore, I have found that comprehensive 
transparency regulation is primarily a feature of treaties hailing from the Americas. While 
this tendency was not apparent in the BITs, it nevertheless confirms the activism of the 
United States and Canada on the issue, as the proliferation of comprehensive transparency 
provisions in Latin-American TIAs is clearly a result of these state’s priorities and influ-
ence. A consensus seems firmly established. 
 
A few treaties illustrate a middle position, containing variations on the issue of publication 
of final awards, alternatively all decisions. Mexico treaties, both BITS and TIAs, usually 
belong in this group, as do Taiwan’s TIAs with the Central-American states. To the extent 
that these agreements only state that publication is subject to consensus, they are not de-
serving of much attention. However, some treaties may express interesting approaches. The 
state-centered provisions of the treaties between Asian and Oceanic states discussed above 
is perhaps the clearest expression of an alternative approach, choosing a form of transpar-
ency that signals willingness towards increasing the transparency of specific documents, 
but subjecting the matter to the discretion of the disputing state. It will be interesting to 
follow the development among these states in the future.
237
     
 
The regional differences with regard to transparency provisions in TIAs do not immediate-
ly support a claim that there are factors inherent to trade agreements which is conducive to 
the inclusion of transparency regulation and simultaneously absent from BITs. At least by 
design, the different treaties are highly similar. That the consistent tendency of Latin-
American states to provide transparent dispute settlement is expressed primarily in FTAs 
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has more to do with the fact that almost all post-2004 intra-American investment agree-
ments are FTA rather than BITs. The few BITs between American states from the period 
also tend to include comprehensive transparency provisions, as illustrated by the Peru–
Colombia BIT. And in other regions, states usually do not regulate transparency at all, re-
gardless of treaty type.  
 
However, if one raises one’s view, there are interesting parallels between the rise of trans-
parency in investment agreements and the rise of the free trade agreement as TIA. In an 
environment where FTAs increasingly becomes the chosen vehicle for investment agree-
ments, a more comprehensive approach to the matters at hand may be expected, including 
more detailed dispute settlement. Considering the context, scope and complexity of FTAs, 
traditional, “boiler-plate” BITs may not fit to the same degree, given the interrelatedness of 
the negotiating process. In this respect it is interesting to note that the more developed 
model agreements of Canada and the United States are parallel to the “FTA as investment 
agreement”-development which began around the turn of the millennium. The purpose of 
an FTA is to establish a comprehensive regime, and negotiations include a broad set of 
interests, and also likely involve a broader set of governmental ministries. In sum, the pro-
cess leading to the conclusion of a TIA is far more multifaceted and complex than that 
which traditionally led to the conclusion of a BIT. In this context, the hastened, “photo-op” 
approach to the conclusion of BITs which allegedly was commonplace,
238
 becomes outdat-
ed. To the extent that investments are covered under such agreements, this could possibly 
influence the construction of a treaty’s provisions on investments. However, while the ma-
terial connection between trade – particularly trade in services – and investments have been 
noted,
239
 it is not immediately clear how this affects the approach to procedural issues in 
investor-state arbitration. There is no visible mechanism leading to the design of more 
transparent investment dispute settlement under FTAs. However, it has been proposed that 
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 Maupin (2013) p. 151–152. 
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 Levesque and Newcombe (2013) p. 119. 
75 
 
FTAs are “particularly suited to promoting broader policy objectives over and above a pure 
trade or investment agenda.”240 Against the background of the U.S. Trade Act of 2002 and 
its Trade Negotiating Objectives, this seems at least a possible explanation for the increas-
ing frequency of treaty regulation of transparency in dispute settlement. The Trade Act 
indeed highlights such broader policy objectives, which encompasses, as pointed out, 
transparency in arbitration.
241
 
 
Against this background, there seems to be some basis for the claim that TIAs and the con-
text in which they are negotiated and concluded at least carry the potential of contributing 
to more transparent investor-state dispute settlement. However, TIAs as such do not neces-
sarily lead to increased transparency. The decisive point perhaps, is whether there are 
broader policy objectives at work conducive to increasing transparency. Judged by the 
body of TIAs reviewed herein, this is not necessarily so. 
  
2.5 Conclusions 
In this chapter, I have traced the development and prevalence of procedural transparency 
standards in IIAs. Against the background of my findings, one may be bold enough to pre-
dict a further development in the direction of increased transparency of investment dispute 
proceedings. The states consistently including comprehensive transparency standards in 
treaties seem base this practice on a combination of policy and external pressure, the excep-
tions being Canada and the United States, which, having been at the vanguard on the issues 
since the beginning, have been the ones applying the pressure. On the other hand, states 
which consistently do not include transparency provisions in their treaties often seem to be 
fastened in an investment treaty paradigm which do not have room for more sophisticated 
procedural design. Only certain states seem to more actively avoiding transparency regula-
tion or express idiosyncratic approaches to the issue. [xxx pull back to NAFTA?] 
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As the next chapter turns to assess the transparency regulations of central arbitral regimes 
applicable to investment disputes, the significance of express regulation of procedural 
transparency at the treaty level will be made clear. The two-level dynamic leads to proce-
dural rules filling the vacuum left by treaties which do not regulate the issues. And when 
such issues arise during proceedings, they are out of the exclusive domains of the states. 
The context is changed. In contrast, at the level of state-state negotiation, the parties have 
the opportunity of fine-tuning procedural matters, with binding force upon both parties and 
tribunals. However, relatively few states take advantage of this opportunity.  
     
Finally, a small look towards the future. Based on the way the United States consistently 
have succeeded in including transparency provisions in its treaties, it is likely that the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and its European sibling Transatlantic Trade and Invest-
ment Partnership (“TTIP”), if eventually finalized and adopted, will contain the same 
transparency provisions as other post 2004 US TIAs.
242
 If so, the dispute settlement mech-
anisms of two of the most prominent IIAs at work will provide for substantial transparency. 
Among the parties to the TPP are several states which have not previously committed to 
comprehensive transparency of the American fashion in their IIAs.
243
 However, as there is 
a substantial overlap in the global body of investment agreements, an investor from a 
member country wishing to initiate proceedings against another member state in many cas-
es will have recourse to this under other treaties. Nevertheless, the inclusion of transparen-
cy provisions in line with the U.S. Model BIT in these two treaties would be a significant 
leap forward. There is also reason to expect the EU to take a position in favor of transpar-
ency of investor-state dispute settlement. After the EU assumed competence for foreign 
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 With regard to the TPP, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative has stated that the agreement will 
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office/fact-sheets/2011/november/outlines-trans-pacific-partnership-agreement (last accessed 13 Januar 
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direct investment under the Treaty of Lisbon,
244
 the European Commission has signaled an 
attitude in favour of increasing the transparency of the system.
245
 
3 Transparency Rules in Various Arbitration Rules 
3.1 Introduction 
In investment arbitration proceedings, to the extent that the IIA providing the legal basis for 
the dispute, and constituting the primary rules of procedure, do not regulate transparency, 
the applicable arbitration rules will provide the basis for resolving any such issues. The 
majority of IIAs currently in force do not expressly touch upon transparency issues. Conse-
quently, one must turn to the applicable rules when searching for solutions to transparency 
issues in individual arbitration proceedings. It is something of a paradox, then, that the dif-
ferent institutional and arbitral rules available to disputing parties traditionally have been 
sparse on issues of procedural transparency, mostly leaving such questions to the discretion 
of the parties, or, in the absence of agreement, to the tribunal. In this chapter, I will present 
the essential transparency regulation, or lack thereof, of key arbitration regimes.
246
 Fur-
thermore, I will address how individual tribunals operating under different arbitration rules 
have handled transparency issues where these are not resolved by the rules. Despite the 
absence of any binding rule of precedent in investment arbitration, certain tendencies have 
developed on the subject of procedural transparency in recent years, especially with regard 
to document transparency. In the following, these developments, as well as related awards 
and decisions, will be addressed under the relevant headings. 
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 Dolzer and Schreuer (2012) p. 11. 
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 See “Why is the EU including Investor to State Dispute Settlement in the TTIP?”, available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/in-focus/ttip/questions-and-answers/> (last accessed 13 January 2013). 
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 In presenting the distinct regimes, I will keep separate discussion of the UNCITRAL rules and discussion 
of the newly adopted UNCITRAL Transparency Rules, as the application of the former does not necessitate 
the application of the latter. Furthermore, any case law under the new rules is yet to surface. The UNCITRAL 
Transparency Rules will receive separate treatment in section 3.7. 
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In practical terms, questions pertaining to transparency and confidentiality in arbitral pro-
ceedings primarily concern the extent to which the different sets of rules establish specific 
solutions with regard to the transparency of different aspects of the proceedings. Further-
more, to what extent do the disputing parties if they so wish have access to agree on diverg-
ing solutions? And in the absence of express provisions in the applicable rules or the treaty 
framework, how do tribunals go about exercising their discretionary powers when issues 
arise during proceedings? On what grounds to they base their decisions?  
 
When addressing the scope and exercise of tribunal discretion on issues of transparency, it 
is important to keep in mind the specific characteristics of investment arbitration. While the 
procedural rules applied are modeled primarily on private commercial arbitration, its sub-
ject matter – the review of sovereign acts by the state affecting investors – is of a public or 
administrative law character.
247
 Yet again, the system’s primary legal basis – investment 
treaties and customary international law – is based in public international law.248 How do 
these diverging characteristics frame and possibly limit tribunals’ approach on questions of 
procedural transparency? 
 
In the following, I will structure the presentation according to the different transparency 
issues, or categories, as they have usually crystallized in arbitration rules, treaties, case law 
and scholarly commentary.
249
 I will adopt a perspective corresponding with the typical pro-
gression of proceedings, starting with the issues and rules concerning the commencement 
of investment disputes. I will then go on to discuss document transparency in general, be-
fore taking on questions pertaining to public access to hearings as well as the relationship 
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between amicus curiae and document transparency. I will go on to briefly address rules 
concerning the publication of final awards. Finally, I will present the newly adopted UN-
CITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration. Note however, 
that the primary focus will be on, on the one hand, issues pertaining to document transpar-
ency, as this is where one has observed the exercise of procedural discretion at its most 
pronounced, and on the other hand, access to hearings, as this issue illustrates how the ap-
plicable rules restrict the power of tribunals to adapt proceedings to the context of invest-
ment disputes.  
 
3.2 Registration of the Initiation of Arbitral Proceedings 
3.2.1 The topic 
To the public at large, generally available information on the initiation of investment arbi-
tration proceedings will usually be the only way of getting to know that an investment dis-
pute has been submitted to arbitration. And because knowledge concerning the existence of 
ongoing arbitrations is, obviously, a prerequisite for all kinds of non-party activity in rela-
tion to the proceedings, it being public attendance at hearings, the preparation and submis-
sion of third-party briefs or just general search for information, public scrutiny and debate, 
mechanisms providing for the dissemination of information on active arbitrations, on as 
early a stage as possible, become an important device for increasing the transparency of 
investment arbitration. Arrangements for the registration of the initiation of proceedings 
will constitute a valuable source of information about the factual and legal matter of the 
dispute, as well as information on the claimant, the investment in question, legal counsel 
and more. 
 
For organizational and administrative purposes, any arbitration institution will have to 
maintain internal registries containing information on pending and past arbitral proceedings 
conducted under the respective institution. However, from a general transparency perspec-
tive, such registries are relevant only to the extent that the information they contain are 
available to the public at large.  
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The following section presents the ICISD rules governing registration of information con-
cerning the initiation of arbitral proceedings and related issues. None of the other applica-
ble rules subject to this study provide any kind of transparent registry services.
250
 To the 
extent that they are even equipped to make information available to the public, all disclo-
sure and publicly available information are determined by the parties. These arbitral 
frameworks will therefore not be the subject of any further discussion on this issue. 
3.2.2 The ICSID Register as Transparency Instrument 
According to the ISCID Convention Article 36 (3), requests for arbitration shall be regis-
tered by the Secretary General, unless he finds that the dispute is manifestly outside the 
jurisdiction of ICSID. While the purpose of (3) is to clarify when ICSID shall reject a re-
quest for arbitration, it also indicates the practice of registering any dispute brought under 
the Convention. Indeed, as fleshed out by the ICSID Administrative and Financial Regula-
tions, regulation 22 and 23, “[t]he Secretary General shall appropriately publish infor-
mation about the operation of the Centre, including the registration of all requests for (…) 
arbitration and in due course an indication of the date and method of the termination of 
each proceeding.”251 The registers shall be “open for inspection by any person”, i.e. pub-
lic.
252
 The public character of the ICSID case register, providing a basis for a comprehen-
sive overview over ICSID arbitration proceedings, is the one feature the sets the center dis-
tinctly apart from other arbitration regimes with regard to transparency.  
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 These are the PCA, LCIA, SCC, ICC. With regard to UNCITRAL, this is unsurprising, given that these 
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with the arbitral procedure in isolation. The other frameworks, however, do provide administrative services, 
and as such are equipped to make information publicly available. However, as stated, in the absence of party 
consent, they do not. 
251
 ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 22 (1).  
252
 ICSID Administrative and Financial Regulation 23 (2). 
81 
 
The registration of requests for arbitration includes specific information pertaining to the 
dispute, such as the date of registration, the identity of the parties to the dispute and a brief 
description of subject matter of the case.
253
 In addition, “all significant data concerning the 
institution, conduct and disposition of each proceeding” shall be registered.254 This includes 
the identity of the arbitrators in every case. This basic information is listed in the register 
under each individual case, and may be accessed through the website of the center.
255
 To 
the extent that the register includes the actual notices of arbitration,
256
 these will normally 
contain relatively extensive information on individual disputes.
257
 However, the register is 
not available online in its entirety, and one will not find copies of notices of arbitration on 
the publicly accessible part of the ICSID website. The Secretariat does provide access to 
the full database upon request.
258
 This role of the Secretariat as “doorkeeper” follows from 
Regulation 23, paragraph 2, which in addition to providing for the general openness of the 
register, states that “[t]he Secretary-General shall promulgate rules concerning access to the 
Registers, and a schedule of charges for the provision of certified and uncertified extracts 
therefrom”. Thus, despite the formal openness of the registry, the actual access to infor-
mation necessitates some effort (with regard to time and finances) of the information seek-
er, which may affect the extent to which the register is consulted. 
 
In addition to operating open registers, ICSID routinely publish information and news con-
cerning its operations, including information on ongoing arbitral proceedings, on its web-
site. Note, however, that information pertaining to pending cases is restricted to the pro-
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gress of the proceedings. In-depth information concerning the substantial contents of the 
arbitration proceedings, i.e. filings, evidence etc. is not provided by ICSID.
259
  
 
Taken together, the practices established in accordance with the Administrative and Finan-
cial Regulations, regulation 22 and 23, secure a relatively high degree of transparency with 
regard to information pertaining to the initiation and procedural advancement of arbitra-
tions under ICSID. 
 
In general, the rules of the ICSID Convention do not apply to proceedings under ICSID 
Additional Facility as the Additional Facility is not part of the Convention.
260
 However, 
according to the Additional Facility Rules, Article 5, the Administrative and Financial 
Rules concerning registration of disputes do apply. Consequently, the above applies to arbi-
tration initiated under ICSID Additional Facility as well. 
 
3.3 Procedural Documents and Transparency261 
3.3.1 Introduction 
Document transparency concerns access to or disclosure of documents generated during 
arbitral proceedings. Procedural documents typically comprise all documents issued to or 
from a tribunal during the proceedings, including the different formal procedural docu-
ments, such as notices of arbitration, memorials and responses, pleadings, evidence, tribu-
nal decisions and orders, correspondence between the tribunal and the parties as well as 
minutes and transcripts of hearings.
262
 In contrast, disclosure of information concerning the 
                                                 
 
259
 Access to this information is rather a matter of document transparency, discussed below. 
260
 Additional Facility Rules, Article 3. See Schreuer (2009) p. 27. 
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dispute and the proceedings does not necessarily include disclosure of physical documents. 
However, the question of confidentiality obligations does not itself differentiate between 
disclosure of mere information, typically by way of public discussion, and disclosure of 
actual documents. The two categories are closely connected and, with regard to the extent 
of potential confidentiality obligations, will often be subject to similar arguments. Depend-
ing on the circumstances of individual cases, tribunals may deal with the one issue without 
the other, while not necessarily making a distinction between the two categories. However, 
as we shall see, in deciding on the specific transparency of a given proceeding, tribunals 
often make orders on both document transparency and the access of the parties to publicly 
discuss the case. It is therefore appropriate to address the two issues under the common 
heading of document transparency. 
 
The only institutional or ad-hoc arbitration rules subject to this study which provide express 
rules on the parties’ confidentiality obligations are Article 30 of the LCIA Rules and Arti-
cle 46 of the SCC.
263
 The former places strict confidentiality obligations on both parties 
and tribunal, while the latter provides that “[u]nless otherwise agreed by the parties, the 
SCC and the Arbitral Tribunal shall maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and the 
award”. The wording of the SCC rule do not place obligations directly on the parties, but 
nevertheless implies that SCC Tribunals if necessary will order parties to respect the confi-
dentiality of the proceedings.
264
 Consequently, the parties have at least no general right to 
                                                                                                                                                    
 
(Vienna, 4-8 October 2010), UNCITRAL 44
th
 Session, UN Doc A/CN.9/712, pp. 11–12 (2010) for an over-
view over different categories of procedural documents.  
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 Tribunals, on the other hand, are generally bound by confidentiality, see e.g., ICSID Arbitration Rule 6 (2) 
and 15.  
264
 Born and Shenkman (2009) p. 17; Ortino seem to take the opposite position with regard to parties’ access 
to disclose awards, see Ortino (2013) p. 124. 
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release documents under these regimes.
265
 In contrast, ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility, 
UNCITRAL, ICC and PCA rules do not provide express provisions on the access of the 
parties to make procedural documents available to the public.
266
 The absence of express 
rules is the primary difference between the issue of access to hearings and the issue of ac-
cess to make documents and information publicly available, as absence of rules opens up 
room for unilateral party action as well as tribunal discretion on the matters. 
 
As a consequence of the lack of express rules, the question of a presumption or general 
principle with regards to transparency or confidentiality in arbitration proceedings has been 
a recurring issue in investment law discourse. In commercial arbitration a presumption of 
“implied” confidentiality has traditionally been considered the norm, though in recent times 
there has been increasing debate on the topic, and whether or not such an implied obliga-
tion does in fact exist is not clear.
267
 Initially, as a consequence of modeling investment 
arbitration on the already established system of commercial arbitration, many argued that a 
similar presumption applied to the investment arbitration system.
268
 However, setting aside 
the separate development in commercial arbitration, commentators and investment tribu-
nals have increasingly recognized that the characteristics of investor-state disputes raise 
transparency issues specific to that particular field, and consequently requires its own solu-
tions.
269
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When addressing the related issues of confidentiality and transparency in investment arbi-
tration it may be useful to approach the two as values that need to be sufficiently upheld. In 
the words of Feliciano:  
 
“Confidentiality and transparency are both values in international arbitration. They 
are, however, competing values which need to be accommodated and adjusted one 
to the other in specific cases. A constant or fixed amount of both values in each 
and every case is probably not necessary. The line of actual contact and equilibri-
um between the two desiderata is a moving one, and its particular location and 
shape are function of differing factors. Some of these factors include the kind of 
international arbitration proceeding involved as well as the nature of the subject 
matter of the dispute.”270 
 
In short, the competing values should be properly balanced with due regard to the circum-
stances of the individual case. But how to strike the balance? When tribunals are confront-
ed with having to decide on the appropriate confidentiality measures of a given proceeding, 
how do they approach the issue, and on what grounds do they make their decision? When 
addressing these questions, the conflicting legal characteristics of investment arbitration 
come into play. Does the public law character of investment disputes affect tribunals’ exer-
cise of its procedural powers? Does the public international law character of the treaties? If 
“[i]nvestment arbitration is in substance a special form of international quasi-judicial re-
view of governmental conduct using as a default the methods of commercial arbitration,”271 
to what extent and on what basis do investment tribunals adapt those methods when decid-
ing on transparency in the context of investment arbitration? 
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In the following, I will address how investment tribunals have approached the issue of doc-
ument transparency. I will start by presenting case law on the existence of any general no-
tion of confidentiality or transparency in investment arbitration. I will continue to analyze 
the approach of a few significant tribunals when deciding on the proper level of transparen-
cy in specific cases. 
 
3.3.2 No General Restrictions on Disclosure of Documents 
Against the background of the above, investment tribunals’ approach to document confi-
dentiality may be addressed. From a relatively early stage, investment tribunals have had to 
decide on questions concerning the confidentiality of arbitral proceedings. As early as 
1983, the ICSID Tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia took issue with the notion of “a spirit of 
confidentiality” as fundamental feature of investment arbitration, declaring that “the Con-
vention and the Rules do not prevent the parties from revealing their case”.272 The state-
ment amounts to a rejection of a general principle of confidentiality in investment arbitra-
tion, a view that has been reaffirmed and corroborated by several later tribunals. In the con-
text of the NAFTA, in 1997 the Tribunal in the Metalclad case, conducted according to 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules, similarly rejected the notion of confidentiality of proceed-
ings. The Tribunal asserted that  
 
“[n]either the NAFTA nor the ICSID (Additional Facility) Rules contain any ex-
press restriction on the freedom of the parties in this respect. Though it is frequent-
ly said that one of the reasons for recourse to arbitration is to avoid publicity, un-
less the agreement between the parties incorporates such a limitation, each of them 
is still free to speak publicly of the arbitration.”273 
 
                                                 
 
272
 Amco Asia Corporation and others v. Republic of Indonesia, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on 
Provisional Measures, 9 December 1983, paragraph 4. 
273
Metalclad, Decision on a Request, paragraph 9. Also Loewen, Decision on Hearing, paragraph 26. 
87 
 
Following Metalclad, a number of tribunals have expressed similar views. For example, the 
Chapter 11 Tribunal in S.D. Myers, established under UNCITRAL, stated: 
 
“[W]hatever may be the position in private consensual arbitrations between com-
mercial parties, it has not been established that any general principle of confiden-
tiality exists in an arbitration such as that currently before this Tribunal. The main 
argument in favour of confidentiality is founded on a supposed implied term in the 
arbitration agreement. The present arbitration is taking place pursuant to a provi-
sion in an international treaty, not pursuant to an arbitration agreement between 
the disputing parties.”274 
 
The quoted passage shows the Tribunal clearly delineating against commercial arbitration, 
emphasizing the specific context of treaty-based arbitration, and denying the existence of 
any inherent notion of confidentiality in arbitration based on treaty rather than agree-
ment.
275
  
 
In ICSID arbitrations, the most significant statements concerning confidentiality of pro-
ceedings post Amco were made by the Tribunal in the Biwater case, in Procedural Order 
No. 3.
276
 In its deliberation on the issues, the tribunal started out by noting that: 
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“In the absence of any agreement between the parties on this issue, there is no 
provision imposing a general duty of confidentiality in ICSID arbitration, whether 
in the ICSID Convention, any of the applicable Rules or otherwise. Equally, how-
ever, there is no provision imposing a general rule of transparency or non-
confidentiality in any of these sources.”277 
  
Having established this, the Tribunal identified what it saw as “an overall trend in this field 
towards transparency”,278 and referred to similar reasoning in relevant previous investment 
tribunal practice under ICSID, UNICTRAL and NAFTA, specifically highlighting the 
abovementioned decisions in the Amco, Metalclad, S.D. Myers and Loewen cases.
279
 The 
Tribunal concluded: “These considerations, and the accepted need for greater transparency 
in this field, generally militate against the type of provisional measures for which the 
Claimant now contends.”280 
 
In the years following the confidentiality ruling in Biwater Gauff, several investment tribu-
nals have noted not only the lack of a general obligation towards confidentiality, but indeed 
a tendency or trend towards transparency.
281
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The statements cited in this section indicate an open attitude on the part of tribunals with 
regard to transparency of proceedings. The legal arguments are based primarily on the ab-
sence of explicit rules of confidentiality in the applicable frameworks and, to a degree, a 
distinction between commercial and investment arbitration is noted. However, there is 
more to the picture. As far back as the Amco-decision, statements regarding the non-
confidentiality of investment arbitration in general have been accompanied by “safety 
mechanisms” or “exceptions”, which once applied have a tendency to dramatically de-
crease the discretionary authority of the parties to unilaterally provide for transparency in 
proceedings. The application of these mechanisms will be discussed in the following sec-
tion. 
3.3.3 Specific Confidentiality – Striking the Balance? 
No tribunal known to this writer have concluded that there, without express treaty provi-
sions or agreement, can be no restrictions whatsoever on the discretion of the disputing 
parties with regard to making information and documents pertaining to the dispute publicly 
available. The aim of the present section is no investigate how tribunals have dealt with the 
issue of specific confidentiality, that is, the balancing of the legitimate grounds for both 
transparency and confidentiality in individual proceedings and with regard to specific doc-
uments. In other words, how do tribunals exercise their procedural discretion in the absence 
of rules on document transparency in the applicable frameworks? How do they strike the 
proper balance between transparency and confidentiality of procedural documents? 
 
That there are limits to the discretion of the parties with regard to revealing information on 
arbitral proceedings were indicated already in Amco. After having asserted that no general 
obligations of confidentiality were imposed upon the parties, the Tribunal made an im-
portant addition, stating that “parties to a legal dispute should refrain, in their own interest, 
to do anything that could aggravate or exacerbate the dispute, thus rendering its solution 
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possibly more difficult”,282 the implication being that the confidentiality of the proceedings 
could potentially be subject to protection through provisional measures.
283
 
 
Similar statements can be found in several of the decisions featuring broad declarations on 
the confidentiality of investment arbitration proceedings. In Metalclad, the Tribunal ex-
pressed the view that  
 
“it would be of advantage to the orderly unfolding of the arbitral process and con-
ducive to the maintenance of working relations between the parties if during the 
proceedings they were both to limit public discussion of the case to a minimum, 
subject only to any externally imposed obligation of disclosure by which either of 
them may be legally bound.”284 
 
As in Amco, the passage implies that if the parties fail to respect these recommendations, 
the Tribunal may intervene. 
 
In Biwater, Procedural Order No. 3, the Tribunal referenced the abovementioned observa-
tions of the Amco, Metalclad and Loewen Tribunals concerning the responsibilities of the 
parties to not to contribute to aggravating or exacerbating the dispute. More importantly, 
the Tribunal elaborated on the statements of these previous tribunals, as well as on the 
power and responsibility of tribunals to protect the integrity of the proceedings by directing 
the parties to refrain from acts endangering the dispute.
285
 The statements and reasoning of 
the Tribunal on these points go considerably further than any previous tribunals and have 
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proven influential on subsequent practice. They therefore deserve to be relayed in some 
detail. 
 
Following the disclosure by Tanzania, to a third party, of documents pertaining to the dis-
pute, subsequently published on the Internet, Biwater petitioned for an order prohibiting the 
parties from taking any steps likely to undermine the integrity of the proceedings or exac-
erbate the dispute, as well as prohibiting the unilateral release of any procedural docu-
ments, except for the final award.
286
 In its reasoning on the matter, the Tribunal started by 
expressing the following view on the issues at hand and the nature of the competing inter-
ests: 
“The determination of this application for provisional measures entails a careful 
balancing between two competing interests: (i) the need for transparency in treaty 
proceedings such as these, and (ii) the need to protect the procedural integrity of 
the arbitration.”287 
 
After having discussed the developments with regard to transparency and confidentiality 
obligations in investment arbitration, the Tribunal fleshed out the concerns of “procedural 
integrity” and “non-aggravation/non-exacerbation” of the dispute by listing a number of 
aspects inherent to them, namely the preservation of the Tribunal’s mission and mandate to 
settle the issues in dispute, the need to protect the order and “proper functioning” of the 
proceedings, maintain trust, confidence and equality in the relationship between the parties 
as well as the need to avoid external pressure and “trial by media”.288 It went on to note that 
the broadcasting of accurate information on a dispute while proceedings are still ongoing, 
despite being in the public interest, may be difficult to achieve,
289
 the implication being that 
procedural integrity concerns stand in the way of such disclosure. The Tribunal then ex-
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pressed its agreement with the statements of the Metalclad and Loewen Tribunals on the 
advantages of limiting public discussion to what is necessary; subject only to externally 
imposed legal obligations.
290
 The Tribunal added, however, that the concerns necessitating 
the protection of the integrity of the proceedings do not extend beyond the conclusion of 
the arbitration, but simultaneously emphasized the “obvious tension between” transparency 
and procedural integrity in pending cases.
291
 The passage strongly implies, while not stat-
ing outright, that the interests in favour of transparency will trump those supporting confi-
dentiality after the conclusion of the proceedings. This is unsurprising, as contractual or 
statutory limits on disclosure will normally apply regardless of the arbitral proceedings, and 
thus provide the necessary protection of confidential information. Danger of aggravation or 
exacerbation will no longer be a concern. In line with these considerations, the recom-
mended provisional measures provided in the order were limited to the duration of the arbi-
tration.
292
  
 
Turning to the specific circumstances of the case, the Tribunal noted that the proceedings 
had not yet been harmed by the disclosure taking place prior to the petition for provisional 
measures, but simultaneously made clear its disagreement with the Respondent on mani-
fested actual harm as prerequisite for provisional measures.
293
 The Tribunal emphasized its 
responsibility to “[ensure] that the proceedings will be conducted in the future in a regular, 
fair and orderly manner … that potential inhibitions and unfairness do not arise” and to 
“reduce the risk of future aggravation and exacerbation of the dispute, which necessarily 
involves probabilities, not certainties.”294 Furthermore, given the considerable interest in 
the case and the “media campaign” waged by both parties and other actors, the Tribunal 
declared that there was risk of both harm and aggravation. However, it added that in light 
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of the “public nature of the dispute and the range of interests that are potentially affected, 
including interests in transparency and public information … as far as possible, any re-
strictions must be carefully and narrowly delimited”.295 
 
Against this background, the Tribunal decided on the particular restrictions to be placed on 
the different categories of documents. With regard to dissemination of information through 
general public discussion, the Tribunal concluded that such discussion should not be re-
stricted, as long as it was limited to the extent considered necessary and did not complicate 
the relationship between the parties or the settling of the dispute.
296
 Furthermore, no re-
striction was placed on the publication of a party’s own documents, regardless of whether 
these documents had been produced in the proceedings following a disclosure exercise, and 
without prejudice to contractual, statutory or other obligations of confidentiality.
297
 With 
regard to decisions, orders and directions,
298
 the Tribunal took a middle position. It noted 
that “the presumption should be in favour of allowing the publication”299 of such docu-
ments, but nevertheless, considering that the varying nature of these materials could result 
in publication being inappropriate in specific instances, the Tribunal retained that disclo-
sure was to be subject to prior tribunal permission.
300
 With regard to transcripts and 
minutes of hearings, as well as pleadings, written memorials, correspondence, and docu-
ments produced in the arbitration by the other party, the Tribunal ordered these documents 
not to be disclosed to non-parties.
301
 The reasoning differed somewhat with regard to the 
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different categories, but in all instances the decisions were based on the several facets of 
the fundamental concerns of procedural integrity and non-aggravation.
302
 
 
Biwater, Procedural Order No. 3 can be, and indeed have been, criticized on a number of 
levels.
303
 While seemingly having due regard both to the interests supporting transparency 
and those supporting confidentiality, the actual decision place strict restrictions on the ac-
cess to disclose documents, leaving next to no discretion to the parties. It may well be 
asked if the Tribunal in its attempts to avoid future harm to the proceedings effectively 
eliminated any substantial transparency in the proceedings, and that the restrictions thus 
were hardly “carefully and narrowly delimited”. It has been pointed out that the order “se-
verely curtailed … Tanzania's ability to increase the transparency of disputes involving the 
government. At the same time, the tribunal also curtailed meaningful amicus curiae partici-
pation by inhibiting public knowledge about the issues raised in the dispute.”304 The quoted 
passage constitutes a double-barrelled critique. On the one hand, it points out that Tanzania 
could not itself decide on the proper level of public access to information on the dispute by 
its own population. That the case in question involved significant public interests – the wa-
ter supply of Tanzania’s capital – adds weight to this critique. On the other hand, the order 
inhibited third-parties in effectively contributing to the proceedings, through precluding 
potential amicus participants from substantial access to information while the proceedings 
were still pending.
305
 The lack of information would likely be to the detriment of the quali-
ty of any amicus briefs, and potentially deprive the Tribunal of valuable perspectives on the 
subject matter. 
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The virtue of the approach taken by the Biwater Tribunal is that it allows for a flexible ap-
proach depending on the circumstances of the individual case.
306
 In recognizing “a trend” 
of transparency, and approaching the issue not on the basis of broad and general notions of 
confidentiality or transparency, but on the basis of the dispute and circumstances at hand, 
the Tribunal creates a dynamic model which, at least theoretically, seems to be able to 
properly balance the competing values of confidentiality and transparency. However, the 
Tribunal’s reliance on the somewhat murky principles of “procedural integrity” and “non-
aggravation/exacerbation of the dispute” seems to stand in the way of performing any real 
balancing act. It remains unclear in which circumstances there will not be “potential” harm 
to the proceedings? Admittedly, the Biwater proceedings had been characterized by some-
thing akin to a media campaign, which was a matter of obvious importance to the Tribu-
nal.
307
 However, the look to future procedural conduct may in itself contain a bias in favour 
of confidentiality as a fear of future aggravation is likely to concern the tribunal, and make 
it more prone to order in favour of confidentiality of documents. In disputes involving sig-
nificant public interests, with the according NGO activity and media attention these cases 
usually bring, tribunals oriented towards securing procedural integrity may resist increasing 
the transparency of the proceedings, in spite of the interests involved. Somewhat paradoxi-
cally, then, the public interests involved, which on the one hand provides the basic argu-
ments in favour of transparency, on the other constitutes the very danger inclining tribunals 
to order in favour of confidentiality.  
 
The approach of the Biwater tribunal has proven influential on later tribunals. In Abaclat, 
the Tribunal, having expressed its intention of trying “to achieve a solution that balances 
the general interest for transparency with special interests for confidentiality of certain in-
formation and/or documents,”308 nevertheless ended up issuing an order that restricted the 
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access to disclose anything but orders, decisions and awards,
309
 as well as the parties’ own 
disclosed documents and exhibits.
310
 Of particular interest are the Tribunal’s statements on 
pleadings and written memorials. According to the tribunal, such materials carry an “inher-
ent risk to give an incorrect impression about the proceedings.”311 Further, an incorrect 
impression would not only run contrary to public information purposes, it would likely 
harm the relationship between the parties, i.e. aggravate the dispute.
312
 These statements set 
a high bar for the publication of pleadings and similar documents expressing a party’s ar-
guments. Indeed, by identifying an “inherent risk” of harm to the proceedings upon disclo-
sure of these materials, the Tribunal basically establishes a presumption of confidentiali-
ty.
313
 The Tribunal performed no real assessment of the extent to which publication of 
pleadings would in fact lead to harm, nor did it discuss arguments in favour of making the 
pleadings public. This hardly constitutes a balanced approach to the issue.
314
 It is not self-
evident why a risk of incorrect public impressions in itself necessarily would constitute 
danger of exacerbation or aggravation? And the interest of the state in making its positions 
on the issues known to its public, in more detail than general public discussion (which the 
Tribunal allowed
315
) was seemingly not addressed. One could object that the access of the 
parties to publish their own disclosed documents, as well as all decisions, orders and 
awards, secured a sufficiently balanced relationship between transparency and confidential-
ity. While there may be some truth in this, the fact remains that the Tribunal’s reasoning 
with regard to the pleadings does not seem to justify why these documents had to be kept 
confidential. Considering that the Tribunal acknowledged the lack of any general rule of 
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confidentiality in investment disputes and the trend towards transparency,
316
 the lack of 
evaluation of the “danger” represented by the specific pleadings in the case is even more 
confounding. 
 
An even more restrictive view was expressed by the Telefónica Tribunal, which ordered all 
documents submitted, all correspondence, and all decisions save the final award (which 
was to be published according to the Mexico–Spain BIT) to be kept confidential.317 The 
decision, while noting the absence of general rules on confidentiality or transparency, is 
more or less devoid of any reasoning on the need for transparency in the proceedings. In-
deed, as pointed out by the dissenting arbitrator, the decision implies a presumption of con-
fidentiality “applied in a broad and unrestricted manner, without the Tribunal having exer-
cised any form of prior control”.318 
 
The Tribunal in Philip Morris expressed a somewhat more flexible approach to the issue of 
document transparency.
319
 It allowed for the publication by the parties all their own filings, 
including pleadings and submissions, subject to the notification to the other party and even-
tual redaction.
320
 The decision is relatively slim, but the Tribunal made it clear that it built 
on the lengthy submissions of the parties when making its decision, and emphasized the 
public interest component of investment disputes as foundation for increasing transparen-
cy.
321
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Interestingly, Australia had argued by analogy to the practice of Chapter 11 Tribunals, the 
ICJ, and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea to allow for the publication of 
written submissions. It had further argued that before WTO panels, the parties maintain the 
right to publish their own submissions.
322
 To the extent that the Tribunal built on these 
analogies, which is not explicitly stated in the decision, but probable in light of its content, 
this constitutes a clear example of public international law perspectives making an impact 
on transparency assessments. Such analogies have been largely absent from the other deci-
sions discussed in this section. In any case, the decision to let the parties decide the extent 
of transparency to be applied to their own filings, as well as the deliberate procedures for 
the protection of confidential information
323
 is indicative of a far less strict reliance on pro-
cedural integrity-arguments than that expressed in other case law, and does seem better 
able to balance the conflicting values at play. As such, it provides an appealing model for 
later tribunals. 
 
3.3.4 Conclusion 
Despite that most tribunals have exhibited a general sympathy towards the considerations 
supporting transparency, when it comes to deciding specific cases the same tribunals often 
appear surprisingly restrictive. Based on the cases examined under the preceding sections, 
few tribunals are willing to adapt the arbitral procedure to reflect the significant public in-
terest dimension in investment disputes. The general adherence to the value of transparency 
does to a degree reflect public law perspectives, in the sense that the public interest in the 
review of state administrative acts is recognized, but this, as we have seen, has rarely been 
sufficient to outbalance the distinctively arbitral character of the procedural integrity-
argument, with its focus on the relationship between the parties and the orderly unfolding 
of the proceedings. However, the approach taken by the Philip Morris Tribunal may signify 
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a shift. It should be kept in mind that this case concerns a public health issue and involved 
the decidedly untrendy tobacco business. However, this aspect is not pronounced in the 
reasoning of the Tribunal, and its balanced decision seems well fit to be expanded upon. 
3.4 Non-party Access to Hearings 
3.4.1 The Topic and the Rules 
The concept of privacy involves the issue of whether arbitration proceedings shall be open 
to persons other than the parties to the dispute. The issue goes to the heart of the transpar-
ency debate in investment law, striking at the well-established notion of the right of the 
disputing parties to limit access to the physical environment of the dispute settlement pro-
cess. As we shall see, this latter notion is clearly expressed in the various international arbi-
tration frameworks subject to review in this thesis. 
 
In public law, the public character of judicial proceedings is considered a fundamental 
principle, intrinsic to proper “rule of law” and the principle of “fair trial”, and an essential 
part of any reasonably evolved legal society.
324
 Public access to the judicial proceedings of 
the state, i.e. before municipal courts, enables insight into the mechanisms and operation of 
the law and oversight with the practice and quality of the courts and their decisions, and as 
such provides a means to secure public trust in the legal system.
325
 
 
These principles do not generally apply to traditional arbitration as private dispute settle-
ment. The starting point with regard to public access to hearings is the opposite of that of 
the public law sphere. Arbitral proceedings are private; there is no right of access to anyone 
but the parties. Even if an implied notion of general confidentiality in international arbitra-
tion may no longer be taken for granted, the privacy of hearings remains a more or less 
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undisputed concept,
326
 with some commentators highlighting private proceedings as a “uni-
formly recognized standard” of international arbitration.327 
 
Against this background the question becomes, is the issue of privacy fundamentally dif-
ferent in the context of investment arbitration? Does the principle of privacy comprise in-
vestor-state disputes as well? The answer is, in short, yes. The majority of the arbitration 
regimes subject to this study do not separate between investment and commercial arbitra-
tion on the issue of access to hearings. Indeed, these frameworks do not separate between 
investor-state disputes and purely private disputes in general. Even though many have ar-
gued for the public or administrative law character of investment arbitration,
328
 such per-
spectives are not reflected in the rules. They all contain binding rules on the private nature 
of the arbitral procedure, affirming the traditional position in commercial arbitration. As 
expressed by UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2010), Article 28 (3): “Hearings shall be in 
camera unless the parties agree otherwise.”329 The arbitration rules of the PCA, SCC, ICC 
and LCIA all contain identical or highly similar provisions.
330
 Consequently, tribunals un-
der these rules do not have the authority to conduct public hearings without the consent of 
the parties or investment treaty provisions providing for public hearings. They have no dis-
cretionary authority on the matter. As we shall see, this also applies to the regimes applica-
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ble to investment disputes only, namely ICSID, ICSID Additional Facility. The current 
rules of these regimes do not significantly expand the authority of tribunals with regard to 
access to hearings. 
3.4.2 ICSID Revision: Attempted Reform? 
ICSID and the accompanying Additional Facility provide a differently designed rule on the 
issue of non-party access to arbitral hearings. Originally, article 32, paragraph 2 of the IC-
SID Arbitration Rules left to the tribunal to decide the issue of non-party access to hear-
ings, but only “with the consent of the parties”.331 The Additional Facility Arbitration Rules 
contained the identical rule in article 39, paragraph 2. Thus, despite the somewhat broader 
discretionary powers bestowed upon tribunals by the provision, ICSID proceedings were 
effectively subject to the same “in camera unless otherwise agreed”-rule as most arbitration 
regimes. 
 
In 2004, in order to respond to increased demands for transparency in investment arbitra-
tion, ICSID initiated a process of revising its arbitration rules.
332
 Early on, the proposed 
revisions included giving ICSID tribunals the authority to conduct open hearings even in 
the absence of party consent. According to the original proposal, tribunals “[a]fter consulta-
tion with the Secretary-General and with the parties as far as possible … may allow other 
persons, besides the parties, their agents, counsel and advocates, witnesses and experts dur-
ing their testimony, and officers of the Tribunal, to attend or observe all or part of the hear-
ings.” To introduce a rule depriving the disputing parties of the final word on the privacy 
issue would have constituted a significant departure from arbitral tradition. It was perhaps 
to be expected, then, when the proposal failed to get the necessary majority of votes in the 
ICSID Administrative Council,
333
 which instead opted for a rule according to which a tri-
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bunal may decide to conduct open hearings, but only “unless either party objects”.334 The 
same changes were made in the Additional Facility Arbitration Rules, Article 39 (2). The 
only material difference of note between the original and the revised rules is that instead of 
the tribunal having to actively seek the consent of the parties, i.e. a duty to act, under the 
current rules the tribunal may decide to open up hearings on its own, and it is up to the par-
ties to protest the decision. The change is one from a “consent rule” to a “veto rule”.335 
Other than being a kind of encouragement of tribunal discretionary action, in vesting in 
tribunals the power to single-handedly approach the issue, the revision has no real effect on 
the balance of power between parties and tribunal, and can hardly be seen as anything but 
minor. The privacy of the proceedings still lies firmly in the hands of the parties. 
3.4.3 Tribunal Practice on Hearings 
As a consequence of the strict privacy rules, one has only seen public hearings in invest-
ment disputes where the parties have so agreed. The position of tribunals on this point was 
clearly expressed in relation to ICSID Arbitration Rule 32, paragraph 2, by the ICSID Tri-
bunal in the Suez-Vivendi-arbitration:  
 
“Rule 32 (2) is clear that no other persons, except those specifically named in the 
Rule, may attend hearings unless both Claimants and Respondent affirmatively 
agree to the attendance of those persons … Although the Tribunal, as the Petition 
asserts, does have certain inherent powers with respect to arbitral procedure, it has 
no authority to exercise such power in opposition to a clear directive in the Arbi-
tration Rules, which both Claimants and Respondent have agreed will govern the 
issue … The crucial element of consent by both parties to the dispute is absent in 
this case.”336  
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With regard to the corresponding privacy rule in the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Article 
28 (3) (Article 25 (4) in the 1976-version of the rules), several tribunals operating under 
NAFTA Chapter 11 have plainly expressed the same view.
337
 
 
In light of the lack of ambiguity in the applicable rules, and the unwillingness of tribunals 
to attempt to extend their procedural powers through the erosion of the privacy principle, it 
is very unlikely that investment tribunals will contribute to a general opening up of arbitra-
tion proceedings in the near future. This would involve a fundamental redefinition of the 
way investment tribunals relate to the greater, established system and principles of interna-
tional arbitration. For the time being, the issue is one for the parties to agree upon, or states 
to expressly regulate in treaties. As long as a treaty simply refers the issue to the applicable 
rules, the treaty parties, as such, have no influence in the matter. The issue lies fully with 
the disputing parties. 
 
However, the rigidity of the current system does not mean that there has been no develop-
ment with regard to the openness of investment arbitration proceedings.
338
 As we recall, 
since 2004 the NAFTA parties have all committed themselves to consent to public hearings 
in Chapter 11 arbitrations. Consequently, most Chapter 11 hearings are now open to the 
public.
339
 Open hearings in Chapter 11 proceedings established under ICSID Additional 
Facility are usually supported by the facilities of ICSID in Washington. Hearings in Chap-
ter 11 proceedings under UNCITRAL rules are usually either supported by ICSID or the 
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offices of the PCA. Where open hearings are agreed upon, it is these institutions in cooper-
ation with the tribunals that provide the necessary logistical arrangements. The latest logis-
tical development is webcasting of arbitral proceedings. Webcasting has significant transpar-
ency advantages compared to closed-circuit broadcasting. In popularizing access to hearings, one 
largely alleviates the abovementioned problems related to the capacity of localities, geographical 
distance and to a certain degree also socio-economical distance to proceedings. The first invest-
ment arbitration featuring webcasted public hearings was the Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Re-
public of El Salvador case (“Pac Rim”), established under ICSID rules on the basis of the 
CAFTA–DR FTA.340 The hearings took place in May 2010.341 In 2011, the procedure was 
repeated in the Railroad Development Corporation v. Republic of Guatemala and Com-
merce Group Corp. and San Sebastian Gold Mines, Inc. v. Republic of El Salvador, both 
cases taking place within the same treaty and institutional framework as the Pac Rim 
case.
342
 Furthermore, in November 2013, the hearings in the NAFTA arbitration Bilcon v. 
Canada, conducted according to UNCITRAL rules under the auspices of the PCA, were 
webcasted from the headquarters of the PCA in The Hague.
343
 This is the first PCA admin-
istered public webcast in investment arbitration known to this writer. 
 
Outside the context of the NAFTA, CAFTA-DR and other treaties providing for public 
hearings under which there is available case law, it is unclear how many ICSID arbitrations 
have featured open hearings.
344
 Similarly, the relative lack of transparency of the other ar-
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bitration regimes under review makes it difficult to ascertain the extent to which open hear-
ings have been held. The assumption, considering the tradition of privacy, would be that 
few proceedings under other regimes have been open to the public. 
 
Against this background, it is difficult to make qualified predictions with regard to whether 
public hearings will be increasingly common in investment arbitration in the future. As 
noted above, such a development is not likely to be initiated by tribunals, and the number 
of treaties providing for mandatory public hearings is relatively low. What then, about the 
parties themselves? Are there notable pressures and forces currently working upon inves-
tors and states that may lead to a change in perspective on privacy in arbitration? The 
NAFTA-development may indicate that such forces are at work. As noted in section 2.2, 
the NAFTA does not make public hearings mandatory. Nevertheless, a large number, if not 
the majority, of Chapter 11 arbitrations have been open since the member states committed 
themselves to consent to public hearings. This implies that disputing investors, when con-
fronted with forces in favor of transparency, may reach different conclusions than when 
operating within a climate where privacy of proceedings is taken for granted. This is per-
haps no fundamental insight. Nevertheless, it may support increased activity of pro-
publicity states and third parties with regard to changing the status quo. If confronted with 
a multifaceted set of forces in favor of transparency, both internal, i.e. the state party, and 
external, i.e. interested third parties, the general public, media etc., an investor may con-
clude that privacy is no longer necessarily in his/her interest. However, such a scenario 
presupposes a certain level of transparency, e.g. the public registration of the initiation of 
the dispute, as external pressure is more likely to be present if the existence of the dispute 
is known to other actors than the parties and the tribunal. 
 
One should not take for granted that all investors will be against opening the physical pro-
ceedings. On the contrary, in light of the legitimacy debate and the generally low level of 
understanding and awareness of investment law among the general populace, one could 
argue that it is in fact in the interest of both investors and states to allow access to the pro-
ceedings, as a way of showing what these types of disputes are really about. Through show-
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ing a willingness to shed light on the workings of investment dispute settlement, as well as 
on the subject matter of the dispute, the disputing parties may in fact strengthen the legiti-
macy of the system. As such, public hearings could potentially contribute to increased le-
gitimacy in two different, although related, ways. On the one hand, open hearings, in in-
creasing the transparency of the dispute by making it, in principle, accessible by anyone, 
heightens the legitimacy of the investment arbitration system. On the other hand, increased 
public knowledge and understanding of investment arbitration and the grounds upon which 
the system is based, could itself lead to strengthened legitimacy. 
 
3.5 Third-Party Participation and the issue of Amicus curiae submissions 
3.5.1 The Topic and the Development 
Investment disputes fairly often raise public interest issues. For various reasons, these in-
terests are not always brought to the tribunal’s attention by the disputing parties. This raises 
the question of whether non-disputing parties should be allowed to represent such interests 
and perspectives in arbitral proceedings.
345
 The discussion of third-party, or amicus curiae, 
participation in investment arbitration has been conducted against the background of this 
question. It has never been an issue of providing third parties with full legal standing in 
investment disputes.
346
 Rather, its primary focus has been the authority of tribunals to ac-
cept submissions on factual or legal issues relevant to the cases in question. By now, tribu-
nals’ authority to accept such submissions is fairly well-established in both case law and 
central institutional frameworks, to the extent that “it is almost presumed that investment 
tribunals have the authority to permit amici curiae participation.”347 Additionally, most 
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treaty regimes providing comprehensive procedural transparency include provisions on 
third-party participation. Therefore, I see no need to discuss these developments at length. 
However, there are remaining issues of interest pertaining to amicus curiae in investment 
arbitration. One such issue is the question of access to information and documents. The 
primary question of interest here is what limits apply to tribunal authority to release or or-
der the release of documents for this purpose. 
 
A quick recapitulation of the development is appropriate. Initially, the issue of amicus curi-
ae participation was not referenced in any of the arbitral rules commonly applicable to in-
vestment disputes. Consequently, the question of tribunal authority to allow submissions 
had to be answered on the basis of the rules concerning the power of tribunals to determine 
issues of procedure, e.g. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976), Article 15 (1)
348
 and ICSID 
Convention Article 44.
349
 In 2001, the Methanex Tribunal became the first investment tri-
bunal to accept amicus submissions.
350
 Following the Methanex decision, the Tribunal in 
UPS reached the same conclusion in October 2001,
351
 and, as we recall, the NAFTA FTC 
later echoed the two Chapter 11 Tribunals by issuing its Statement of Non-Disputing Party 
Participation.
352
 In the context of ICSID, the first Tribunal to assert tribunal authority on 
amicus participation was the Suez-Vivendi Tribunal, in May 2005.
353
 The revision of the 
ICSID Rules in 2006 constituted a formal acceptance of the Suez-Vivendi Tribunal’s deci-
sion.
354
 Both the Arbitration Rules and the Additional Facility Rules now explicitly states 
that “[a]fter consulting both parties, the Tribunal may allow a person or entity that is not a 
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party to the dispute … to file a written submission … regarding a matter within the scope 
of the dispute.”355 
 
3.5.2 Amicus Access to Procedural Documents 
In light of the authority of tribunals to accept amicus briefs, the question arises whether this 
authority also extends to make documents available to the public. The issue must be distin-
guished from the question of whether parties are free to unilaterally disclose procedural 
documents and information to third parties or the general public.
356
 With regard to the 
question of document access for amicus, it is rather a question of whether tribunals may 
order the release of documents to third-parties. The argument in favour of such disclosure 
is that increased access to information on the dispute and the proceedings is likely to lead 
to submissions of a higher quality, thus better equipped to be of use to the tribunal.
357
 
 
As is the case with other questions concerning transparency of procedural documents, the 
applicable rules are silent. Case law on the matter differs. Tribunals have generally been 
unwilling to grant document access without party consent, but the grounds on which access 
have been denied varies. In the Methanex decision, the petitioners request for full document 
access was eventually denied on the grounds of the parties’ confidentiality order, which 
restricted publication to certain selected documents.
358
 The Tribunal nonetheless empha-
sized that “as amici has no rights under Chapter 11 of NAFTA to receive any materials 
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generated within the arbitration … they are to be treated by the Tribunals as any other 
member of the public.”359 The UPS Tribunal expressed the view that  
 
“[u]nder Chapter 11 and the UNCITRAL Rules provision is made for the commu-
nication of pleadings, documents and evidence to the other disputing party, the 
other NAFTA Parties, the Tribunal and the Secretariat – and to no one else.”360  
 
In absence of agreement between the parties sanctioning the release of documents, the Tri-
bunal could have no power under UNCITRAL Rule 15 (1) to provide document access to 
third parties by a general ruling.
361
 In 2013, the Chapter 11 Tribunal in Detroit Bridge,
362
 
when setting out the conditions for the filing of amicus briefs, echoed these older state-
ments by stating that  
 
“[a]micus curiae have no standing in the arbitration, and will have no special ac-
cess to documents filed in the arbitration, different from any other member of the 
public. Their briefs must be limited to argument, and may not introduce new evi-
dence.”363  
 
The 2001 FTC Notes of Interpretation applied in Detroit Bridge.
364
 Consequently, almost 
all procedural documents would be made available to the public over the course of the dis-
pute. One may ask why the Tribunal felt the need to so clearly express that potential amici 
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would be treated like the general public, especially before any petitions were made. How-
ever, the position is not surprising. The statement is fully in line with the view expressed in 
UPS and Methanex, as well as, significantly, the recommended procedure set out in the 
2003 FTC Statement on amici, which states that “[a]ccess to documents by non-disputing 
parties that file applications under these procedures will be governed by the FTC’s Note of 
July 31, 2001.”365 It is relatively unsurprising that an egalitarian approach is valued in the 
transparent NAFTA regime. The solution maintains a strict separation between parties and 
non-parties with regard to document transparency, which is likely to relieve tribunals and 
parties from having to relate to specific requests for information from third-parties seeking 
participation as amicus. Simultaneously, the general level of transparency is very high. 
 
In the context of the ICSID, case law on the issue of amicus’ rights of document access has 
been less categorical. The Suez-Vivendi Tribunal recognized that the issue raised “difficult 
and delicate questions because of certain constraints” in the ICSID rules and case law but 
did not go into detail on the matter as the petitioners in question were not yet accepted as 
amici, and the “purpose in seeking access to the record is to enable a nonparty to act as 
amicus curiae in a meaningful way.”366 Consequently, until amicus status was eventually 
granted, there would be no question of access to documents. However, the last quoted pas-
sage seemed to open up the possibility of granting access to documents if this would entail 
meaningful participation. 
 
The petitioners later applied for and were granted amicus status.
367
 However, they were 
denied document access on the grounds that they already had sufficient information to 
meaningfully act as amici. This information was attained from sources other than the Tri-
                                                 
 
365
 NAFTA Free Trade Commission, Statement on Non-Disputing Party Participation (7 October 2003), Sec-
tion B, paragraph 10. 
366
 Suez-Vivendi, Order on Amicus, paragraph 30–31. 
367
 Suez-Vivendi, Order in Response to a Petition by Five Non-Governmental Organizations for Permission to 
make an amicus curiae Submission, 12 February 2007. 
111 
 
bunal and the parties, and in addition the Tribunal’s decision on jurisdiction had been made 
available through ICSID.
368
 In the view of the Tribunal, this was sufficient for the amici “to 
provide their perspective, expertise and arguments to help the court,”369 No clarification of 
the general question of a non-party’s access to the record was made. At approximately the 
same time, the Biwater Tribunal came to a highly similar conclusion.
370
 
 
There are two known instances where ICSID tribunals have granted some right of docu-
ment access to third-parties. The first instance was the Electrabel v Hungary
371
 case, in 
which the European Commission was granted the right to make a submission as well as 
accessing some documents in accordance with ICSID Arbitration Rules, Article 37 (2).
372
 
The grounds on which the Tribunal based its decision are not known.
373
 In the other case, 
Foresti v. South Africa, the Tribunal – on the basis of the Additional Facility Arbitration 
Rules, Article 41 (3) – expressed its will that “the NDPs [non-disputing parties] must be 
allowed access to those papers submitted to the Tribunal by the parties that are necessary to 
enable the NDPs to focus their submissions upon the issues arising in the case and to see 
what positions the parties have taken on those issues.”374 The Tribunal reached its conclu-
sion bearing in mind that “NDP participation is intended to enable NDPs to give useful 
information and accompanying submissions … but is not intended to be a mechanism for 
enabling NDPs to obtain information from the Parties.”375 Furthermore, the Tribunal em-
phasized that “[w]here there is NDP participation, the Tribunal must ensure that it is both 
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effective and compatible with the rights of the Parties and the fairness and efficiency of the 
Arbitral process.”376 While brief, the reasoning of the Tribunal operationalizes the guide-
lines in Additional Facility Arbitration Rule 41 (3) and expands on the previous ICSID 
practice on the issue.   
 
The decision responds to the criticism that the purpose of amicus participation is undercut 
if amici are not provided with the proper tools to meaningfully participate.
377
 And the dis-
semination of relevant information to amicus is well in line with the broader issue of secur-
ing public interest representation in investment arbitration. However, the decision is viewed 
less favorably from the perspective of Tribunal obligations of confidentiality in relation to 
the parties. While there are no rules in the ICSID Additional Facility Rules
378
 expressly 
stating that Tribunals cannot make procedural documents public, there is a framework of 
rules concerning the authority of the ICISD and tribunals to make information and docu-
ments publicly available indicating that tribunals should approach the issue of document 
transparency with caution.
379
 While tribunals, as pointed out by the Foresti Tribunal, 
should have a view to fulfill the object and purpose of amicus participation as expressed in 
Additional Facility Arbitration Rule 41 (3) (and ICISD Arbitration Rules 37 (2)), and keep 
in mind the public interests at play,
380
 the fact remains that these provisions do not make 
reference to document access. Therefore, release of documents by tribunals themselves in 
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the absence of clear rules remains a delicate issue.
381
 While there is no general duty of con-
fidentiality in investment arbitration, the freedom (within limits) to release documents lies 
with the parties, and if there is danger of publication interfering with the rights of the other 
party, then the latter may go to the tribunal and ask for the necessary procedural steps to be 
taken. But when the tribunal itself is releasing or ordering the release of documents to non-
parties, there is no recourse to procedural orders or measures. Potentially, the release of 
documents on the basis of amicus provisions in the ICSID framework may thus create an 
imbalance in the relationship between the parties and the Tribunal. It is not clear how such 
document release relates to the commandment that submission shall not “burden or unfairly 
prejudice either party”.382 It should be kept in mind that the Foresti case involved highly 
delicate issues concerning the relation between South African “Black Economic Empow-
erment” legislation and the conditions for granting of mining licenses. As such, there was a 
significant public interest in the case, which is likely to have influenced the tribunal. The 
few known cases in which amici have been granted document access indicates that tribu-
nals are still trying to find a comfortable position on the issue. 
 
The parallel development in NAFTA and ICISD arbitration illustrate the interrelatedness of 
transparency and participation issues. In the context of ICISD arbitration on the basis of 
treaties which do not regulate procedural transparency, there is a tension between effective 
amicus participation and confidentiality following from the lack of rules on document 
transparency, which is less acute in the context of the NAFTA, where document transpar-
ency on the basis of the 2001 FTC statement has become the rule. In proceedings under the 
latter regime, third-parties will not have the same need for specific access, as the large ma-
jority of procedural documents routinely enter the public domain. In ICISD proceedings, on 
the other hand, depending on the circumstances and the position of the parties, there may 
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be no more publicly known information than what is publicly registered with ICSID. 
Granting document access to third-parties participating under amicus provisions therefore 
may secure the level of transparency necessary to facilitate meaningful submissions, which 
in turn may lead to perspectives on the wider public interests being brought to the attention 
of tribunals.   
3.6 The Issue of Public Access to Final Awards 
All the application rules subject to this study contain express rules on the conditions for 
publication of final awards. UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (2012), Article 34 (5) expresses 
the basic principle:  
 
“An award may be made public with the consent of all parties, or where and to the 
extent disclosure is required of a party by legal duty, to protect or pursue a legal 
right or in relation to legal proceedings before a court of other competent authori-
ty.” 
 
The PCA Rules contain an identical provision.
383
 The LCIA Rules, as we recall, are more 
severe, placing strict confidentiality obligations upon the parties and tribunals, including 
confidentiality of awards.
384
 The SCC Rules place the responsibility with tribunals to 
“maintain the confidentiality of the arbitration and the award”, unless the parties agree oth-
erwise.
385
 It is not immediately clear whether this gives tribunals under the SCC the author-
ity to “maintain” confidentiality by prematurely ordering final awards not to be pub-
lished.
386
 In any case, it is unclear how and under what circumstances such an authority is 
to be executed. In the absence of tribunal orders, however, one may assume that the parties 
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may unilaterally disclose an award.
387
 With regard to IIC Rules, Article 34 (2) forbids a 
tribunal to release copies of the award to anyone but the parties. Notably, the provision 
does not address the parties. As such, parties seem to have a “right to transparency” with 
regard to awards.
388
 
 
Under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility the parties are considered 
to have a right to unilaterally disclose final awards, in the absence of agreement to the con-
trary.
389
 Many ICISD awards today end up in the public domain by way of the parties.
390
 
On the other hand, the rules do prohibit ICSID from publishing the award without the con-
sent of the parties.
391
 However, ICSID have an unreserved right to publish “excerpts of the 
legal reasoning of the Tribunal”.392 In a similar fashion, the ICC publishes redacted extracts 
of selected awards. This practice does not seem to have a specific basis in the rules.
393
 Par-
ty consent is generally not obtained, but objections are respected.
394
 
 
Given that the final awards are rendered at the conclusion of the case, procedural decisions 
explicitly concerning publication of final awards do not occur. Disputes concerning the 
level of transparency of proceedings rarely concentrate on awards. The issue is usually not-
ed in confidentiality orders, but often only with reference to the applicable rules or eventual 
agreement between the parties.
395
 As highlighted by the Biwater Tribunal, the tensions be-
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tween interests in transparency and procedural integrity are significant primarily while pro-
ceedings are pending.
396
 This does not mean that a party may no longer have a legitimate 
interest in keeping the awards confidential. However, it serves to explain why the issue is 
rarely put before tribunals. In any case, given that the different applicable rules is interpret-
ed to either give parties a right to unilateral disclosure or establish confidentiality as the 
rule in absence of contrary agreement, there is no space available for procedural discretion 
on the matter. Should the issue prematurely arise during proceedings, a tribunal established 
under rules establishing default confidentiality of awards will have to make an according 
order. If the tribunal is established under ICSID, or even ICC, there will be no basis on 
which to base a confidentiality order. 
  
The public availability of final awards raises interesting questions with regard to the devel-
opment of consistent arbitral practice and the evolution of investment law, as well as 
broader issues of public interest and transparency. However, it would go beyond the scope 
of the present study to address these matters. 
3.7 UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
 
In July 2013, after several years in the making, the UNCITRAL Commission adopted the 
UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-Sate Arbitration (“UN-
CITRAL Transparency Rules”).397 The rules, which will be effective as of 1 April 2014, 
constitute the first example of comprehensive mandatory transparency regulation as part of 
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ad-hoc or institutional rules applicable to investment treaty arbitration. In this section, I will 
provide an overview of the rules, and briefly address certain perspectives on how they may 
relate to some of the matters discussed in this study. A thorough analysis of issues pertain-
ing to interpretation and application of the new rules should be the focus of a separate 
study. 
 
The Rules cover all the essential transparency categories. As the provisions to a large de-
gree mirror similar provisions and arrangements in transparent treaty regimes, a quick 
enumeration should do. Article 2 cf. Article 8, provides for the prompt publication the 
name of the disputing parties, the economic sector involved and the treaty providing the 
basis for the dispute. Article 3 provides for the timely publication of all procedural docu-
ments, subject to the redaction of confidential information in accordance with Article 7.
398
 
Respectively, articles 4 and 5 concern submissions by third persons and non-disputing trea-
ty parties. Article 6 provides for public hearings. Article 7 contains grounds and procedures 
for the designation of information and documents as confidential.
399
 The rules are mandato-
ry.
400
 
 
Article 7 (6) and (7) is of special interest for the present purposes. According to paragraph 
(6), information determined to “jeopardise the integrity of the arbitral procedure” in ac-
cordance with paragraph (7) shall be exempted from publication. The wording raises the 
question of how the provision relates to previous case law concerning the “integrity” of the 
arbitral procedure.
401
 If interpreted in line with case law, the provision would stand in dan-
ger of undercutting the whole purpose of the rules, by granting tribunals a wide discretion-
ary margin when deciding on transparency. However, according to paragraph (7), there will 
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only be question of jeopardy to proceedings where publication “could hamper collection of 
evidence, lead to intimidation” of the different actors or other “exceptional circumstanc-
es.”402 It will be interesting to see if the narrow concept of procedural integrity expressed in 
this provision will influence tribunal approaches to the concept of procedural integrity in 
disputes in which the rules are not applied. If so, confidentiality orders of the Biwater va-
riety could in time become exceedingly rare. Such a shift in the view on what constitutes 
dangers to procedural integrity in the context of investment arbitration would perhaps rep-
resent a final acceptance of the public interest in investment disputes as basis for increased 
transparency of proceedings. However, considering the apparent resistance of tribunals to 
contribute to increased document transparency in non-transparent treaty regimes, such an 
effect is perhaps not likely. 
 
According to Article 1 (1), the rules will apply to all UNCITRAL arbitrations based in trea-
ties concluded after 1 April 2014, unless otherwise provided by the treaty. As such, states 
will have an option to provide for UNCITRAL arbitration in the IIAs without having the 
Transparency Rules applying to proceedings. With regard to older treaties, i.e. the thou-
sands of IIAs currently in force, the situation is the opposite. Under such treaty regimes, the 
treaty parties have to agree on the matter in order for the rules to apply.
403
 Alternatively the 
disputing parties may agree on their application.
404
 The UNCITRAL Commission has rec-
ognized the need for a mechanism for mass-acceptance of the rules, and UNCITRAL 
Working Group II is currently developing a convention for this purpose.
405
 The danger of 
forum shopping by investors following increasing application of the Transparency Rules is 
reduced by Article 1 (9), which provides for their application in investor-state disputes un-
der other rules. Consequently, states may agree on the application of the rules under all 
dispute settlement mechanisms available under a given treaty. 
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4 Concluding Remarks  
 
Some of those calling for the reform of investment arbitration seem to ignore the clear lim-
its on the extent of openness attainable within the system in its traditional form and shape. 
Although tribunals have contributed significantly to the opening up of investment arbitra-
tion at different junctures in time, the frameworks in which they operate have, if not neces-
sarily clear, then at least definite, limits. The final farewell to confidentiality in investment 
arbitration will not be driven by individual tribunals deciding individual cases. The push 
will not come from within.  
 
This is especially so in an environment where the large majority of the treaties providing 
the legal basis of the system are completely silent on issues pertaining to procedural trans-
parency. As we have seen, the significant developments have primarily taken place within 
the context of specific treaty regimes and, just recently, the framework of the UNCITRAL. 
This recognition fuels the idea that stakeholders wishing to fundamentally change the 
mechanisms determining the transparency of the procedure are likely to be more successful 
if focusing their efforts on reforms at the treaty or institutional level, rather than on at-
tempting to influence tribunal attitudes on the different questions raised by the transparency 
issue. This is the avenue best suited to provide clear, efficient and predictable rules on the 
matter. 
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Canada–Costa Rica FTA (signed early 2001, in force 2002)  
Chile–Malaysia FTA (2012) 
China–New Zealand FTA (in force 2008) 
Colombia–Canada FTA (2011) 
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Colombia–Chile FTA (2009) 
Colombia–EFTA FTA (2011) 
Colombia–Mexico FTA (1995) 
Colombia–Northern Triangle FTA (in force 2009) 
Colombia–United States FTA (signed 2006, in force 2012) 
COMESA Investment Agreement (in force 2007) 
Dominican Republic–Central America–United States FTA (“CAFTA-DR”, signed 2004, in 
force 2006) 
El Salvador and Honduras-the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and 
Matsu FTA (in force 2008) 
Guatemala–the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu FTA 
(2006) 
India–Malaysia FTA (in force 2011) 
Japan–Philippines FTA/EIA (2008) 
Malaysia–New Zealand FTA (in force 2010) 
Mexico–Japan FTA (in force 2005) 
Mexico–Peru FTA (in force 2012) 
North American Free Trade Agreement (in force 1994) 
Nicaragua–Taiwan FTA (in force 2008) 
Nicaragua–the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu FTA (in 
force 2008) 
Panama–Central America FTA (in force 2008) 
Panama–Chile FTA (signed 2006, in force 2008) 
Panama–the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu FTA (in 
force 2004) 
Panama–United Sates FTA (2012) 
Peru–Canada FTA (2009) 
Peru–Chile FTA (2009) 
Peru–China FTA (in force 2010) 
Peru–Costa Rica FTA (2013) 
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Peru–EFTA FTA (in force 2011) 
Peru–Japan FTA (2012) 
Peru–Panama FTA (2012) 
Peru–Republic of Korea FTA (in force 2011) 
Peru–Singapore FTA (in force 2009) 
Peru–United States FTA (in force 2009) 
Republic of Korea–Chile FTA (signed 2003, in force 2004) 
Turkey–Albania FTA (2003) 
United States–Bahrain FTA (in force 2009) 
Unites States–Chile FTA (signed 2003, in force 2004) 
United States–Israel FTA (in force 1985) 
United States–Morocco FTA (in force 2006) 
United States–Oman FTA (in force 2009) 
United States–Republic of Korea FTA (signed 2007, in force 2012) 
United States–Singapore FTA (signed 2003, in force 2004) 
 
Model Investment Agreements 
 
Austrian Model BIT (2008) 
Canadian Model FIPA (2004) 
Chinese Model BIT (Exact year of adoption unknown, presumably late 1990s) 
Colombian Model IIA (2009) 
French Model BIT (2006) 
German Model BIT (2009) 
Italian Model BIT (2003)  
The Netherlands’ Model BIT (2004) 
Norwegian Model BIT (2007) 
Russian Model BIT (2002) 
Southern African Development Community Model BIT (2012) 
United Kingdom Model IPPA (2008) 
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United States Model BIT (2012) 
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Annex 1: U.S. and Canadian Model Investment Agreements 
 
2012 United States Model BIT – Relevant Excerpts 
 
Article 28: Conduct of the Arbitration  
  
1. The disputing parties may agree on the legal place of any arbitration under the arbitral rules  
applicable under Article 24(3). If the disputing parties fail to reach agreement, the tribunal shall  
determine the place in accordance with the applicable arbitral rules, provided that the place shall  
be in the territory of a State that is a party to the New York Convention.  
  
2. The non-disputing Party may make oral and written submissions to the tribunal regarding the  
interpretation of this Treaty.  
  
3. The tribunal shall have the authority to accept and consider amicus curiae submissions from a  
person or entity that is not a disputing party.  
  
4. Without prejudice to a tribunal’s authority to address other objections as a preliminary  
question, a tribunal shall address and decide as a preliminary question any objection by the  
respondent that, as a matter of law, a claim submitted is not a claim for which an award in favor  
of the claimant may be made under Article 34.  
  
(a) Such objection shall be submitted to the tribunal as soon as possible after the  
tribunal is constituted, and in no event later than the date the tribunal fixes for the  
respondent to submit its counter-memorial (or, in the case of an amendment to the  
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notice of arbitration, the date the tribunal fixes for the respondent to submit its  
response to the amendment).   
 
(b) On receipt of an objection under this paragraph, the tribunal shall suspend any  
proceedings on the merits, establish a schedule for considering the objection  
consistent with any schedule it has established for considering any other  
preliminary question, and issue a decision or award on the objection, stating the  
grounds therefor.  
  
(c) In deciding an objection under this paragraph, the tribunal shall assume to be true  
claimant’s factual allegations in support of any claim in the notice of arbitration  
(or any amendment thereof) and, in disputes brought under the UNCITRAL  
Arbitration Rules, the statement of claim referred to in Article 20 of the  
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. The tribunal may also consider any relevant facts  
not in dispute.  
  
(d) The respondent does not waive any objection as to competence or any argument  
on the merits merely because the respondent did or did not raise an objection  
under this paragraph or make use of the expedited procedure set out in paragraph  
5.  
  
5. In the event that the respondent so requests within 45 days after the tribunal is constituted, the  
tribunal shall decide on an expedited basis an objection under paragraph 4 and any objection that  
the dispute is not within the tribunal’s competence. The tribunal shall suspend any proceedings  
on the merits and issue a decision or award on the objection(s), stating the grounds therefor, no  
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later than 150 days after the date of the request. However, if a disputing party requests a hearing,  
the tribunal may take an additional 30 days to issue the decision or award. Regardless of  
whether a hearing is requested, a tribunal may, on a showing of extraordinary cause, delay  
issuing its decision or award by an additional brief period, which may not exceed 30 days.  
  
6. When it decides a respondent’s objection under paragraph 4 or 5, the tribunal may, if  
warranted, award to the prevailing disputing party reasonable costs and attorney’s fees incurred  
in submitting or opposing the objection. In determining whether such an award is warranted, the  
tribunal shall consider whether either the claimant’s claim or the respondent’s objection was  
frivolous, and shall provide the disputing parties a reasonable opportunity to comment.  
  
7. A respondent may not assert as a defense, counterclaim, right of set-off, or for any other  
reason that the claimant has received or will receive indemnification or other compensation for  
all or part of the alleged damages pursuant to an insurance or guarantee contract.  
  
8. A tribunal may order an interim measure of protection to preserve the rights of a disputing  
party, or to ensure that the tribunal’s jurisdiction is made fully effective, including an order to  
preserve evidence in the possession or control of a disputing party or to protect the tribunal’s  
jurisdiction. A tribunal may not order attachment or enjoin the application of a measure alleged  
to constitute a breach referred to in Article 24. For purposes of this paragraph, an order includes  
a recommendation.  
   
9. (a) In any arbitration conducted under this Section, at the request of a disputing party,  
a tribunal shall, before issuing a decision or award on liability, transmit its  
proposed decision or award to the disputing parties and to the non-disputing  
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Party. Within 60 days after the tribunal transmits its proposed decision or award,  
the disputing parties may submit written comments to the tribunal concerning any  
aspect of its proposed decision or award. The tribunal shall consider any such  
comments and issue its decision or award not later than 45 days after the  
expiration of the 60-day comment period.  
  
(b) Subparagraph (a) shall not apply in any arbitration conducted pursuant to this  
Section for which an appeal has been made available pursuant to paragraph 10.  
  
10. In the event that an appellate mechanism for reviewing awards rendered by investor-State  
dispute settlement tribunals is developed in the future under other institutional arrangements, the  
Parties shall consider whether awards rendered under Article 34 should be subject to that  
appellate mechanism. The Parties shall strive to ensure that any such appellate mechanism they  
consider adopting provides for transparency of proceedings similar to the transparency  
provisions established in Article 29. 
 
Article 29: Transparency of Arbitral Proceedings  
  
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 4, the respondent shall, after receiving the following documents,  
promptly transmit them to the non-disputing Party and make them available to the public:  
  
(a) the notice of intent;  
  
(b) the notice of arbitration;  
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(c) pleadings, memorials, and briefs submitted to the tribunal by a disputing party and  
any written submissions submitted pursuant to Article 28(2) [Non-Disputing Party  
submissions] and (3) [Amicus Submissions] and Article 33 [Consolidation];  
  
(d) minutes or transcripts of hearings of the tribunal, where available; and  
  
(e) orders, awards, and decisions of the tribunal.  
  
2. The tribunal shall conduct hearings open to the public and shall determine, in consultation  
with the disputing parties, the appropriate logistical arrangements. However, any disputing party  
that intends to use information designated as protected information in a hearing shall so advise  
the tribunal. The tribunal shall make appropriate arrangements to protect the information from  
disclosure.  
  
3. Nothing in this Section requires a respondent to disclose protected information or to furnish  
or allow access to information that it may withhold in accordance with Article 18 [Essential  
Security Article] or Article 19 [Disclosure of Information Article]. 
 
4. Any protected information that is submitted to the tribunal shall be protected from disclosure  
in accordance with the following procedures:  
  
(a) Subject to subparagraph (d), neither the disputing parties nor the tribunal shall  
disclose to the non-disputing Party or to the public any protected information  
where the disputing party that provided the information clearly designates it in  
accordance with subparagraph (b);  
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(b) Any disputing party claiming that certain information constitutes protected  
information shall clearly designate the information at the time it is submitted to  
the tribunal;  
  
(c) A disputing party shall, at the time it submits a document containing information  
claimed to be protected information, submit a redacted version of the document  
that does not contain the information. Only the redacted version shall be provided  
to the non-disputing Party and made public in accordance with paragraph 1; and  
  
(d) The tribunal shall decide any objection regarding the designation of information  
claimed to be protected information. If the tribunal determines that such  
information was not properly designated, the disputing party that submitted the  
information may (i) withdraw all or part of its submission containing such  
information, or (ii) agree to resubmit complete and redacted documents with  
corrected designations in accordance with the tribunal’s determination and  
subparagraph (c). In either case, the other disputing party shall, whenever  
necessary, resubmit complete and redacted documents which either remove the  
information withdrawn under (i) by the disputing party that first submitted the  
information or redesignate the information consistent with the designation under  
(ii) of the disputing party that first submitted the information.  
  
5. Nothing in this Section requires a respondent to withhold from the public information  
required to be disclosed by its laws 
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2004 Canadian Model FIPA – Relevant Excerpts: 
 
Article 38: Public Access to Hearings and Documents  
  
1. Hearings held under this Section shall be open to the public. To the extent  
necessary to ensure the protection of confidential information, including business  
confidential information, the Tribunal may hold portions of hearings in camera.  
  
2. The Tribunal shall establish procedures for the protection of confidential  
information and appropriate logistical arrangements for open hearings, in consultation  
with the disputing parties.  
  
3. All documents submitted to, or issued by, the Tribunal shall be publicly available,  
unless the disputing parties otherwise agree, subject to the deletion of confidential  
information.  
  
4. Notwithstanding paragraph 3, any Tribunal award under this Section shall be  
publicly available, subject to the deletion of confidential information.  
  
5. A disputing party may disclose to other persons in connection with the arbitral  
proceedings such unredacted documents as it considers necessary for the preparation of  
its case, but it shall ensure that those persons protect the confidential information in such  
documents.  
  
6. The Parties may share with officials of their respective federal and sub-nationa l  
153 
 
governments all relevant unredacted documents in the course of dispute settlement under  
this Agreement, but they shall ensure that those persons protect any confidential  
information in such documents.  
  
7. As provided under Article 10(4) and (5), the Tribunal shall not require a Party to  
furnish or allow access to information the disclosure of which would impede law  
enforcement or would be contrary to the Party’s law protecting Cabinet confidences,  
personal privacy or the financial affairs and accounts of individual customers of financial  
institutions, or which it determines to be contrary to its essential security.  
  
8. To the extent that a Tribunal’s confidentiality order designates information as  
confidential and a Party’s law on access to information requires public access to that  
information, the Party’s law on access to information shall prevail. However, a Party should en-
deavour to apply its law on access to information so as to protect information  
designated confidential by the Tribunal. 
 
Article 39  
Submissions by a Non-Disputing Party 
1. Any non-disputing party that is a person of a Party, or has a significant presence  
in the territory of a Party, that wishes to file a written submission with a Tribunal (the  
“applicant”) shall apply for leave from the Tribunal to file such a submission, in  
accordance with Annex C.39. The applicant shall attach the submission to the  
application.  
 
2. The applicant shall serve the application for leave to file a non-disputing party  
submission and the submission on all disputing parties and the Tribunal.  
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3. The Tribunal shall set an appropriate date for the disputing parties to comment on  
the application for leave to file a non-disputing party submission.  
 
4. In determining whether to grant leave to file a non-disputing party submission, the  
Tribunal shall consider, among other things, the extent to which:  
  
(a) the non-disputing party submission would assist the Tribunal in the  
determination of a factual or legal issue related to the arbitration by  
bringing a perspective, particular knowledge or insight that is different  
from that of the disputing parties;  
  
(b) the non-disputing party submission would address a matter within the  
scope of the dispute;  
  
(c) the non-disputing party has a significant interest in the arbitration; and  
  
(d) there is a public interest in the subject-matter of the arbitration.  
  
5. The Tribunal shall ensure that:  
  
(a) any non-disputing party submission does not disrupt the proceedings; and  
  
(b) neither disputing party is unduly burdened or unfairly prejudiced by such  
submissions.  
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6. The Tribunal shall decide whether to grant leave to file a non-disputing party  
submission. If leave to file a non-disputing party submission is granted, the Tribunal  
shall set an appropriate date for the disputing parties to respond in writing to the non-disputing par-
ty submission. By that date, the non-disputing Party may, pursuant to Article34 (Participation by 
the Non-Disputing Party), address any issues of interpretation of this Agreement presented in the 
non-disputing party submission.  
 
7. The Tribunal that grants leave to file a non-disputing party submission is not  
required to address the submission at any point in the arbitration, nor is the non-disputing  
party that files the submission entitled to make further submissions in the arbitration.  
  
8. Access to hearings and documents by non-disputing parties that file applications  
under these procedures shall be governed by the provisions pertaining to public access to  
hearings and documents under Article 38 (Public Access to Hearings and Documents).  
 
 
Annex C.39  
Submissions by Non-Disputing Parties:  
1. The application for leave to file a non-disputing party submission shall:  
  
(a) be made in writing, dated and signed by the person filing the application,  
and include the address and other contact details of the applicant;  
  
(b) be no longer than 5 typed pages;  
  
(c) describe the applicant, including, where relevant, its membership and legal status (e.g., compa-
ny, trade association or other non-governmental organization), its general objectives, the nature of 
its activities, and any parent organization (including any organization that directly or indirectly 
controls the applicant);  
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(d) disclose whether the applicant has any affiliation, direct or indirect, with any disputing party;  
  
(e) identify any government, person or organization that has provided any financial or other assis-
tance in preparing the submission;  
  
(f) specify the nature of the interest that the applicant has in the arbitration;  
  
(g) identify the specific issues of fact or law in the arbitration that the applicant has addressed in its 
written submission;  
  
(h) explain, by reference to the factors specified in Article 39(4), why the Tribunal should accept 
the submission; and  
  
(i) be made in a language of the arbitration.  
  
2. The submission filed by a non-disputing party shall:  
  
(a) be dated and signed by the person filing the submission;  
  
(b) be concise, and in no case longer than 20 typed pages, including any appendices;  
  
(c) set out a precise statement supporting the applicant’s position on the issues; and  
  
(d) only address matters within the scope of the dispute.  
 
 
157 
 
 
 
 
 
